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PREFACE
In this book, I investigate the conditions under which pre-electoral coalitions
form. In most democracies, political parties who wish to exercise executive power
are typically forced to enter some form of coalition. In effect, they can either form
a pre-electoral coalition with another party (or parties) prior to election in the
hopes of governing together afterward if successful at the polls, or they can com-
pete independently and hope to form a government coalition after the election.
The fact that coalition government is the norm rather than the exception across
the world has encouraged a vast coalition literature to develop in political science.
The overwhelming majority of this literature focuses purely on government coali-
tions. By contrast, electoral coalitions are virtually ignored. This lack of literature
is surprising, given that pre-electoral coalitions are common, that they affect elec-
tion outcomes, and that they have important policy and normative implications.
I redress this imbalance in our knowledge of coalitions by focusing on pre-electoral
coalitions in this book. I use a combination of methodological approaches (game
theoretic, qualitative, and quantitative) to explain why pre-electoral coalitions
form in some circumstances, but not in others.
I argue that there is a common underlying logic to the formation of pre-elec-
toral coalitions that can be captured in a simple bargaining model between party
leaders who care about office and policy. Using a two-stage bargaining game, I
derive several hypotheses relating the likelihood of pre-electoral coalition forma-
tion to institutional and ideological features of the party system. I use in-depth
qualitative analyses of electoral coalition history in France and in South Korea to
provide support for the model’s assumptions and hypotheses. I also subject the
hypotheses to a more systematic statistical analysis using a new data set on pre-
electoral coalitions in advanced industrialized democracies. I find that pre-electoral
coalitions are more likely to form between ideologically compatible parties. They
are also more likely to form when the expected coalition size is large (but not too
large) and when the potential coalition partners are similar in size. They are also
more likely to form if the party system is ideologically polarized and the electoral
rules are disproportional.
Although party leaders often form electoral coalitions to win more votes and
seats, the effects of pre-electoral coalitions do not end once the votes have been
counted and legislative seats have been allocated. After presenting my explanation
xi
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of pre-electoral coalition formation, I begin to link my analysis to the larger gov-
ernment coalition literature by showing how pre-electoral agreements affect sever-
al aspects of government coalitions in advanced industrialized democracies. I find
that pre-electoral agreements increase the likelihood that a party will enter into
government, they increase the ideological compatibility of governments, and they
increase the speed with which governments take office.
In addition to these generally positive consequences, I argue throughout the
book that pre-electoral coalitions provide an opportunity for combining the best
elements of the majoritarian vision of democracy (increased accountability, trans-
parency, government identifiability, and mandates) with the best elements of the
proportional vision of democracy (wide choice, more accurate reflection of voter
preferences in both the legislature and government). If this is a desirable goal, as I
believe it should be, then the analyses conducted in this book show that political
actors can encourage pre-electoral coalition formation by manipulating the elec-
toral rules. As I clearly indicate, though, the actual effect of this manipulation will
depend on the size of the party system and the ideological nature of political com-
petition in each country.
I maintain a website for this book. On the website you will find a detailed code-
book, as well as all the data and computer code necessary to replicate the results
and figures in this book. The current URL is http://www.fsu.edu/~polisci/
people/faculty/sgolder.htm. Please contact me if you have any comments, ques-
tions, or quibbles concerning the data or any of the analyses. It is my hope that
other scholars will pursue the study of pre-electoral coalitions and improve our
knowledge beyond what I have provided in this preliminary study—the study of
electoral coalitions provides a fertile terrain for the opportunistic researcher.
xii PREFACE
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
Prior to the 2002 German legislative election, the Social Democrats and the
Greens reached a pre-electoral agreement announcing that they intended to form
a government together if they received sufficient votes at the polls and encouraged
voters to support their coalition. In the French legislative elections a few months
earlier, the major parties on both the left and right were largely successful in form-
ing pre-electoral coalitions of their own. Doing so typically meant fielding single
candidates from the left or right in each electoral district. Yet in the French presi-
dential elections that same year, the absence of pre-electoral agreements on the left
and on the right allowed an extreme-right candidate, Jean-Marie Le Pen, into the
final round of the presidential elections, an event the world press described as “a
political earthquake.” Meanwhile, in the Dutch legislative elections, all of the
political parties ran independent electoral campaigns, and there was a great deal of
uncertainty as to the likely identity of the future coalition government up to and
immediately following the legislative elections. These empirical observations raise
the question as to why pre-electoral coalitions formed in Germany but not in the
Netherlands, and why they formed in some French elections but not others. More
generally, why do some parties coordinate their electoral strategies as part of a pre-
electoral coalition, whereas others choose to compete independently at election
time?
In most democracies, single parties are unable to command a majority of sup-
port in the legislature. Thus, political parties who wish to exercise executive power
are typically forced to enter some form of coalition. In effect, they can either form
an electoral coalition with another party (or parties) prior to an election, or they
can compete independently at election time and form a government coalition
afterwards. For the purposes of this study, ‘electoral’ or ‘pre-electoral’ coalitions are
defined fairly broadly to include cases where party leaders announce to the elec-
torate that they plan to form a government together if successful at the polls or if
they agree to run under a single name with joint lists or nomination agreements.1
1
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The common link between these situations is that parties or party leaders in a pre-
electoral coalition never compete in elections as truly independent entities. The
fact that coalition government is the norm rather than the exception across the
world has encouraged a vast literature to develop in political science. The over-
whelming majority of this theoretical and empirical literature focuses purely on
government coalitions; electoral coalitions are virtually ignored. This book seeks to
redress this imbalance in our knowledge of coalitions by focusing on pre-electoral
coalitions; specifically, it aims to explain electoral coalition formation at the
national level. Although parties may form pre-electoral coalitions for several rea-
sons, the theoretical and empirical analyses conducted in this book focus primari-
ly on electoral coalitions between parties whose goal is to enter government. By
concentrating on national-level efforts to enter government, my analyses of pre-
electoral coalition formation can be directly connected with the existing govern-
ment coalition literature.
Understanding the formation of electoral coalitions is important because (i)
they can have a considerable impact on election outcomes, government composi-
tion, and policies; (ii) they have important normative implications for the repre-
sentative nature of government; and (iii) they are quite common. Consider the fol-
lowing simple example. Imagine a legislative election with single-member districts
in which there are two blocs of parties, one on the left and one on the right. The
right-wing bloc has more electoral support than the Left. Suppose the parties on
the left form an electoral coalition and field a common candidate in each district,
but the parties on the right compete independently. The Right would most likely
lose in this situation. In this example, the possibility arises that a majority of vot-
ers could vote for a group of politicians who support similar policies and that these
politicians might still lose the election by failing to coordinate sufficiently.2 The
result is that the left-wing party is elected to implement policies that a majority of
the voters do not want. In other words, the absence of a pre-electoral coalition on
the right can have a significant impact on the election outcome, on the govern-
ment that forms, and on the policies that are likely to be implemented. Inasmuch
as one places a normative value on the basic principle that the candidate with the
most support among the electorate should be elected and should implement poli-
cy, it matters whether political elites choose electoral strategies and coalitions that
make them more or less likely to win elections.
Coalition strategies employed by political parties also have important norma-
tive implications for the representative nature of governments. Powell (2000) dis-
tinguishes between majoritarian and proportional representation visions of demo-
cratic government. In the majoritarian vision, a party with a majority or plurality
of the vote wins the election and governs the country until the next election. In
this situation, members of the electorate know that their votes directly influence
2 CHAPTER ONE
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which party exerts executive power and implements policy. In the proportional
representation vision, this is not necessarily the case, since coalition governments
often form after the votes have been counted, beyond the scrutiny of the elec-
torate. In effect, elections in proportional systems “serve primarily as devices for
electing representative agents in postelection bargaining processes, rather than as
devices for choosing a specific executive” (Huber 1996, 185). As a result, the lines
of accountability are blurred, and it is unclear how well voter preferences are
reflected in the government that is ultimately formed.
To some extent, pre-electoral coalitions can alleviate this problem by helping
voters to identify government alternatives and to register their support for one of
them. In fact, party leaders in the Netherlands, Ireland, and Germany have made
this type of argument publicly in order to explain their participation in electoral
coalitions and in an attempt to appeal to voters (Saalfeld 2000; Mitchell 1999;
Klingemann, Hofferbert, & Budge 1994; De Jong & Pijnenburg 1986). Arguably,
electoral coalitions increase democratic transparency and provide coalition gov-
ernments with as much of a mandate as single parties in majoritarian systems. In
fact, one might even say that pre-electoral coalitions provide an opportunity for
combining the best elements of the majoritarian vision of democracy (increased
accountability, transparency, government identifiability, strong mandates) with the
best elements of the proportional representation vision of democracy (wide choice,
more accurate reflection of voter preferences in the legislature). Given the impor-
tant implications for the representative nature of government, one might want to
know the conditions under which pre-electoral coalitions form.
Finally, electoral coalitions are not rare phenomena. There were 240 pre-elec-
toral coalitions between 1946 and 2002 in the 23 advanced industrialized parlia-
mentary democracies at the center of this book. Significantly, 70 (29.2%) of these
240 pre-electoral coalitions actually went on to form the government following the
election. This number would be even higher if I also counted governments that
contained electoral coalitions along with additional government partners. One
hundred seventy-four (47.8%) of the 364 legislative elections between 1946 and
2002 had at least one pre-electoral coalition. Thus, about one-fifth (19.2%) of all
the elections examined in this book produced a government that was based on a
pre-electoral agreement. Again, this number would be even higher if I counted
governments that comprised an electoral coalition along with other parties. A
recent study of formal government coalition agreements in Western European par-
liamentary democracies concluded that when all coalition cabinets were consid-
ered, many had an “identifiable coalition agreement,” and more than one-third
were written prior to the election (Strøm & Müller 2000). Naturally, this study did
not pick up all instances of electoral coalitions—it obviously omits all electoral
coalitions that did not make it into government. However, it does serve to reinforce
3INTRODUCTION
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the point that coalition bargaining often occurs prior to elections in a wide range
of countries and that a large proportion of government coalitions are based on pre-
electoral agreements. The strong empirical link found between pre-electoral and
government coalitions suggests that if we think that understanding government
coalitions is important, which the vast literature on this subject suggests is the case,
then it must logically follow that understanding pre-electoral coalitions is impor-
tant, as well.
Despite these strong reasons for studying electoral coalitions, current research
has almost nothing to say about them. Those quantitative analyses and formal
models of coalition behavior that exist are typically used to predict which govern-
ment coalition will form (Baron & Ferejohn 1989; Laver & Shepsle 1990; Austen-
Smith & Banks 1990; Baron 1991; Strøm, Budge, & Laver 1994; Diermeier &
Merlo 2004), who gets which portfolio (Warwick & Druckman 2001), how long
the formation process takes (Diermeier & van Roozendaal 1998; Martin &
Vanberg 2003), and how long the government coalition will last (King et al. 1990;
Warwick 1994; Lupia & Strøm 1995; Merlo 1997; Warwick 1999; Diermeier &
Stevenson 1999; Diermeier, Eraslan, & Merlo 2003). In other words, they focus
almost entirely on government coalitions.3 There are simply no formal models of
government coalitions that incorporate the possibility of electoral coalitions. Pre-
electoral coalitions are almost entirely absent in the quantitative literature, as well.4
Only in the case study literature do references to pre-electoral coalitions crop up
with any semblance of regularity. Even among those scholars who address electoral
coalitions here, the primary interest is not in studying the pre-election stage of
electoral competition as such; electoral coalitions are typically treated purely as an
interesting aside (Strøm, Budge, & Laver 1994; Laver & Schofield 1998; Müller
& Strøm 2000b; Strøm & Müller 2000). To this point, there has been no system-
atic, cross-national research focused on electoral coalitions.5
Given the prevalence of electoral coalitions and their potential normative and
policy implications, I believe that this lack of focused research represents a serious
omission in our knowledge of coalitions. In fact, this state of affairs has led G.
Bingham Powell to claim in the conclusion to his highly influential book, Elections
as Instruments of Democracy, that
One area that cries out for more serious theoretical and empirical work is the
appearance of announced preelectoral coalitions between political parties. We
know too little about the origins of such coalitions and about the great vari-
ety of forms (shared manifestos, withdrawal of coalition partners, recommen-
dations to voters) that they can take. But in a number of countries such coali-
tions unmistakably play a critical role at both electoral and legislative levels.
(Powell 2000, 247)
4 CHAPTER ONE
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My book begins to answer Powell’s appeal by examining the conditions under
which electoral coalitions form.
This research objective presupposes the existence of a common underlying logic
to the formation of pre-electoral coalitions. To some extent, this objective repre-
sents a new approach to analyzing these coalitions. As I mentioned earlier, the lim-
ited research that already exists on electoral coalitions is often country or election
specific. One consequence of this fact is the emphasis placed on factors that are
idiosyncratic to particular countries, elections, or party leaders. For example, the
inability of the moderate right in France to form electoral coalitions in certain elec-
tions has frequently been explained in terms of the personal animosities or plain
“stupidity” of party leaders (Bell 2000; Goldey 1999; Knapp 1999; Nay 1994).
While the country-specific research is both important and highly informative, it
does not offer us a general theory for explaining why electoral coalitions form in
some circumstances but not in others. I seek to provide such a theory here.
As with government coalition formation, the emergence of pre-electoral coali-
tions is the result of a bargaining process among party leaders. For example, party
leaders who wish to form a pre-electoral coalition must reach agreement over a
joint electoral strategy and the distribution of office benefits that might accrue to
them. This process may involve outlining a common coalition platform; deciding
which party gets to run the more powerful ministerial posts; choosing which
party’s candidates should step down in favor of candidates from their coalition
partner(s) in particular districts; or determining which leader is to become prime
minister. Clearly, any pre-electoral coalition bargaining process involves a thorny
set of distributional and ideological issues. Ultimately, party leaders must weigh
the incentives to form an electoral coalition against the incentives to run inde-
pendently.
Before elaborating on these incentives, it is worth noting that the pre-electoral
coalition formation process is not quite the same as the government coalition for-
mation process. First, electoral advantages that come from competing together as
a coalition, particularly in countries with disproportional electoral rules, will cre-
ate incentives to form an electoral coalition that are no longer relevant in the
post-election context. Put differently, forming a government coalition cannot
influence the probability of electoral victory; electoral coalitions can. Second, the
ideological compatibility constraint facing potential coalitions is likely to be
stronger prior to the election than afterwards. This likelihood is because voters
might be unwilling to vote for electoral coalitions comprising parties with incom-
patible policy preferences; after the election, parties have more leeway to enter
into these types of government coalitions, because voters are no longer such an
immediate constraint on politicians’ actions. My point here is only that it would
be a mistake to immediately assume that the factors that have been found to be
5INTRODUCTION
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important in the government coalition bargaining process will turn out to be the
same factors that shape pre-electoral coalition formation.
The logic of electoral coalition formation that I present is based on the belief
that party leaders care about winning office and policy (Müller & Strøm 1999).
Party leaders must compare the utility that they expect to receive if they competed
independently to the utility that they expect to receive if they competed as part of
an electoral coalition. Consider first the case where party i decides to run inde-
pendently. In this scenario, the party may be sufficiently successful at the polls that
it gets to enter government. If the party wins more than 50% of the seats, it could
form a government on its own. In this situation, the party would obtain all of the
office benefits associated with being in power and could set policy at its own ideal
point. Clearly, this would be the first choice for party i. However, party i will rec-
ognize that it is relatively rare for a single party to control a majority of the seats in
most parliamentary systems. If party i is to enter government, then it is much more
likely to do so as part of a government coalition. In this case, party i would receive
some utility from its share of the office benefits and would suffer some utility loss
from having government policy set at the ideal point of the coalition rather than at
its own ideal point. Naturally, the utility loss suffered by each coalition partner
would be lower the more ideologically compatible the government coalition.
Finally, party i will know that there is some probability that it will not get to enter
government if it runs independently. If this situation arises, then it will receive no
office benefits and will suffer the utility loss associated with having the government
set policy at the government ideal point and not at party i ’s ideal point. The low-
est possible utility for party i from running independently would occur if it was in
opposition and government policy was ideologically distant from its own ideal
point.
The second case is when party i decides to run as part of an electoral coalition.
Note that in order to form a pre-electoral coalition, it is likely that party i will need
to make some concessions in terms of policy and office to its potential coalition
partners. For example, it is highly unlikely that party i would get to set the coali-
tion policy exactly at its own ideal point and/or obtain all of the office benefits if
the electoral coalition entered government. These concessions are essentially the
exact same concessions that parties that run independently would have to make
when forming a government coalition after the election. Arguably, these conces-
sions may be more costly to make prior to an election than afterwards. This pos-
sibility is because any concessions that must be made to other parties in terms of
ministerial posts or coalition policies after an election can more easily be present-
ed to party members as a consequence of the votes cast by the electorate; if the
concessions occur before an election, they can only be blamed on the party lead-
ership. Given this idea, one might reasonably wonder why parties do not simply
6 CHAPTER ONE
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wait until after the election to make these concessions. Indeed, in many elections,
this is precisely what happens.
However, the key thing to note about pre-electoral coalitions is that they can
affect the probability that a party gets to enter government. Recognizing this fact,
party leaders will form a pre-electoral coalition if they think that doing so will
increase their probability of entering government to such an extent that the expect-
ed utility from forming such a coalition is larger than the expected utility from
running independently. There are several reasons why pre-electoral coalitions
might be electorally advantageous.6 First, it may be the case that an electoral coali-
tion would attract a higher number of votes or seats than the coalition parties
would jointly win running independently.7 This situation might occur if voters are
risk averse in regard to the policy positions of potential future governments; that
is, they prefer being able to identify a government alternative to being faced with
a lottery over possible government outcomes, even if the mean expected policy
position in both cases is identical. The lottery over possible government outcomes
is less desirable, because the variance in possible policy positions is greater (Enelow
& Hinich 1981; Snyder & Ting 2002; Ashworth & Bueno de Mesquita 2006). By
decreasing voter uncertainty over which government coalition might form and
thus which policy would get implemented, the parties that form a pre-electoral
coalition might attract more votes than would otherwise be the case.
Second, and probably more important, is the strong empirical evidence that
disproportional electoral institutions provide an electoral bonus to large parties or
coalitions through their mechanical effect on the translation of votes into seats
(Duverger 1963 [1954]; Lijphart 1994; Cox 1997; Clark & Golder 2006). Since
all electoral systems are disproportional to some extent, electoral coalitions may
hold out significant advantages in terms of extra legislative seats. Although we do
not yet have an entirely satisfactory model of how particular distributions of leg-
islative seats get translated into government coalitions, it seems reasonable to think
that these extra legislative seats will be positively correlated with an increased prob-
ability of being in government. If this is the case, then party leaders will have an
incentive to form pre-electoral coalitions.
To sum up, I hope to generate a wider scholarly debate about the role played
by electoral coalitions at election time. Pre-electoral coalitions are important. Not
only are they commonplace, but they also have the ability to determine electoral
and policy outcomes. They may even be preferable on normative grounds to gov-
ernment coalitions that are not based on an electoral agreement. As a result, they
deserve more attention from researchers. In the chapters that follow, I develop a
theoretical model of electoral coalition formation and expose the hypotheses that
it generates to statistical and case study analyses. In an attempt to link these analy-
ses with the existing coalition literature, I also begin to examine how the decision
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to form an electoral coalition affects various characteristics of government coali-
tions. This research represents the first attempt to formally analyze those factors
that systematically influence the emergence of pre-electoral coalitions across elec-
tions and countries. The empirical analysis also represents the first time that data
on electoral coalitions across such a large number of countries have been collected
and analyzed.
The book proceeds in the following way. In the next chapter, I discuss in more
detail how I define and identify pre-electoral coalitions. In addition to stating my
coding rules and addressing several ambiguous cases, I also describe some of the
different forms that electoral coalitions take in various countries and briefly sum-
marize the data used in the rest of the book. In chapter three, I examine two
hypotheses that are implicitly made in the existing coalition literature regarding
pre-electoral coalitions. The first states that pre-electoral coalitions should be more
common in disproportional electoral systems (Disproportionality Hypothesis).
The second hypothesis focuses on the electorate’s desire to be able to identify
future governments (Signaling Hypothesis). I test these hypotheses using data on
pre-electoral coalitions in 23 advanced industrialized parliamentary democracies
between 1946 and 2002. The data support a modified version of the
Disproportionality Hypothesis—disproportional electoral rules do encourage pre-
electoral coalition formation, but only so long as the number of parties in the sys-
tem is sufficiently large. There is no evidence for the Signaling Hypothesis.
While electoral institutions are clearly an important determinant of electoral
coalition formation, I argue in the conclusion to chapter three that the implication
in the coalition literature that pre-electoral coalitions are a simple function of elec-
toral rules is probably too reductionist. I claim that a more nuanced understand-
ing of pre-electoral coalition formation must take account of the distributional
costs in terms of policy and office benefits that arise during coalition bargaining,
as well as the potential electoral benefits. I develop a model of electoral coalition
formation that takes account of these distributional costs in chapter four. The
model is a bargaining game between two party leaders who must decide whether
to form an electoral alliance or not. I derive several implications that relate the
likelihood of pre-electoral coalition formation to various institutional and ideo-
logical features of the party system. Of the hypotheses that are generated, the most
important are that electoral coalitions are more likely when the potential coalition
partners share similar ideological preferences; when electoral institutions generate
an electoral bonus for competing as a coalition; when the party’s expected share of
office benefits from running alone decreases; when the likelihood of entering gov-
ernment after running alone decreases; and when there is an extreme opposition
and the coalition is electorally beneficial.
In the following chapter, I use a detailed investigation of electoral coalitions in
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Fifth Republic France and post-1987 South Korea to illustrate the causal process of
pre-electoral coalition formation and the plausibility of my model’s assumptions and
implications. The unusual nature of the French semi-presidential regime offers an
opportunity to examine the impact of different electoral institutions, namely legisla-
tive and presidential elections, on pre-electoral strategies while holding other coun-
try characteristics constant. Moreover, the French case provides a dramatic example
of the impact that pre-electoral coalitions (or their absence) can have on election out-
comes. The South Korean case supports the notion that there truly is an underlying
general logic of electoral coalition formation. Although France is a country in
Western Europe with a well-established democratic pedigree and South Korea is a
relatively new democracy in East Asia, similar factors play an influential role in pre-
electoral coalition formation in both countries. For example, evidence from both
South Korea and France indicate that distributional issues play a significant role in
determining the ease with which electoral coalitions form. If these issues can be
resolved, then even the most strident and long-held personal animosities among
party leaders can be overcome. The South Korean case also provides evidence that
my model of electoral coalition formation can be usefully applied to presidential
democracies.
In chapter six, I conduct a cross-national statistical analysis of the hypotheses
generated by my bargaining model using a data set containing information on
potential coalition dyads in 292 legislative elections in 20 advanced industrialized
parliamentary democracies between 1946 and 1998. The results provide strong
support for all of my hypotheses. Pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form
when parties are ideologically compatible, when the expected coalition size is large
(but not too large), and when the potential coalition partners are of similar size.
They are also more likely to form if the party system is ideologically polarized and
the electoral rules are disproportional.
In the seventh chapter, I begin to link my study of pre-electoral coalition for-
mation more directly with the existing government coalition literature by examin-
ing several aspects of the relationship between electoral and government coalitions.
I find that electoral coalitions significantly increase the likelihood that member
parties enter government; in other words, they affect the identity of government
coalitions. I also find that governments that are based on pre-electoral agreements
are not only more ideologically compatible than those that are not, but that they
also get to take office more quickly. While there are several reasons to think that
electoral coalitions might also improve government stability, I find no evidence to
support this idea. Overall, the evidence presented in this chapter indicates that the
effect of pre-electoral coalitions does not end with the counting of votes and the
allocation of legislative seats; electoral coalitions continue to affect important
aspects of the government formation process even after elections are over.
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In the conclusion, I summarize the theoretical, empirical, and methodological
contributions that my study makes to our understanding of electoral coalitions,
and I address its normative implications. I also suggest that, although this book
represents the first systematic, cross-national analysis to focus on pre-electoral
coalitions, a fruitful area of future research would be to develop a more unified
approach to government formation that simultaneously incorporates both pre-
electoral and government coalitions.
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CHAPTER TWO
Identifying 
Electoral Coalitions
The empirical study of electoral coalitions poses a particular challenge for the
researcher. While the identity of government coalitions is typically well document-
ed, the same cannot be said for pre-electoral coalitions. Put simply, it is often quite
difficult to determine which, if any, parties actually formed an electoral coalition in
a particular election, what the terms of each electoral alliance were, and how suc-
cessful electoral coalitions were at the polls. The basic problem is that electoral coali-
tions are not always listed in official election results or on electoral ballots; where they
are, they are rarely disaggregated to list their constituent parties. This situation leaves
the interested researcher scouring through the vast case study literature that analyzes
elections and party competition. The problem is magnified once one realizes that
pre-electoral coalitions have rarely been the focus of scholarly attention in these stud-
ies. These practical issues may explain why I have failed to locate a detailed database
on these coalitions and why there have been no cross-national statistical analyses
examining pre-electoral coalition formation prior to this study.1
In the appendix at the end of this book, I provide a country-by-country
description of the pre-electoral coalitions that I found in the case study literature
and the sources used to identify them. The countries include Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom from 1946 to 2002. These
countries correspond to the 23 parliamentary democracies most commonly
included in government coalition data sets (Mershon 2002). In this chapter, I dis-
cuss how I define pre-electoral coalitions and address ambiguous cases, I describe
the various forms that electoral coalitions take in different countries, and I provide
a brief overview of the data employed in the upcoming analyses.
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2.1 Defining Pre-Electoral Coalitions
How do you know a pre-electoral coalition when you see one? There is as yet no
accepted definition of electoral coalitions in the existing literature. For the pur-
poses of this book, I define a pre-electoral coalition in the following way:
Definition:—A pre-electoral coalition is a collection of parties that do not com-
pete independently in an election, either because they publicly agree to coordinate
their campaigns, run joint candidates or joint lists, or enter government together
following the election.
There are, of course, finer distinctions that can be made among the various types
of electoral coalition. For example, one might argue that coalitions composed of par-
ties with different geographic bases of support are qualitatively different from those
composed of parties that typically compete in the same districts. Given the limited
research on pre-electoral coalitions to date, though, I prefer to focus in this book on
the defining characteristic of a pre-electoral coalition—that parties do not compete
independently at election time—rather than on the various ways in which these
coalitions can be further disaggregated. The definition shown above employs two
objective and observable criteria for identifying pre-electoral coalitions.
Criterion I:—An electoral coalition must be publicly stated.
This criterion is important because one of the primary reasons for forming a
coalition prior to an election rather than afterwards is to affect voter behavior.
While the requirement that electoral coalitions be publicly stated does not neces-
sarily entail that there is an explicit written agreement between the member par-
ties, it does rule out what might be considered ‘implicit’ coalitions. For example,
an outgoing coalition government that is expected to reconstitute itself if given the
opportunity might be considered an implicit electoral coalition. The principal
problem with including such implicit coalitions in a systematic analysis is that it
relies on the subjective evaluation of the analyst as to whether the relevant parties
really are coordinating their campaign strategies or not. Moreover, there is no way
of knowing if these implicit coalitions would actually have formed the expected
government coalitions if they were unsuccessful at the polls. By ruling out these
implicit coalitions, I minimize the probability of committing a Type II error when
classifying pre-electoral coalitions.
Criterion II:—Member parties in an electoral coalition cannot compete in elec-
tions as truly independent entities.
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This second criterion is fairly inclusive and recognizes that parties can coordi-
nate their electoral strategies in a variety of ways. For example, a coalition strategy
might entail merely announcing an intention to govern together if the coalition is
successful at the polls, as is sometimes the case in the Netherlands, or it might
involve choosing a single coalition candidate to run in each district, as is often the
case in France.
While these two criteria help identify pre-electoral coalitions in general, the
focus of this book is on national-level electoral coalitions. As a result, I also
employed the following criterion when identifying pre-electoral coalitions.
Criterion III:—The electoral coalition must be at the national level.
This third criterion means excluding electoral coalitions that compete only in a
particular region of a country. In the Spanish case, this definition means that elec-
toral coalitions such as Convergencia i Unió (Convergence and Union), Unidade
Galega, the Galician National Popular Block, the Basque Left, and Herri Batasuna
(United People) are all omitted from the upcoming analyses (Newton 1997).2 The
third criterion also means excluding several sub-national electoral coalitions in
Japan and Finland that were negotiated by local party leaders. Although parties
regularly form electoral coalitions to contest mayoral or gubernatorial elections in
Japan (Christensen 2000; Johnson 2000), I found evidence for only two national-
level electoral coalitions.3 Local party leaders do sometimes negotiate electoral
alliances in various constituencies in Finland, as well. However, “for the most part
electoral alliances have been understood simply as technical arrangements which
do not structure the bargaining situation. In Finnish elections the parties strive to
maximize their parliamentary strength, with government participation in mind;
but pre-electoral executive agreements are practically non-existent, and coalition
alternatives are not presented to the electorate” (Nousiainen 2000, 270). I found
evidence for only three national-level electoral coalitions in Finland.4 While
national-level electoral coalitions did not become commonplace until the Fifth
Republic in France, I did find evidence of sub-national coalitions in the Fourth
Republic. These sub-national coalitions are not included in the forthcoming
analyses, either.
On the whole, it was relatively easy to identify pre-electoral coalitions at the
national level using these three criteria. There were only two ambiguous cases of
electoral coalition formation in the sample of countries employed in this book.5 In
virtually every pre-electoral coalition that I found, all of the member parties explic-
itly endorsed the coalition. However, there were two Austrian elections (1986,
1995) in which the Socialist Party announced an intention to govern together with
the People’s Party. The ambiguity arises because although the People’s Party did not
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publicly reciprocate this announcement, it did not actually reject the proposed
coalition, either. I took the absence of a rejection on the part of the People’s Party
as a tacit endorsement of the proposed pre-electoral coalition. A similar situation
occurred in Ireland in 1992, when the Fine Gael leader publicly proposed a pre-
electoral coalition with Labour and the Progressive Democrats. However, in this
instance, the leader of the Labour Party immediately and publicly rejected the pro-
posed pre-electoral coalition (Mair 1999, 146). Naturally, I do not code this Irish
case as an electoral coalition. Although I code the two Austrian cases as pre-elec-
toral coalitions, I should note that my inferences in the following chapters do not
depend on this coding decision.
Using the coding rules outlined above, I found evidence of 240 pre-electoral
coalitions in the 23 parliamentary democracies studied in this book. While I have
done my best to identify all national-level electoral coalitions that formed between
1946 and 2002, I recognize that my data collection efforts are only as good as the
sources that I consulted. Given that some country experts address pre-electoral
coalitions in more detail than others, one must conclude that I may have missed
one or two electoral alliances.
2.2 Data Overview
Table 2.1 presents some basic information about the pre-electoral coalitions examined
in this book. The 240 electoral coalitions that I found competed in 364 legislative
elections between 1946 and 2002. Only Canada and Malta have had no experience
with pre-electoral coalitions at the national level. While some countries such as Japan,
the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Luxembourg have had few electoral coali-
tions, others such as Australia, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, and Portugal have had
many. In fact, pre-electoral coalitions have competed in all Australian elections,
93.3% of Germany’s elections, and 90% of Portugal’s elections. The electoral success
of pre-electoral coalitions shows considerable variation across countries, too. For
example, roughly two-thirds of the governments in Australia and France, and one-half
of German governments, have been based on pre-electoral alliances. In contrast, none
of the pre-electoral coalitions in Iceland, Japan, Luxembourg, and the United
Kingdom have ever made it into government. Pre-electoral coalitions have consis-
tently won a large percentage of the vote in countries such as Australia, Austria,
France, and Germany. On average, pre-electoral coalitions comprised 2.8 parties.
Although most electoral coalitions (62.5%) formed between two parties, some coali-
tions have been quite large. For example, the Union of the Democratic Center com-
prised fourteen parties in the 1977 Spanish elections, and the United Camp of the
Nationally Minded contained nine parties in the 1946 Greek elections.
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I should note at this point that there is a difference between the number of pre-
electoral coalitions listed in table 2.1 and the number of pre-electoral coalitions
that I am able to include in some of my upcoming analyses. This is not an issue in
the next chapter, where my empirical analysis includes all of the national-level
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Country Election 
Years
# of 
Elections
# of 
PECs
% Elections 
with PECs
% Votes 
for PECs
Govts. Based   on 
PECs Size of  PECs
# %
Australia 1946–2001 23 25 100 46.5 15 65.2 2.0
Austria 1949–2002 17 12 58.8 44.7 9 52.9 2.0
Belgium 1946–1999 18 14 61.1 8.1 1 5.6 2.2
Canada 1949–2000 17 — — — — — —
Denmark 1947–2001 22 8 36.4 3.6 1 4.5 2.1
Finland 1948–1999 15 3 20.0 6.9 1 6.7 3.3
France 1946–2002 15 23 73.3 59.7 10 66.7 3.0
Germany 1949–2002 15 19 93.3 57.9 8 53.3 2.3
Greece* 1946–2000 19 25 73.7 26.4 4 21.1 3.2
Iceland 1946–1999 17 8 47.1 6.7 0 0 2.4
Ireland 1948–2002 17 9 47.1 24.4 5 29.4 2.4
Israel 1949–1999 15 26 86.7 35.5 0 0 3.5
Italy 1948–2001 14 9 35.7 23.5 2 14.3 4.5
Japan 1947–2000 20 2 5.0 2.4 0 0 3.5
Luxembourg 1954–1999 10 3 30.0 8.5 0 0 2.0
Malta 1966–1998 8 — — — — — —
Netherlands 1946–2002 17 8 35.3 19.0 3 17.6 2.6
New Zealand 1946–2002 20 2 10.0 2.6 1 5.0 2.0
Norway 1949–2001 14 9 64.3 23.8 5 35.7 3.2
Portugal 1976–2002 10 14 90.0 24.6 2 20.0 2.6
Spain 1977–2000 8 11 87.5 3.1 1 12.5 4.4
Sweden 1948–2002 18 8 38.9 17.0 2 11.1 2.5
UK 1950–2001 15 2 13.3 3.2 0 0 2.0
TOTAL 364 240 70 2.8
Table 2.1
Descriptive Data about Pre-Electoral Coalitions (PECs) by Country
Sources: Listed in the Appendix to this book.
Notes: Table lists (i) the election years included; (ii) the number of legislative elections; (iii) the num-
ber of pre-electoral coalitions; (iv) the percentage of elections with pre-electoral coalitions; (v) the
average percentage of votes going to pre-electoral coalitions in all elections; (vi) the number and per-
centage of governments based purely on pre-electoral coalitions (no additional parties); and (vii) the
average number of parties in each pre-electoral coalition by country. 
* indicates that the years 1968–1973 are not included; — indicates that there were no pre-electoral
coalitions. 
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pre-electoral coalitions in my sample. However, it does become an issue in chap-
ters six and seven, where some of my empirical analyses require information on
the ideological position of various parties. The problem arises because my source
for information on each party’s position in the ideological space—the Campaign
Manifesto Research Group (MRG)—occasionally treats electoral coalitions as if
they were single parties (Budge et al. 2001). Since all of the pre-electoral coali-
tions in Greece and Israel are coded as single parties, I am forced to omit Greece
and Israel from my analyses in chapters six and seven. I am also forced to drop
Malta, because no Maltese party is included in the MRG data set. While a few
electoral coalitions between very small parties in other countries are also coded as
single parties, this particular data constraint may actually be appropriate for my
purposes. In practical terms, the very small size of the parties in these few cases
suggests that the goal of these pre-electoral coalitions is probably to overcome
some threshold of representation, rather than to enter government. Although my
theory itself does not require the primary goal of parties that form pre-electoral
coalitions to be entry into government, the basic theory, as I present it through-
out much of the book, is couched in terms of parties in parliamentary democra-
cies that have an interest in entering government. Thus, it is arguably appropri-
ate that the pre-electoral coalitions included in the empirical analyses conducted
in chapters six and seven are formed primarily between parties that are large
enough to realistically have an eye toward entering government. In any case, this
situation is forced upon me by the constraints of the MRG data set.
2.3 Types of Electoral Coalitions
For the purposes of this book, I distinguish between parties that compete inde-
pendently at election time (no pre-electoral coalition) and parties that do not com-
pete independently (pre-electoral coalition). As I have already stated, this seems a
useful starting point, given the limited nature of the research concerning electoral
coalitions that exists at present. However, future research might want to move
beyond this simple dichotomy and think more along the lines of a continuum of
electoral coordination, with completely separate and independent parties compet-
ing in elections at one end of the spectrum, and party mergers at the other end.
Different points on this continuum would represent different degrees of electoral
coordination. For example, parties that agree to present only one candidate per
district in a single-member district electoral system or run candidates on a joint list
under a coalition name would represent a relatively high degree of electoral coor-
dination. Parties that ask their electorates to vote for more than one member of an
electoral coalition in countries where individuals have multiple votes, or where
16 CHAPTER TWO
Golder_CH_2_2nd.qxp  6/8/2006  3:55 PM  Page 16
votes can be transferred to other parties, would represent a middling degree of elec-
toral coordination. Parties that simply announce to the electorate that they hope
to form a government coalition after the election would represent a relatively low
degree of electoral coordination. The specific form that electoral coordination
takes in a particular country is likely to depend on the electoral rules, the region-
al distribution of the party system, and other factors relating to the relative
strengths and ideological positions of different parties. Although I do not distin-
guish between these different types of electoral coalitions or different degrees of
electoral coordination in the upcoming analyses, let me briefly describe some of
the more common forms that these coalitions take in the 23 parliamentary democ-
racies at the center of this book.
2.3.1 Nomination Agreements
Nomination agreements between parties represent a relatively high level of elec-
toral coordination on my hypothetical continuum, since they involve parties
agreeing to present a coalition candidate in each district rather than each party
putting up its own candidate. Such nomination agreements are a typical form of
electoral coordination in countries with single-member districts. In France, parties
often choose to nominate a single coalition candidate in each district before the
first round of elections, or they agree to withdraw their respective candidates in
favor of a coalition candidate prior to the second round of voting. For example,
the two mainstream right parties (UDF and RPR) in France agreed to put up a
single candidate in 385 districts in the first round of the 1981 legislative elections
(Bell 2000). In contrast, electoral coalitions between the Socialist and Communist
Parties in France do not typically occur in the first round of voting; instead, the
parties nearly always agree to compete independently in the first round and then
give the best-placed candidate on the left a free-run in the second round. The two
national-level pre-electoral coalitions that have occurred in the United Kingdom
since 1946 have also involved the use of nomination agreements. In the 1980s, the
Liberal Party and the newly-formed Social Democratic Party “recognized that
competition between them would be mutually destructive . . . [As a result], they
quickly worked out an electoral pact in which constituencies were allocated
between the two parties, so that nowhere would they oppose each other.
Furthermore, they ran a joint electoral campaign, which, in turn, required some
degree of joint policy-making” (Rasmussen 1991, 168).6
Nomination agreements have also been employed at various times in Germany,
Italy, and New Zealand. During the 1950s in Germany, the Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) formed an electoral alliance with the German Party (DP), in which
it agreed not to nominate candidates in certain constituencies held by the DP in
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return for the DP’s continued support of Konrad Adenauer as Chancellor. This
electoral alliance was crucial to the DP’s ‘survival’ in the 1953 and 1957 legislative
elections (Saalfeld 2000, 39). Following the introduction of a new, mixed electoral
system, the major Italian parties grouped together into four competing electoral
cartels (Progressives, the Pact for Italy, the Freedom Pole, the Pole of Good
Government) for the 1994 legislative elections, with the goal of fielding common
candidates in each of the single-member constituencies; these same parties ran sep-
arate (or joint) lists in the more proportional upper tier (Daniels 1999, 82–84).
The only electoral coalition that formed in New Zealand prior to the adoption of
a mixed electoral system in 1996 also consisted of a nomination agreement—the
New Labour Party agreed to stand in the general seats and allow Mana Motuhake
to stand in the Maori seats for the 1990 elections.
2.3.2 Joint Lists
Joint party lists also represent a relatively high level of electoral coordination since
they involve parties agreeing to a single list of coalition candidates. Joint party
lists are quite common in Israel, where parties typically run under a new coalition
name. For example, Maki and Rakah ran as Moked (Focus) in the 1973 Israeli
legislative elections, and Labor and Mapam formed an electoral alliance known
as Maarach (Alignment) for the 1969 elections. Since Israeli parties tend to run
under joint lists when they form electoral alliances, it is often difficult to deter-
mine how many votes come from each member’s electorate. As a result, Israeli
electoral results are often reported as though the electoral coalitions were single
parties. Indeed, there are instances where scholars may describe a particular coali-
tion as “a parliamentary bloc, a combination of single parties rather than a single
party,” yet they later refer to the same coalition as if it were a single party (Akzin
1979). This confusion obviously makes it difficult for any analyst who is trying
to identify the existence of electoral coalitions in Israel.7 Somewhat interestingly,
Israeli electoral coalitions are actually treated as single parties for the purposes of
determining who is eligible to become the formateur—customarily, the ‘party’
that wins the largest number of seats in the Knesset [Israeli parliament] becomes
the formateur (Elazar 1979). For instance, the Likud coalition of the Liberals and
Herut won more votes than did the Alignment coalition of Mapam and Labor in
1977; as a result, Likud took the lead in forming the government.
Electoral coalitions based on joint lists also occur in other countries such as the
Netherlands, Portugal, and Greece. For example, the three Christian Democratic
parties in the Netherlands—the Catholic People’s Party, the Christian Historical
Union, and the Anti-Revolutionary Party—formed a joint list under the heading
of Christian Democratic Appeal for the 1977 legislative elections. These three par-
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ties later merged in 1980 into a single party, the Christian Democratic Accord
(Koole 1994; De Swaan 1982). In Portugal, the Portuguese Communist Party
formed a joint list with the small Green Party, under the heading of the Unitarian
Democratic Alliance, for the 1987 legislative elections, and the Center Social
Democrats, the Social Democrats, and the Popular Monarchist Party ran under
the single banner of the Democratic Alliance in 1979 (Cunha 1997, 36–37). In
Greece, the Christian Democrats, Communist Party-Interior, Socialist Initiative,
Socialist March, and U.D. Left formed a joint list under the heading of the
Alliance of Progress and Left-Wing Forces for the three legislative elections in
1989 and 1990.
2.3.3 Dual Ballot Instructions
A slightly lower level of electoral coordination often occurs in countries where
individuals get to cast two votes in different electoral tiers.8 In these countries, elec-
toral coalitions often take the form of party leaders telling their supporters to cast
one vote for their party, and the second vote for their coalition partner. This type
of electoral coalition occurs quite frequently in Germany, where individuals cast
one vote for a constituency candidate elected by plurality rule and a second vote
for a party list in a multi-member (regional) district. It is usually understood in the
German case that the district vote will go to the candidate from the larger coali-
tion member, and the list vote will go to the smaller partner to ensure that the
small party passes the 5% electoral threshold. For example, almost two-thirds of
the Free Democrats’ (FDP) list vote for the 1994 elections came from supporters
of its larger coalition partner, the Christian Democratic Union. “With a core sup-
port of approximately 3% of the electorate, the FDP has often relied on a sub-
stantial share of so-called ‘borrowed votes’ (Leihstimmen) to straddle the 5 per cent
threshold and secure its representation in the Bundestag” (Saalfeld 2000, 40).
Given that neither of the two largest parties in Germany seems capable of winning
an overall majority of seats on its own, the FDP has been courted as an electoral
coalition partner by both the Christian and the Social Democrats; indeed, the
FDP has formed electoral alliances with both parties over the years.
2.3.4 Vote Transfer Instructions
In countries where voters get to rank their preferences over candidates and pref-
erences are transferable, electoral coalitions often take the form of party leaders
telling their supporters to rank their own party first, and a coalition member sec-
ond. This is a relatively easy request to make of voters compared to asking them
to support a single coalition candidate, as party leaders in non-transferable 
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single-ballot systems are forced to do. These vote transfer instructions are similar
in many ways to the dual ballot instructions discussed above. For example, parties
in Australia often give individuals ‘how-to-vote’ cards outside polling stations,
with clear instructions on how to rank candidates so that the flow of preferences
will benefit the party if the party is running separately, or the coalition if a pre-
electoral agreement is in place. The National Party and the Liberals in Australia
have formed a “nearly permanent” electoral coalition that competes against the
Labour Party in every election, with the long-term understanding that if the for-
mer gains a majority, they will form a government together (Klingemann,
Hofferbert, & Budge 1994).9 Australia’s alternative-vote electoral system “gives
much scope to the political parties to control the re-direction of preferences, and
it is arguable that preferences [have] controlled the last five federal elections”
(McAllister 2003, 382).
The existence of preferential voting in Ireland’s more proportional single trans-
ferable vote system produces electoral coalitions similar to those in Australia. For
example, the electorates of Fine Gael and Labour were instructed to list their pre-
ferred party’s candidate first and their coalition partner’s candidate second when
these parties reached a pre-electoral arrangement for several elections during the
1970s and early 1980s. Irish voters pay attention to these instructions, and “[h]igh
transfer rates among parties can make all the difference to the distribution of a fair-
ly small number of seats . . . [G]iven that the Dáil [the Irish parliament] is often
delicately balanced and governments rarely enjoy sizable majorities (if they have
one at all), transfers can make or break a prospective coalition” (Mitchell 1999,
246). Perhaps because vote transfers can play such an important role in determin-
ing electoral outcomes in Ireland, the country experts who analyze Irish elections
often explicitly address whether or not parties choose to form electoral coalitions.
2.3.5 Public Commitment to Govern Together
Electoral coalitions that simply involve parties publicly announcing their inten-
tion to govern together if successful at the polls represent a relatively low level of
electoral coordination in comparison to nomination agreements, joint lists, dual
ballot instructions, and vote transfer instructions. This type of electoral coalition
occurs in many countries such as New Zealand, the Netherlands, and Germany.
For example, the Alliance and Labour Party in New Zealand formed a loose elec-
toral coalition stating that they would govern together if they won the elections
in 1999 (Vowles 2002). In the Netherlands, the Labor Party (PvdA), Liberal
Democrats (D66), and the Radical Party (PPR) formed a pre-electoral coalition
for the 1971 and 1973 Dutch elections. These three parties announced that they
would govern together if successful at the polls, even though they did not com-
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pete under a joint coalition list (Timmermans & Andeweg 2000). In Germany,
it is generally understood that the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the
Christian Social Union (CSU) will work together in parliament and govern
together if successful at the polls. Voters never actually get a chance to vote for
both parties, since the two parties run in different geographic regions—the CSU
in Bavaria, the CDU in the rest of the country. Although the CDU and CSU are
often seen as a single party, they should rightfully be considered a two-party elec-
toral coalition, because they have separate party organizations and leadership;
they also formally organize themselves as a common parliamentary bloc after each
election (Norpoth 1982; Mackie & Rose 1991; Laver & Schofield 1998; Saalfeld
2000).
Interestingly, some parties also make public commitments to not govern with
certain parties (Strøm, Budge, & Laver 1994; Hillebrand & Irwin 1999; Müller
2000; Müller & Strøm 2000b ; Narud & Strøm 2000). For example, party leaders
in Germany, Austria, Norway, and the Netherlands sometimes announce the par-
ties they will refuse to govern alongside under any circumstances, effectively rul-
ing out certain government cabinet configurations. For example, prior to the 1949
German election, the CSU stated that it would not participate in any government
with the Social Democrats or the Bavarian Party. More recently, all parties reject-
ed the possibility of forming a government with the Party of Democratic Socialism
(the former Communist party in East Germany) prior to the 1990, 1994, and
1998 elections (Saalfeld 2000, 39). A recent empirical study shows that ‘anti-coali-
tion pacts’ such as these make it more unlikely that a potential government includ-
ing these parties will form (Martin & Stevenson 2001).
2.4 Conclusion
While I have tried to make my coding rules as clear as possible, I recognize that
other scholars may prefer different coding criteria. Depending on the question
being addressed, I can imagine scholars wanting to distinguish between different
types of pre-electoral coalitions, such as those based on nomination agreements
or joint lists and those based simply on a publicly stated intention to govern
together. For the purposes of this book, I employ a fairly inclusive definition of
pre-electoral coalitions that ignores, to some extent, the variety of forms that elec-
toral coordination can take. I simply distinguish between parties that publicly
coordinate their campaign strategies at the national level (pre-electoral coalitions)
and those that do not (no pre-electoral coalitions). I believe that this is a useful
starting point for research on electoral alliances. I have no doubt that some coun-
try experts will disagree with my reading of the case study literature as it relates
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to electoral coalitions in their country of expertise. Partly for this reason, my data
and codebook are publicly available on my homepage. Analysts should feel free
to use these data to further examine the robustness of my results and to begin
analyzing the differences between the various types of electoral coalitions. Indeed,
as scholars begin to ask different questions about electoral coalitions, such dis-
tinctions will be required.
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CHAPTER THREE
Existing Theories
3.1 Existing Theories of Pre-Electoral Coalitions
While there has been little systematic investigation of pre-electoral coalitions 
to this point, it would be misleading to imply that electoral coalitions are never
mentioned in the coalition literature. In fact, if one looks carefully enough in the
coalition literature one can see that two implicit hypotheses are made regarding
pre-electoral coalition formation. The Disproportionality Hypothesis states that
pre-electoral coalitions should be more common in disproportional electoral sys-
tems. In this case, electoral coalitions are formed as a means of overcoming some
barrier of representation. The Signaling Hypothesis focuses on the electorate’s
desire to be able to identify the nature of future governments. In this case, elec-
toral coalitions act as a signaling device, indicating the likely shape of the 
post-election government coalition. While the Disproportionality Hypothesis is
predominant in the literature, the Signaling Hypothesis tends to be called upon to
explain why pre-electoral coalitions sometimes form in highly proportional elec-
toral systems. To date, neither of these hypotheses has been carefully analyzed or
tested. In this chapter I examine the theoretical underpinning of each argument in
turn, I generate testable hypotheses, and I subject them to statistical analysis using
a data set comprising all of the legislative elections between 1946 and 2002 in the
23 parliamentary democracies listed in table 2.1.
3.1.1 Disproportional Electoral Rules
By far the predominant argument in the literature is that disproportional electoral
systems encourage pre-electoral coalition formation (Shepsle & Bonchek 1997,
190–91). Strøm, Budge, & Laver (1994, 316) state, “Systems not based on PR
[proportional representation] lists tend to force parties to coalesce before elections
in order to exploit electoral economies of scale. The more disproportional the
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electoral system, the greater the incentives for preelectoral alliances.” The argu-
ment is fairly straightforward. Electoral rules that consistently benefit larger par-
ties should encourage party leaders to forge pre-electoral alliances. While the
implicit goal of pre-electoral coalition formation in this argument appears to be
to gain more seats, this need not be the main objective of party leaders. If the size
of a party in terms of legislative seats is highly correlated with being part of a gov-
ernment coalition or being chosen as formateur, then party leaders in parliamen-
tary systems could increase their chances of being in government by joining an
electoral coalition (Laver & Schofield 1998).
This book opened with an empirical puzzle: Why did pre-electoral coalitions
form prior to the 2002 legislative elections in Germany and France, but not in the
Netherlands? The disproportionality argument outlined here implies that pre-
electoral coalitions are a simple function of electoral rules. Thus, the claim would
be that pre-electoral agreements were reached in France because of the majoritari-
an nature of French electoral institutions, and that they were not reached in the
Netherlands owing to the highly proportional nature of Dutch electoral institu-
tions. Of course, the German case is slightly ambiguous, given the way its electoral
system combines majoritarian and proportional elements.
While the disproportionality argument has a great deal of intuitive appeal, it
needs to be qualified. Imagine a country with a highly disproportional electoral
system in which there is only one seat being contested (or one seat per district, the
extreme case being a presidential election). The argument as stated above, and in
the literature, suggests that pre-electoral coalitions should be quite common in this
country. However, if there were only two parties, then there would clearly be no
reason to form an electoral coalition. Except for periods of war or political crisis,
when political elites may want to form a government of national unity, one would
not expect to see electoral alliances in a two-party system. In other words, the
incentives to form a pre-electoral coalition only really exist when there are more
than two parties. The intuition from this example can be stated more generally:
disproportionality encourages pre-electoral coalition formation, but only when the
number of parties is sufficiently large. In fact, Duverger (1963 [1954], 328) made a
similar point when he said in the 1950s that “[t]he action of the simple-majority
single-ballot system is totally different according to whether it coincides with a
dualist or a multi-party system. In the first case the idea of electoral alliances is log-
ically unthinkable: if the two parties were to unite there would be only one candi-
date and the election would take on a plebiscitary character that would complete-
ly change the nature of the regime.” It is unclear why the conditional part of this
hypothesis has been dropped or forgotten in the contemporary coalition literature.
Disproportional electoral rules should only encourage electoral coalition for-
mation when the party system is sufficiently large. A vast literature exists investi-
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gating the factors that determine the size of the national party system in various
countries (Duverger 1963 [1954]; Lijphart 1994; Amorim Neto & Cox 1997;
Clark & Golder 2006). There is strong theoretical and empirical evidence that
more disproportional electoral systems are associated with fewer political parties.
It is the existence of a ‘mechanical effect’ in favor of large parties that creates incen-
tives for strategic voting on the part of voters and for strategic withdrawal on the
part of political entrepreneurs. The end result is that parties typically merge and
coalesce so as to exploit electoral economies of scale in disproportional systems.
This is precisely the same argument presented in the coalition literature for why
pre-electoral coalitions form in disproportional systems. Note that this argument
raises an interesting puzzle. If the incentives to coalesce are so great in dispropor-
tional systems, then one should not actually observe pre-electoral coalitions in
these countries; there simply will not be a sufficiently large number of independ-
ent parties. It is only when there are ‘surplus’ or ‘excess’ parties that choose to retain
their party identity in spite of the incentives created by disproportional systems
that one would expect to observe electoral coalitions.
Determining when and why some political parties will retain their separate
identities rather than merge or coalesce into a larger party is a complex question
that goes beyond the scope of this book. However, several institutions are already
known to influence how likely parties are to retain their separate identities. One
such institution is the use of fusion candidacies, where multiple parties can nom-
inate the same candidate. Fusion candidacies were employed in many US states in
the nineteenth century, and it is interesting to note that electoral alliances were
quite common between the Democratic Party and various other parties (depend-
ing on the state) at this time. Although this practice continues in New York State,
it was stopped in most other states more than a century ago. The end of fusion
candidacies contributed quite markedly to the evolution of a party system in
which the Democratic and Republican parties were the only viable parties outside
New York State (Argersinger 1980). Majority requirements are also thought to
encourage parties to retain their separate identities (Duverger 1963 [1954]).
Certain characteristics of presidential elections, such as the use of runoff proce-
dures, their temporal proximity to legislative elections, and the number of presi-
dential candidates, have also been found to influence the number of parties
(Golder 2006).
The size of the party system is also likely to be determined by the extent to
which the party system is nationalized. The Duvergerian logic outlined above
applies primarily to the district level. Although a country with single-member dis-
tricts may well be expected to have two main parties in any given district, there is
nothing to say that these parties will necessarily be the same across different dis-
tricts. Chhibber & Kollman (2004) have shown that the extent to which this local
25EXISTING THEORIES
Golder_CH_3_2nd.qxp  6/8/2006  3:56 PM  Page 25
two-party system is mirrored at the national level will depend on the relative
importance of national and sub-national governments. If the most salient political
issues are at the national level, and the national government controls most of the
economic power, the party system is likely to be highly nationalized, with strong
linkages across districts. In this case, disproportional electoral rules should lead to
few parties. However, if there are no strong linkages across districts, then the num-
ber of parties in the national legislature may be larger than what one would expect
from simply looking at the electoral rules. This idea may help to explain some
‘non-Duvergerian’ outcomes in party system size at the national level.
Although various institutions obviously influence whether there will be a ‘sur-
plus’ or ‘excess’ number of parties, these institutions themselves are not the focus
of the analysis here. They are relevant only to the extent that they create a party
system of sufficient size that parties are able to take advantage of joining a pre-
electoral coalition in order to gain office and policy benefits. Thus, the principal
point that I want to emphasize is simply that the disproportionality hypothesis
regarding pre-electoral coalitions must be conditional in nature:
Disproportionality Hypothesis:—Disproportionality increases the likelihood of
pre-electoral coalition formation only when there are a sufficiently large number
of parties.1</DT>
3.1.2 Signaling Devices
While the Disproportionality Hypothesis is predominant, a second explanation
for pre-electoral coalition formation can be discerned in the literature. In this alter-
native argument, pre-electoral coalitions are treated as signaling devices with
respect to voters. There appear to be at least three separate motives behind form-
ing an electoral coalition as a signaling device: (i) to signal that member parties can
form an effective government coalition; (ii) to signal the identity of a potential
future government as clearly as possible; and (iii) to signal the desire of political
parties to give voters a more direct role in choosing government coalitions. These
variants of the signaling argument are typically found in the case study literature
dealing with coalitions. They are often used to explain what appear to be anom-
alous cases of electoral coalition formation in highly proportional electoral sys-
tems. As such, they tend to be case-specific and rather ad hoc.
The argument that electoral coalitions send a signal to voters that member par-
ties can form an effective government coalition has been made in the case of
Ireland, Sweden, and India. Each of these countries has experienced long periods
in which a single party has dominated the executive (Fianna Fáil in Ireland, the
Social Democrats in Sweden, the Congress Party in India). Those voters who pre-
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ferred one of the smaller, opposition parties in these countries risked ‘wasting’ their
vote if they voted for this party. Opposition parties formed electoral coalitions in
these countries to signal their ability to compete effectively with the ruling party
and encourage the electorate to vote for them. In Sweden, the Social Democrats
were dominant for decades because the various opposition parties were so ideo-
logically distant from one another that they were not seen as a credible government
alternative. Eventually, the three ‘bourgeois’ parties formed electoral coalitions in
the 1970s as a signal to voters that their policy positions had sufficiently converged
that they could offer a viable governing alternative (Hancock 1998, 231–32).
Similarly, opposition parties in Ireland formed pre-electoral coalitions as a way of
signaling to voters that they were a viable alternative to Fianna Fáil (Farrell 1987,
137–38). In India, opposition parties formed an electoral coalition based on a
common anti-corruption platform to bring down the long-dominant Congress
Party (Andersen 1990, 528–30).
The argument that electoral coalitions are a device to signal the identity of
potential future government coalitions is perhaps more common. Pre-electoral
coalitions can be used to signal with whom member parties will try to form a gov-
ernment if elected. As a result, pre-electoral coalitions can be expected to offer
benefits to risk-averse voters who would rather know the identity of the post-
election coalition for sure, rather than wait for the lottery that occurs during a 
government coalition bargaining process. These benefits are likely to be quite sig-
nificant in those countries where the post-election bargaining process is very
uncertain. Some of the parties in Germany are quite explicit in their campaign
messages about the coalition government that they will form if elected. They often
tell voters to support a particular coalition by splitting their votes in the con-
stituency and party-list portions of the ballot, precisely because doing so can affect
the identity of the post-election government coalition (Roberts 1988, 317–37).
Pappi and Thurner (2002, 213) note that in “the German system, voters recognize
the realistic options for a new coalition government and the German two-vote sys-
tem offers voters an opportunity to support not only their party, but also the spe-
cific coalition advocated by their party.”
The final variant of the signaling argument is that party leaders form electoral
coalitions to signal their desire to have voters play a larger role in determining gov-
ernment coalitions. At least, this was the public justification behind the electoral
coalitions that formed in the Netherlands in the early 1970s (De Jong & Pijnenburg
1986; Andeweg 1989; Hillebrand & Irwin 1999; Rochan 1999). Coalition parties
claimed that voters would feel that the future government coalition was more legit-
imate if they knew ahead of time what they were voting for.2 Some analysts have
argued that this motivation has been important in Germany, as well. For example,
Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge (1994) state that the Free Democrats (FDP)
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and whichever of the major parties was its partner at the time benefited from
forming an electoral alliance, since they could claim to have a direct popular man-
date once in office.
If pre-electoral coalitions are to be useful as signaling devices, it must be the
case that they translate fairly accurately into the government coalitions that even-
tually form after elections. If this is not the case, then the electorate is unlikely to
continue voting for them in the future. In other words, public commitments to
form a government with another party if successful at the polls should actually be
implemented. On the whole, there seems to be strong empirical evidence to sup-
port this idea (Laver & Schofield 1998; Strøm, Budge, & Laver 1994; Martin &
Stevenson 2001). In fact, cases where members of a successful pre-electoral coali-
tion do not enter government together appear to be so unusual that they warrant
particular comment in the case study literature. Two cases that are mentioned
involve pre-electoral coalitions in Luxembourg and Norway. In Luxembourg, the
Socialist Party and the Christian Democrats formed an electoral coalition for the
1968 elections and together won 68% of the vote. Following the election,
though, the trade union affiliated with the Socialist Party prevented the party
from entering government (Dumont & Winter 2000, 405). In Norway, the three
‘bourgeois’ parties (the Conservative Party, the Christian People’s Party, and the
Center Party) formed a pre-electoral coalition for the 1981 elections and did well
enough that they were expected to form the government. However, while form-
ing the government, the parties had a disagreement over the issue of abortion,
and both the Christian People’s Party and the Center Party refused to enter 
government with the Conservatives. After supporting the minority Conservative
government for a couple of years, the Christian People’s Party and the Center
Party did eventually join the government in 1983 (Narud & Strøm 2000, 177).
I do not consider the government that formed after the election in these two cases
to be based on a pre-electoral coalition.3 Despite these two cases, it does appear
that parties that form pre-electoral coalitions do enter government together if
given the opportunity.
The three variants of the signaling story have often been developed in a case-
specific and ad hoc manner. As a result, it is difficult to delineate shared features
and generate testable claims that can easily be evaluated across different cases. The
variant of the signaling story that can most easily be generalized is the one that
focuses on the identifiability of potential future governments. The basic claim is
that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form when the identifiability of
future governments is uncertain. One only needs a measure of identifiability to be
able to test this idea. Although measures of ‘identifiability’ do exist in the litera-
ture, the creators themselves acknowledge that the measurement criteria are very
‘impressionistic’ (Strøm 1990; Powell 2000; Shugart 2001). One alternative to
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these impressionistic measures is to assume that uncertainty about the identity of
future governments is correlated with the number of potential governments that
could form. The number of potential governments is obviously an increasing func-
tion of the number of parties. This statement means that those countries with a
large number of parties should also have a high level of uncertainty as to who will
be in the next government. This line of reasoning generates the following testable
hypothesis:
Signaling Hypothesis:—Pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form when
there are a large number of parties.
3.2 Data and Model
Before specifying the model to test the Disproportionality and Signaling
Hypotheses, it is useful to first examine the unconditional disproportionality
hypothesis that is predominant in the contemporary coalition literature.
Remember that this hypothesis states that electoral coalitions will be common and
successful in disproportional systems such as those that employ a majoritarian elec-
toral formula; they should be absent or uncommon in systems that employ a pro-
portional formula (Laver & Schofield 1998; Strøm, Budge, & Laver 1994). In
table 3.1, I present information on the number of electoral coalitions that have
formed in elections using majoritarian formulas, as opposed to those that have
formed in elections using some form of proportional representation (M. Golder
2005). Majoritarian systems—plurality rule, absolute majority rule, alternative
vote, single non-transferable vote—all require the winning candidate to obtain a
plurality or majority of the vote. Although it is possible to distinguish between
proportional, multi-tier, and mixed electoral systems in my sample of countries, I
do not do so here—they are all classified as proportional systems because they
employ a proportional formula in at least one electoral tier. Table 3.1 also provides
information on the average number of pre-electoral coalitions, the average 
percentage of the vote received by these coalitions, and the average effective num-
ber of electoral parties by electoral formula. The effective number of electoral par-
ties is calculated as 1 / Svi 2, where vi is the percentage of votes won by the ith
party (Laakso & Taagepera 1979). If the unconditional hypothesis is correct, then
pre-electoral coalitions should be both significantly more frequent and more suc-
cessful in countries that employ majoritarian systems than in those using propor-
tional systems.
The evidence in table 3.1 is quite clear. Pre-electoral coalitions are just as like-
ly to form in proportional systems as in majoritarian ones. Indeed, the percentage
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of elections with pre-electoral coalitions is higher in proportional systems than in
majoritarian systems. Moreover, the average percentage of the vote won by pre-
electoral coalitions is also slightly higher in proportional systems than in majori-
tarian systems. In sum, there is very little evidence thus far in favor of the uncon-
ditional disproportionality hypothesis found in the existing coalition literature.
This outcome is exactly as I predicted earlier. Note that the average number of
electoral parties is significantly lower in majoritarian systems than in proportional
ones. By encouraging political parties to coalesce and merge, disproportional sys-
tems have fewer parties and, hence, fewer opportunities for electoral coalitions to
form. Making the disproportionality hypothesis conditional on the number of
parties was motivated precisely by the need to take account of the opportunity
structure facing individual parties. The question now is whether there is evidence
in favor of the conditional Disproportionality Hypothesis.
Up to this point, I have expressed the Disproportionality and Signaling
Hypotheses in terms of the likelihood of pre-electoral coalition formation—
whether an electoral coalition forms or not. However, the literature is slightly
ambiguous on this point, referring at different times to the likelihood that pre-
electoral coalitions will form, to the electoral success of these coalitions, and to the
relative importance of electoral coalitions. In this chapter, I test the
Disproportionality and Signaling Hypotheses using (i) the percentage of the vote
received by pre-electoral coalitions and (ii) the percentage of parties involved in a
pre-electoral coalition as dependent variables. In chapter six, I examine how the
disproportionality of the electoral system and the number of parties affect the
actual likelihood of electoral coalition formation. The results from that analysis are
qualitatively similar to those presented in this chapter, using the different depend-
ent variables just mentioned.4
The Disproportionality and Signaling Hypotheses can be tested using the fol-
lowing multiplicative interaction model:
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Table 3.1
PECs by Electoral Formula
Electoral Formula
# of Elections
with PECs      without PECs
% of Elections 
with PECs
% of Vote for 
PECs
Effective # of 
Electoral Parties
Majoritarian 37 64 37 19.8 3.2
Proportional 137 126 52 20.7 4.2
Notes: Data are based on 364 legislative elections from 1946 to 2002 in the 23 countries listed in
table 2.1. Majoritarian electoral formulas include plurality rule, absolute majority rule, the alternative
vote, and the single non-transferable vote. Proportional electoral formulas include proportional,
multi-tier, and mixed electoral systems (M. Golder 2005).
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PEC = b0 + b1Effective Threshold + b2Electoral Parties
+ b3Effective Threshold × Electoral Parties + e (3.1)
where PEC is one of the two dependent variables already mentioned. Effective
Threshold captures electoral system disproportionality and is measured using
Lijphart’s effective threshold.5 The higher the effective threshold, the more dispro-
portional the electoral system. An alternative measure of electoral system dispro-
portionality is the district magnitude. While district magnitude has long been con-
sidered the decisive factor in determining the proportionality of an electoral sys-
tem (Rae 1967; Taagepera & Shugart 1989; Cox 1997), it captures only one ele-
ment of it. In contrast, the effective threshold takes account of several aspects of
the electoral system—the district magnitude, legal thresholds, and upper-tier seats.
It is for this reason that I prefer to use the effective threshold. I should note,
though, that qualitatively similar results to those presented here are found if the
log of average district magnitude is used instead of effective thresholds. Electoral
Parties is the effective number of electoral parties. The interaction term is required
to test the conditional nature of the Disproportionality Hypothesis.
The marginal effect of Electoral Parties is
= b2 + b3Effective Threshold
According to the Signaling Hypothesis, this quantity should always be positive,
since an increase in the number of electoral parties is expected to increase both
dependent variables irrespective of the effective threshold. It follows from this idea
that b2 should be positive. The Signaling Hypothesis does not make a precise pre-
diction about b3, because it says nothing about the modifying effect of electoral
system disproportionality.
The marginal effect of Effective Threshold is
= b1 + b3Electoral Parties
The Disproportionality Hypothesis predicts that this quantity should only be pos-
itive when the number of electoral parties is sufficiently large. Since b1 indicates
the marginal effect of effective thresholds when there are no electoral parties, this
coefficient should be zero (or negative). Given that the marginal effect of effective
thresholds should be increasing as the number of parties grows, b3 should be pos-
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itive. While this theory does not provide us with a clear expectation as to when
the marginal effect of effective thresholds will become positive and significant,
the Disproportionality Hypothesis will have found little support if this never
occurs across the observed range for the number of electoral parties. The flip side
of the Disproportionality Hypothesis is that the marginal effect of electoral par-
ties should only increase the two dependent variables when the electoral system
is sufficiently disproportional. Thus, b2 should be zero (or negative), since this
coefficient indicates the marginal effect of electoral parties in highly proportion-
al systems (Effective Threshold = 0). This prediction is in direct contrast to the
Signaling Hypothesis, where b2 was expected to be positive.
I use the data described in chapter 2 to test the Disproportionality and
Signaling Hypotheses. Thus, I analyze all 364 legislative elections that took place
in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom from
1946 to 2002. The data set contains evidence of 240 pre-electoral coalitions com-
peting in 174 elections. Unfortunately, my analysis omits parties that won less
than 1% of the national vote, because official electoral statistics typically do not
list them. Descriptive statistics for the data are shown in table 3.2. The percentage
of the vote for pre-electoral coalitions ranges from zero, in elections where there
were no coalitions, to 99.12% in the 1976 German election. The 1976 German
election also had the highest percentage of parties in a pre-electoral coalition
(100%). Effective thresholds range from a low of 0.6% in Israel in 1949 to a high
of 35% in countries such as the United Kingdom with single-member districts.
The lowest effective number of electoral parties was 1.99 in the 1971 New
Zealand elections, and the highest was 10.29 in the 1999 Belgian elections.
I tested the Disproportionality and Signaling Hypotheses using a pooled analy-
sis. The reader might be concerned that the data are censored, since it is not pos-
sible to observe the electoral support for pre-electoral coalitions if no coalition
actually forms. After all, there were 190 elections with no pre-electoral coalitions.
One might be tempted to omit countries and elections where there were no pre-
electoral coalitions to avoid this censoring issue. However, doing so leads to biased
and inconsistent estimates, since those countries that have factors discouraging the
formation of pre-electoral coalitions would be systematically under-represented.
The second temptation is to include countries and elections that do not have pre-
electoral coalitions but code electoral coalition support as zero. Including these
countries and elections is wrong, since doing so also results in inconsistent esti-
mates (Wooldridge 2002, 524–25). The correct procedure would be to include all
observations, but to use a tobit model to take account of the censored nature of
the data. However, it turns out that using a tobit model in this particular case
32 CHAPTER THREE
Golder_CH_3_2nd.qxp  6/8/2006  3:56 PM  Page 32
yields almost exactly the same inferences as using straightforward ordinary least
squares (OLS). Given that interpreting the results from tobit models can be quite
complicated (Sigelman & Zeng 1999) and that my inferences are unaffected, I
prefer to report OLS results. I employed the Beck and Katz (1995) procedure for
panel-corrected standard errors to take account of panel heteroskedasticity and
contemporaneously correlated errors—this procedure would not have been possi-
ble with the tobit model.
3.3 Results and Interpretation
The results from my analysis are shown in table 3.3. Models 1 and 2 refer to the
two dependent variables that I use. Model 1 refers to the percentage of the vote
won by pre-electoral coalitions, and Model 2 refers to the percentage of parties in
a pre-electoral coalition. The first column provides a direct test of the Signaling
Hypothesis, because the effective number of electoral parties is the only variable
included. I do not show the equivalent results for the case where the dependent
variable is the percentage of parties in a pre-electoral coalition, because they are
qualitatively similar to those already shown. By including Electoral Threshold with-
out an interaction term, the second column provides yet another test of the uncon-
ditional disproportionality hypothesis. Finally, the last two columns provide a test
of the conditional Disproportionality Hypothesis by presenting results from the
full model outlined in equation (3.1).
The first column provides no support for the Signaling Hypothesis. The number
of parties in a country seems to have no significant impact on pre-electoral coali-
tions. Nor is there any evidence that an increase in the number of parties will have
any effect on the vote for pre-electoral coalitions when we control for electoral sys-
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Table 3.2
Descriptive Statistics for PECs
Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Percentage Vote for PECs 364 20.42 28.46 0 99.12
Percentage of Parties in PECs 364 22.86 27.85 0 100
Electoral Parties 364 3.90 1.42 1.99 10.29
Effective Threshold * 349 13.43 12.86 0.6 35
*Data on effective thresholds are missing for Austria (1994–2002), Belgium (1995–2002), and Greece
(1946–64).
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tem disproportionality (column 2). The results from the full model outlined in equa-
tion (3.1) also provide no support for the Signaling Hypothesis (columns 3 and 4).
The marginal effect of electoral parties on both the percentage of votes won by pre-
electoral coalitions and the percentage of parties in a pre-electoral coalition is nega-
tive in highly proportional systems, that is, when Effective Threshold = 0. This result
is in direct contrast to the Signaling Hypothesis, which predicts that this effect
should always be positive. The positive sign on the interaction coefficient does indi-
cate that this reductive effect declines as the effective threshold increases, though.
As expected, there is no evidence in support of the unconditional dispropor-
tionality hypothesis (column 2). An increase in the effective threshold appears to
have no significant effect on pre-electoral coalitions. However, there is consider-
able support for the conditional Disproportionality Hypothesis (columns 3 and
4). As predicted, the interaction term Effective Threshold × Electoral Parties is 
positive and significant in both Model 1 and Model 2. While this finding is sup-
portive of the Disproportionality Hypothesis, it should also be the case that the
marginal effect of effective thresholds is positive when the number of electoral par-
ties is sufficiently high. Although the coefficient on Effective Threshold is negative
in both models, it is important to remember that this coefficient only captures the
marginal effect of effective thresholds when there are no electoral parties
34 CHAPTER THREE
Table 3.3
Regression Results: Disproportionality vs. Signaling Hypotheses
Regressor
Signaling
(Model 1)
Unconditional 
Disproportionality 
(Model 1)
Conditional
Disproportionality
(Model 1)    (Model 2)
Electoral Parties -0.05
(1.04)
0.86
(1.40)
-3.22*
(1.76)
-1.98
(1.48)
Effective Threshold 0.17
(0.12)
-1.27***
(0.47)
-0.99***
(0.43)
Effective Threshold × Electoral Parties 0.42***
(0.14)
0.35***
(0.12)
Constant 20.68***
(4.04)
14.42**
(6.71)
30.71***
(7.89)
27.21***
(6.73)
Observations 359 344 344 344
R 2 0.000 0.005 0.051 0.043
Note: Data are based on 364 legislative elections from 1946 to 2002 in 23 parliamentary democracies.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed). Panel-corrected standard errors appear in parentheses.
Model 1: Dependent variable is the percentage of the vote won by pre-electoral coalitions.
Model 2: Dependent variable is the percentage of parties in a pre-electoral coalition.
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(Brambor, Clark, & Golder 2006). As should be obvious, this coefficient is sub-
stantively meaningless, and it is necessary to evaluate the marginal effect of effec-
tive thresholds at more realistic values for the number of electoral parties. This is
exactly what I do in figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1
The Marginal Effect of Effective Thresholds on:
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Figure 3.1 graphically illustrates the marginal effect of effective thresholds on
the percentage of the vote won by pre-electoral coalitions (the top figure) and on
the percentage of parties in a pre-electoral coalition (the bottom figure) as the
effective number of electoral parties changes. The solid, sloping lines indicate how
the marginal effect of effective thresholds (b1 + b3Electoral Parties) changes with
the effective number of electoral parties. The two-tailed 95% confidence intervals
around the lines indicate the conditions under which effective thresholds have a
significant effect—they exert a significant effect whenever the upper and lower
bounds of the confidence intervals are both above (or below) the zero line.
As predicted, effective thresholds have a positive effect on pre-electoral coali-
tions only when the number of parties is sufficiently large. Specifically, the mar-
ginal effect of effective thresholds will increase the percentage of votes for pre-
electoral coalitions when the effective number of electoral parties is greater than
3.5. It will increase the percentage of parties in a pre-electoral coalition when the
number of parties is greater than 3.4. These results are substantively meaningful,
since 48% and 56% of the sample have an effective number of electoral parties
higher than 3.5 and 3.4, respectively. Thus, the evidence clearly supports the con-
ditional Disproportionality Hypothesis that parties are more likely to be in a pre-
electoral coalition and that these coalitions are more likely to be electorally suc-
cessful in disproportional electoral systems so long as the party system is suffi-
ciently large.
3.4 Conclusion
This brief analysis represents the first attempt to formulate and test hypotheses
relating to pre-electoral coalitions using cross-national data. Specifically, it tests the
two hypotheses most commonly made (often implicitly) about pre-electoral coali-
tions in the literature—the Disproportionality and Signaling Hypotheses. The
results from a pooled analysis of pre-electoral coalitions in 23 parliamentary
democracies from 1946 to 2002 clearly support the Disproportionality
Hypothesis—parties are more likely to be in pre-electoral coalitions, and these
coalitions are more likely to be successful in countries that have a disproportional
electoral system and a large number of parties. Although the number of parties in
a country was taken as given in this analysis, I did indicate several institutions that
might encourage political parties to retain their separate identities in dispropor-
tional systems despite electoral incentives to merge or coalesce.
In contrast, there was little evidence that electoral coalitions are more likely to
form when there are many parties, so as to signal the identity of future govern-
ments to voters (Signaling Hypothesis). While the evidence in support of the
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Disproportionality Hypothesis seems clear, I believe that one should be cautious
in rejecting the Signaling Hypothesis on the basis of this analysis alone. As my ear-
lier discussion indicated, there are several versions of the Signaling Hypothesis,
and only one variant was tested here. Moreover, the proxy for the identifiability of
future governments used in this analysis was the effective number of electoral par-
ties. It may simply be the case that this is not a particularly good proxy. The fact
that countries such as the Netherlands and Israel do have a number of successful
pre-electoral coalitions despite their highly proportional electoral institutions
should make one wary of rejecting the Signaling Hypothesis too hastily.
The evidence presented in this chapter shows that electoral institutions play an
important role in explaining pre-electoral coalition formation. Though the link
between electoral rules and pre-electoral coalitions has long been suspected, this
chapter is the first to systematically analyze and find evidence for such a relation-
ship. Although this is an important step, the implication common in the coalition
literature that pre-electoral coalitions are a simple function of electoral rules is
probably too reductionist. After all, there are costs to forming pre-electoral coali-
tions. Just as government coalitions emerge out of a bargaining process between
party leaders, so do pre-electoral coalitions. Party leaders who are thinking about
forming a coalition must reach an agreement as to how they would distribute
office benefits if they come to power. For example, party leaders have to decide
which party will get to run the more powerful ministries and who is to become
prime minister or president. They may also have to decide which party should step
down in favor of the other at the district level. It is likely that these distributional
issues will be hard to resolve in some circumstances. Political parties also have to
reach agreement on a coalition policy that they would implement if successful at
the polls. The fact that parties must make concessions on office and policy may
explain why pre-electoral coalitions often fail to form, even when there appear to
be clear electoral incentives to do so. A more nuanced understanding of pre-
electoral coalition formation must take account of the distributional costs that
arise during coalition bargaining, as well as the potential electoral benefits. The
following chapter provides a formal model in which the electoral benefits of coali-
tion formation are clearly weighed against the associated distributional costs. The
analysis will show that it is only under particular conditions that pre-electoral
coalitions actually form.
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CHAPTER FOUR
A Theoretical Model
In this chapter, I present a theoretical model of pre-electoral coalition formation.
The analysis emphasizes that party leaders must carefully weigh the costs and ben-
efits associated with coordinating their pre-electoral strategies when deciding
whether to form an electoral coalition. The model provides clear predictions about
the conditions under which electoral coalitions are likely to form. The chapter is
divided into two sections. In the first, I outline the basic intuition behind the
model. In the second, I formalize this intuition and examine how particular vari-
ables affect the likelihood of electoral coalition formation.
4.1 The Intuition
Given that it is often infeasible for a single party to govern alone in most democ-
racies, party leaders are faced with a strategic choice. They can form an electoral
coalition either prior to the election or compete independently at election time
and possibly participate in government coalition bargaining afterwards. As I have
already stated, the vast majority of the coalition literature in political science
ignores the first possibility. However, the fact that one regularly observes electoral
coalitions across a broad range of countries suggests that they must offer some
form of political advantage—at least some of the time. Since electoral coalitions
do not always emerge, it must equally be true that there are costs associated with
party leaders coordinating their pre-electoral strategies. It seems natural, then, to
seek an explanation of electoral coalition formation in terms of its associated costs
and benefits. I argue that party leaders can be expected to care about policy, office,
and votes when they make decisions about whether to participate in electoral
coalitions (Müller & Strøm 1999).
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4.1.1 Office
Just as with government coalition formation, the emergence of pre-electoral coali-
tions is the result of a bargaining process among party leaders. Thus, I use a bar-
gaining model to analyze the formation of electoral coalitions (Morrow 1994;
Osborne & Rubinstein 1990). Some of the issues that concern party leaders prior
to an election are likely to be very similar to those involved in any post-election
bargaining process. In particular, party elites must decide how office benefits are
to be distributed if they win the election. It seems an obvious assumption to make
that politicians care about winning office both for its own sake and for the ability
to affect policy. Winning office allows them to enjoy the perquisites of power and
to influence policy (Downs 1957; Mayhew 1974). It follows, though, that they
also care about their place in the party or coalition hierarchy. After all, only a lim-
ited number of party members can hope to win highly visible and important
national posts. Any electoral coalition agreement must be able to overcome what
can be a complex set of distributional issues both among elites from the same party
and across elites from different parties.
These distributional issues are particularly stark if there are few offices available
to satisfy the party elites. For example, only one party leader can be the official
presidential candidate of an electoral coalition. Legislative elections might offer
party elites an easier opportunity to reach an agreement on distributional issues,
since there are multiple legislative seats and ministerial portfolios to hand out. In
other words, one might expect that the divisibility of office benefits would affect
the ease with which pre-electoral coalition agreements are reached. As will be
shown in the next chapter, it seems to be the case in French elections that parties
on both the right and the left find it easier to organize nomination agreements
prior to the first round of voting in legislative elections rather than in presidential
ones. However, even pre-electoral agreements in legislative elections can be prob-
lematic, since they raise the possibility that some candidates will be forced to step
down in favor of candidates from another party. Evidence from South Korea also
suggests that the divisibility of office benefits may be a crucial determinant of how
easy it is to reach presidential electoral coalition agreements. For example, the pres-
ence of term limits in South Korea seems to make electoral coalitions for presi-
dential elections more attractive than they might otherwise be, because the leader
of one party can throw his support behind a candidate of another party in
exchange for a promise of similar support in future elections. This promise is
deemed more credible because of the presence of term limits.
Questions of credibility and commitment become an issue in pre-electoral coali-
tion bargaining when nomination agreements are not being used. For example, party
elites in a proportional representation system might be able to reach an agreement
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on how to divide the spoils of office before an election occurs. However, there is no
concrete guarantee that one of the parties will not renege on this agreement after-
wards. A strong electoral performance by one of the coalition parties might cause it
to want to renegotiate, or even cancel, the deal. There are no third-party enforcers
for these types of agreements unless one considers the threat of future voter sanctions
to be great enough to deter parties from reneging. When nomination agreements are
employed, though, there is no obvious way for parties to renege on their commit-
ments after the election, since the constituencies have already been divided up and
the electoral campaign has already been fought. As a result, questions of commit-
ment are less pertinent when party leaders are discussing nomination agreements. As
I indicated in a previous chapter, though, it turns out that questions of credibility
and commitment are rarely a problem in practice, even when discussions of electoral
coordination do not involve nomination agreements (Strøm, Budge, & Laver 1994).
Laver and Schofield (1998, 28) note that when
the coalition formation strategies of electoral coalitions are publicly
announced—as they must be, since a more powerful legislative bargaining bloc
is precisely what electoral alliances set out to offer the electorate—then the
extent to which the alliance can subsequently be abandoned is a significant
empirical matter. Certainly, when two or more parties promise to go into gov-
ernment together if they are able, such promises tend only rarely to be broken.
It is also important to realize that political parties are engaged in repeated interac-
tions. If a coalition partner refuses to honor the terms of an electoral agreement,
then that party may find itself unable to gain electoral coalition partners in the
future. Mitchell (1999) argues that, though parties could change partners between
the pre-electoral and post-electoral stages, “they may risk credibility costs if they do
so. In practice parties that have formed electoral coalitions and offered themselves
as a government-in-waiting do tend to govern together if the numbers allow it.”1
4.1.2 Policy
While party leaders care about office benefits, it seems clear that they also bring pol-
icy concerns to the table during any electoral coalition bargaining process. In those
models of government coalition formation that include policy as a component of
the players’ utility function (Austen-Smith & Banks 1988), party leaders bargain
over the policy that they will introduce as the government coalition. Typically, the
bargaining process results in a ‘coalition policy’ that is some weighted average of the
policy ideal points of the parties in the government coalition. Obviously, such a bar-
gaining process must occur when pre-electoral agreements are made as well.
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However, policy concerns take on more significance during electoral coalition
bargaining than during government coalition bargaining, since the party leaders
do not know if they will actually get to form the government. They face the pos-
sibility that an opposition party or coalition might win the election and imple-
ment its ideal policy. This ‘opposition government’ might implement moderate or
extreme policies. I believe that the ideological position of the opposition may be
taken into account during pre-electoral coalition bargaining. In particular, I expect
that party leaders are more willing to compromise on office and policy issues if
they face an ideologically extreme opposition party with a credible expectation of
electoral success. Imagine two countries in which moderate right-wing parties are
considering whether to form an electoral coalition. In one country, the principal
opposition party is on the extreme left, and in the other it is on the center left.
Holding everything else constant, the parties on the right are likely to feel a greater
urgency to overcome bargaining conflicts in the first country compared to the sec-
ond, because they risk increasing the possibility that policy far from their ideal
point will be implemented if they fail to form an electoral coalition. Right-wing
parties faced by the center-left party may feel less obliged to compromise, since
policy will be fairly moderate regardless of the election outcome.
4.1.3 Votes
Of course, these distributional and ideological issues are moot if the pre-electoral
coalition is expected to be disadvantageous from an electoral standpoint. Party
leaders are unlikely to engage in electoral coalition bargaining if they can expect to
do as well or better by running separately at election time. There is no guarantee
that participation in an electoral alliance is going to increase the likelihood of par-
ticipating parties entering government or increasing their seat or vote shares.
Potential coalitions can either be super-additive, additive, or sub-additive. A super-
additive coalition is one in which the coalition wins more votes or seats than the
coalition members can expect to win running separately. A coalition that wins the
same number of seats is additive, whereas a coalition that wins fewer seats is sub-
additive (Kaminski 2001). Coalitions between parties with extremely disparate
policy platforms may well be sub-additive. Even if the party leaders were willing
to form a coalition, voters might reject it because one of the members supported
objectionable policies. For instance, a coalition that consisted of a small party on
the far right and a small party on the far left would have difficulty in winning the
support of either electorate if the main policy issues of the election fell along a
standard left-right issue dimension.2 I would argue that it is a fairly safe assump-
tion that party leaders will not wish to participate in electoral coalitions if they
think that such a coalition offers no significant electoral gains.3
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The extent to which a pre-electoral coalition offers gains is likely to be a function
of the electoral institutions in a given country. As the discussion in chapter three sug-
gested, disproportional electoral systems should provide larger incentives for party
leaders to reach pre-electoral agreements than proportional ones. One would expect
the electoral bonus associated with electoral coalition formation to be higher the
more disproportional the system. This line of reasoning also holds for presidential
and legislative elections. Since only one party can win the presidency, size matters.
As a result, the electoral bonus associated with forming a pre-electoral coalition in
presidential systems is likely to be larger than that associated with forming a similar
coalition in legislative elections. It is interesting to note that it is precisely where the
electoral incentives to form a coalition are highest (presidential elections) that the
distributional issues that need to be overcome are the most problematic.
Party elites often invest considerable resources in various methods to measure
the size of the electoral benefits associated with possible coalitions (Kaminski
2002). For example, party leaders sometimes employ private polling companies to
carry out surveys asking voters whether they would support particular coalition
arrangements (Kaminski 2001). Other party leaders engage in coalition experi-
ments at the regional level to evaluate the performance of particular combinations
of parties (Downs 1998). Based on these local experiences, party leaders then
decide whether these coalitions should be implemented at the national level. In
many cases, politicians often go to great lengths to determine whether an electoral
coalition is likely to offer significant electoral benefits or not.4
It is clear that party leaders’ concerns with office, policy, and votes should be
incorporated into models of pre-electoral coalition formation. The first thing to note
is that party leaders will be unwilling to form a coalition if it offers no electoral
advantage or if the coalition’s policy would be incompatible with their party’s pref-
erences. The second is that a coalition may not see the light of day even if it offers
electoral benefits; party elites still have to overcome a whole host of distributional
and policy differences. Finally, the extent to which these elites are faced with a mod-
erate or extreme opposition party may influence how willing they are to compromise
on these differences. To give this intuitive argument precise meaning, I now turn to
a more formal description of its structure and underlying assumptions.
4.2 The Model
The model is based on a standard, two-person sequential bargaining game. There
are two possible coalition partners (Party Leader A, Party Leader B) and an oppo-
sition party. In order to keep the model as simple as possible, the opposition party
is not treated as a strategic actor in this game. The two party leaders must decide
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whether to run separately or form an electoral coalition. To form an electoral coali-
tion, they must reach agreement on a coalition policy and a post-election distri-
bution of offices. The two party leaders will only decide to form a pre-electoral
coalition if the expected utility from this agreement is greater than the expected
utility from running separately (the reservation price).
4.2.1 Structure and Payoffs
Figure 4.1 depicts the timeline of the bargaining model. The game takes place in two
periods t = {1, 2} because the substantive question that motivates this analysis sug-
gests that the bargaining process is most accurately modeled as a finite period game.
Once elections have been called, the election date is fixed, and any bargaining
process must necessarily come to an end at this point in time. The choice of two peri-
ods is arbitrary, but as the game has finite duration, the addition of more periods
would not change the conclusions with regard to whether or not a pre-electoral coali-
tion forms. In figure 4.1, the beginning of the second period is indicated by a hori-
zontal line. Each decision node is illustrated by a box containing the name of the
player whose turn it is to move there and the decision that must be made.
The game begins in period 1 at the topmost decision node, where Party A either
makes an offer or does nothing. If an offer is made, Party B accepts or rejects it. If
Party B accepts it, the bargaining game ends, and a pre-electoral coalition (PEC)
forms. If Party B rejects it, the game enters a second period, in which Party B can
make a counter-offer. If no counter-offer is made, the game ends without the for-
mation of a pre-electoral coalition (No PEC). If a counter-offer is made, Party A
must decide whether to accept or reject it, and the game ends with PEC or No
PEC. If Party A made no offer in period 1, Party B decides whether to make an
offer in the second period. If no offer is made, the game ends with No PEC. If an
offer is made, Party A accepts or rejects it, and the game ends with PEC or No
PEC. Each time a player has the opportunity to make an offer, he picks from a
continuum of choices that corresponds to the potential electoral coalition agree-
ments that each player can propose. The continuum arises because each electoral
coalition offer is a particular division of an overall ‘pie.’5
As I mentioned earlier, party leaders will decide to form an electoral coalition
only if the expected utility from forming a coalition is larger than the expected util-
ity from running separately (the reservation price). Let me begin by outlining how
the reservation price is calculated. The reservation price for each party is simply the
sum of (i) what they expect to get if they win the election after competing sepa-
rately, weighted by the probability that they win; and (ii) what they expect to
receive if they do not win the election, weighted by the probability that they do not
win. It is important to remember that ‘winning’ the election may mean different
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things in parliamentary and presidential regimes. For the purposes of this study,
‘winning’ in a parliamentary system means entering the government, and ‘winning’
in a presidential system means gaining control of the presidency.
The probability that party leaders ‘win’ after running separately (or divided) is
Pi_d, and the probability that they ‘lose’ is 1 ! Pi_d. If they lose, they do not
receive any office benefits and must suffer the utility loss associated with having
the opposition set policy. Party leaders suffer a utility loss whenever policy is not
implemented at their own ideal point. I capture this utility loss with a standard
quadratic loss function, !(pi ! popp)
2, where pi refers to the policy ideal point of
party i and popp refers to the policy of the non-strategic opposition party. This loss
function means that as the policy of the opposition moves further away from party
i ’s ideal point, then party i’s utility decreases at a faster and faster rate.6 To simpli-
fy the notation, I call this utility loss li_opp.
If they win after running separately, then they receive utility from office bene-
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Figure 4.1 
Timeline of PEC Formation Game
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fits (si) and policy (li_gov). The total amount of office benefits available is large
S. Without loss of generality, this value is normalized to 1. In a presidential regime,
S refers to the office benefits associated with the presidency. Naturally, the expect-
ed share of office benefits will either be si = S or si = 0 in a presidential system. In
other words, if you win the presidency, you gain all of the office benefits; if you
lose the presidential election, you gain nothing.7 In a parliamentary regime, one
can think of S as the collection of ministerial portfolios available to the governing
coalition and si as the share of these portfolios going to party i. It seems reasonable
to think that the share of ministerial portfolios going to party leaders who enter
government will be equal to their share of the government-controlled legislative
seats, i.e.,
si =
where seatsi is the number of seats won by party i and seatsgov is the number of leg-
islative seats won by the government coalition. This assumption seems particular-
ly reasonable given that one of the most consistent empirical regularities in com-
parative politics is that the share of ministerial portfolios in government coalitions
is predicted quite well by the relative share of seats that the coalition partners con-
trol in the legislature (Laver 1998; Warwick & Druckman 2001). As before, the
utility loss suffered by party i in terms of policy (li_gov) is determined by a quad-
ratic loss function capturing the ideological distance between party i ’s ideal point
(pi) and the policy actually implemented by the government coalition (pgov).
Party leaders must compare the reservation price that I have just outlined with
the expected utility that they would receive from forming an electoral coalition.
This expected utility is simply the sum of (i) what they expect to get if they win as
a coalition, weighted by the probability that the coalition wins; and (ii) what they
expect to receive if they lose as a coalition, weighted by the probability that they
lose. The probability that they win as an electoral coalition (or as united parties)
is Pu
t, where t refers to the period in the game in which the coalition forms; the
probability that they lose as a coalition is 1 !Pu
t. I assume that Pu
1 > Pu
2 in order
to incorporate a cost of delay and capture the notion that forming a coalition three
months before an election is preferable to forming one a few days before it (Smith
2004). More time to plan and execute a coherent and coordinated campaign strat-
egy is presumably an asset in electoral competition. If the pre-electoral coalition
offers an electoral advantage, then Pu
1 > Pi_d or Pu
2 > Pi_d . Note that I make no
assumption as to whether the electoral coalition will be advantageous or not.
If the coalition does not win, the parties receive no office benefits, and each
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must suffer a utility loss from having the opposition set policy (li_opp). If the
coalition wins, though, the parties receive a share of the office benefits (oi
t or 1 !
oi
t ) and experience a utility loss associated with implementing coalition policy
(li_pec). By necessity, oit $0 and 1 ! oit $0. When parties form an electoral coali-
tion, they have to agree to a particular division of the office benefits. Since this
division of the office benefits is determined prior to the election, I make no
assumption that this division will be proportional to the post-electoral share of gov-
ernment-controlled legislative seats controlled by each party. This is why I refer to the
share of office benefits going to party i when it runs as an electoral coalition as oi but
refer to the share of office benefits going to party i when it runs separately as si.
The utility loss associated with having the electoral coalition policy rather than
one’s own ideal point is calculated as follows. The coalition policy (ppec) is first cal-
culated by weighting the ideological distance between the potential coalition part-
ners (*pA!pB*) by the relative legislative strength of the coalition members (suA
or suB, where suA + suB = 1). If party A is to the left of party B, then ppec can be
calculated as either pA + suB *pA!pB*or pB !suA*pA!pB*. A simple numerical
example might better illustrate how ppec is calculated. Take a policy space from 0
to 100, where Player A is located at 50 and Player B is located at 60. The coalition
policy would be somewhere between the two parties, and the larger of the two
should exercise a stronger influence over the coalition’s policy. To determine the
weighted average for the coalition, use the expected seats or votes to be won by
each player, suA and suB. Imagine that suA = 0.8 and suB = 0.2. Thus, Player A has
to cede 20% of the policy distance to Player B, and Player B in turn will yield 80%
of the policy distance to Player A. The coalition policy (ppec) would be set at 52.
I let li_pec =  !(pi !ppec)2. I do not assume that suA = sA or that suB = sB, since
a party may win more seats (or fewer) as part of an electoral coalition compared to
running alone.
The payoffs associated with each of the potential outcomes of the timeline out-
lined in figure 4.1 are listed in table 4.1. Player A’s payoffs are listed first, followed
by a semicolon and then Player B’s payoffs.
4.2.2 Equilibrium Behavior and Comparative Statics
Having outlined the structure of the bargaining game and the payoffs, it is now
possible to examine the equilibrium behavior of the party leaders. I follow com-
mon practice and solve the game through backward induction for sub-game per-
fect Nash equilibria. There are three sub-game perfect Nash equilibria, depending
on the specific values of the model’s parameters.8 In two of the equilibria, an elec-
toral coalition forms in the first round, while in the other, the parties run sepa-
rately.
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In order to ease the presentation of the equilibria, I first simplify the presenta-
tion of the payoffs somewhat. Let
• RA PA_d (sA ! lAgov) ! (1 ! PA_d)lAopp
This expression represents Player A’s expected payoff from running 
independently.
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Table 4.1
Actors, Actions, and Payoffs in Bargaining Game
Period Actors Possible Action Expected Payoffs
1 A (i) offer electoral coalition
(ii) make no offer
(if Party A makes offer)
(i) accept offer Pu1(oA
1 – lApec) – lAopp(1– Pu1);
Pu
1((1 – oA
1) – lBpec) –  lBopp(1 –  Pu1)
(ii) reject offer
2 (if Party A makes offer, B rejects)
B (i) offer electoral coalition
(ii) make no offer PA_d (sA – lAgov) – lAopp(1 – PA_d);
PB _d (sB – lBgov) – lBopp(1 – PB_d)
(if Party A makes offer, B rejects, B makes counter-offer)
A (i) accept offer Pu
2(oB
2 – lApec) – lAopp(1 – Pu2);
Pu
2((1 – oB
2) – lBpec) – lBopp(1 – Pu2)
(ii) reject offer PA_d(sA – lAgov) – lAopp(1 – PA_d);
PB_d(sB – lBgov) – lBopp(1 – PB_d)
2 (if Party A makes no offer)
B (i) offer electoral coalition PA_d(sA – lAgov) – lAopp(1 – PA_d);
PB_d(sB – lBgov) – lBopp(1 – PB_d)
(if Party A makes no offer, Party B makes offer)
A (i) accept offer Pu
2(oB
2 – lApec) – lAopp(1 – Pu2);
Pu
2((1 – oB
2) – lBpec) – lBopp(1 – Pu2)
(ii) reject offer PA_d(sA – lAgov) – lAopp(1– PA_d);
PB_d(sB – lBgov) – lBopp(1– PB_d)
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• RB PB_d (sB ! lBgov) ! (1 ! PB_d)lBopp
This expression represents Player B’s expected payoff from running
independently.
• S1 Pu
1(1 ! lApec! lBpec) ! (1 ! Pu1)(lAopp + lBopp)
This expression represents the total expected ‘electoral coalition pie’ in
round 1.
• S2 Pu
2(1 ! lApec ! lBpec) ! (1 ! Pu2)(lAopp + lBopp)
This expression represents the total expected ‘electoral coalition pie’ in
round 2.
One can think of RA and RB as representing the ‘reservation’ prices for each play-
er, respectively. In other words, these are the payoffs that each player will receive if
no electoral coalition agreement is reached by the end of the second period. The
terms S1 and S2 represent the total ‘pie’ available in the game to an electoral coali-
tion formed in round 1 and round 2, respectively.
Let (Xt, 1 ! Xt) be the offer made by Player A in period t, where Xt is Player
A’s share of the electoral coalition pie and 1 ! Xt is Player B’s share. Let (Wt, 1 !
Wt) be the offer made by Player B in period t, where Wt is Player A’s share of the
electoral coalition pie and 1 ! Wt is Player B’s share. I make the assumption that
if a player is indifferent between making an offer and not making an offer, he will
choose to not make an offer. This assumption has a substantive justification if one
believes that there are costs associated with making an electoral coalition offer.
This assumption does not affect the comparative statics or the model’s implica-
tions.9 As I have already mentioned, there are three possible sub-game perfect Nash
equilibria, given the payoffs and assumptions outlined above:
1. If RB < S
2 ! RA, then Player A offers (X1 = S
1 ! S2 +RA, 1 ! X1 = S
2
! RA) in the first round and Player B accepts; if the game were to reach
the second round, Player B offers (W2 = RA, 1 ! W2 = S
2 ! RA) and
Player A accepts.
2. If S2 ! RA # RB # S
1 ! RA, then Player A offers (X1 = S
1 ! RB, 1 !
X1 = RB) in Round 1 and Player B accepts; if the game were to reach the
second round, Player B does not make an offer.
3. If RB > S
1 – RA, then neither player makes an offer in either round.
The proof for each equilibrium is provided in the appendix to this chapter. An
electoral coalition forms in the first round in equilibria 1 and 2 but never forms in
equilibrium 3.
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The equilibria of the model allow a certain number of insights into electoral
coalition formation. However, before moving on to an analysis of the comparative
statics, it is worth taking a moment to better understand the intuition and distrib-
utional consequences associated with each of these equilibria. Although the first
two equilibria result in the formation of an electoral coalition, the nature of the bar-
gain itself is very different. In the first equilibrium, the player who moves last (in
this case Player B) is able to determine the nature of the bargain that is ultimately
reached. This is the result of having a two-period model in which Player B can make
a credible threat to reject an initial offer from Player A that is insufficiently attrac-
tive. Player B knows that if the game enters a second period, he can always make a
take-it-or-leave-it offer that will be accepted by Player A. This, in turn, is the result
of having a large enough ‘electoral coalition pie’ (S2) to bargain over relative to the
disagreement payoffs (RA and RB) available from running separately. Both parties
clearly benefit from forming an electoral coalition in this equilibrium. The bargain
reached in the second equilibrium is very different. In this case, Party A is able to
obtain all of the gains from reaching a pre-electoral agreement; Party B only ever
receives his disagreement payoff. The reason that the distributional consequences of
forming an electoral coalition are different in the second equilibrium is that Party
B can no longer credibly threaten to reject an offer made by Party A in the first
round. In contrast to the first two equilibria, no electoral coalition forms in the
third equilibrium, because there are no gains to be made from reaching a pre-elec-
toral agreement. Both parties would have to give up so much in the bargaining
process to get the other to accept that each would be better off running alone.
How do the variables in the model affect whether or not an electoral coalition
forms? Remember that there are two possible states of the world: one in which an
electoral coalition forms (equilibria 1 or 2), and one in which it does not (equi-
librium 3). The comparative statics generated by the model are shown in table 4.2.
The model provides clear implications. First, electoral coalitions are more likely
to form as the probability that the coalition wins increases (Pu
1 and Pu
2). In prac-
tice, the probability that a coalition is successful will be a function of the electoral
rules in a given country. For example, disproportional electoral institutions such as
low district magnitude or high electoral thresholds provide an electoral bonus for
pre-electoral coalitions through their mechanical effect on the translation of votes
into seats (Duverger 1963 [1954]). The corollary of this implication is that pre-elec-
toral coalitions are less likely to form the greater the probability that a party wins
after running independently (Pi_d). Second, the probability of electoral coalition
formation should increase when the ideological distance between the potential
coalition partners decreases, because li_pec will fall. Third, pre-electoral coalition
formation should also be more likely when the ideological distance between a
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party’s policy and that of the opposition increases (li_opp increases). However, this
inference holds only if the coalition is electorally advantageous (Pu
t > Pi_d). In
other words, having an extreme opposition will make electoral coalition formation
more likely only if the probability of winning as a coalition is greater than the prob-
ability of winning running separately. Finally, electoral coalitions are more likely as
a party’s expected share of office benefits from running alone (si) decreases relative
to its expected share of office benefits as part of a coalition.
4.3 Conclusion
The theoretical model presented in this chapter sought to explain why, and under
what circumstances, electoral coalitions form. The answer, I argue, lies in a careful
analysis of the costs and benefits associated with forming a coalition prior to the
election. In order to fully understand this cost-benefit analysis, I presented a game-
theoretic model in which two party leaders are involved in a sequential bargaining
process where they must decide whether or not to coordinate their pre-electoral
strategies. Both party leaders get to propose an electoral coalition agreement if they
wish. Any coalition offer that is proposed by either party leader can be rejected or
accepted. At the end of the game, the payoffs are distributed as a function of the
decisions reached in the game. I find that there are two types of equilibrium out-
comes—either an electoral coalition forms in the first period of the game, or no
coalition forms at all.
The model generates several testable implications that will be evaluated in the
next two chapters using qualitative and quantitative analyses. These implications
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Table 4.2
Comparative Statics from Bargaining Game
Increase in Variable Probability of Electoral Coalition Formation
Probability first -period PEC wins (pu1) Increasing
Probability second -period PEC wins (Pu2) Increasing
Probability i wins given no PEC (Pi_d) Decreasing
Distance between i and PEC positi on (li_pec) Decreasing
Distance between i and opposition (li_opp) Increasing if pu
t > pi_d
Decreasing if put < pi_d
Party i’s share of office benefits given no PEC (si) Decreasing
Note: “Increasing” means non-decreasing.
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are that coalitions should be more likely to form if the chance of winning as a
coalition increases. On the other hand, if a party’s chance of winning when run-
ning alone increases, it will be less likely to join a coalition. If an opposition vic-
tory would mean that extremely unsatisfactory policies will be implemented, a
party’s likelihood of joining a coalition goes up, but only if joining such a coali-
tion makes it more likely that the opposition would not win. Of course, greater
ideological compatibility between the potential coalition partners makes pre-elec-
toral coalition formation more likely.
The implications generated by the model should seem reasonable. However, it
would be a mistake for the apparent plausibility of these results to cause the read-
er to question the usefulness of formalizing the process through which party lead-
ers bargain over electoral coalition formation and the insights that it generates. For
example, an informal analysis may well have reached the conclusion that electoral
coalitions are more likely when there is a large ideological distance between the
party’s ideal policy and the policy of the likely opposition. On the face of it, this
situation seems quite plausible. However, the model clearly illustrates that this is
the case only if the pre-electoral coalition is expected to be electorally beneficial.
Without formalization, it would have been easy to overlook the conditional nature
of this hypothesis.
The fact that the model incorporates the ideological positions of other poten-
tial governments is an important insight that has not been taken into account to
any great extent in the existing formal or empirical coalition literature. For exam-
ple, although government coalition analysts have suggested for years that coalitions
are more likely to form between parties with similar policy preferences, one does
not find similar references in the coalition literature regarding the ideological posi-
tion of the likely opposition. This situation is odd, since one would think that
party leaders who are deciding whether to form a coalition and contemplating the
possibility of being in opposition should take account of the ideological position
of other potential governments, irrespective of whether this coalition bargaining
process occurs prior to the election or afterward.
I now turn to a qualitative analysis of pre-electoral coalitions in France and
South Korea to show that the assumptions underlying my bargaining model, as
well as the predictions that it generates, are plausible and generate useful intuitions
for thinking about the electoral strategies chosen by party elites.
Appendix: Proofs for Equilibria
The bargaining model presented in this chapter has three sub-game perfect Nash
equilibria. Here I provide a proof for each equilibrium.
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Equilibrium 1:—If RB < S
2 ! RA, then Player A offers (X1 = S
1 ! S2 + RA, 1 ! X1
= S2 ! RA) in the first round and Player B accepts; if the game were to reach the sec-
ond round, Player B offers (W2 = RA, 1 ! W2 = S
2 ! RA) and Player A accepts.
Proof: There are two diverging paths in the timeline outlined in figure 4.1. I focus
first on the one in which Player A makes an initial offer. At the last decision node
on the right-hand side of the timeline, Player A must decide whether to accept or
reject a coalition offer made by Player B. He will accept this offer only if he
receives at least as much utility as he would get from rejecting it. In other words,
he accepts if he receives at least RA. If Player B makes an offer, he will want to max-
imize his payoff. Thus, he will offer exactly RA to Player A and keep the rest of the
‘electoral coalition pie’ for himself. Player B would propose the agreement pair
(RA; S
2 ! RA) in the second period. It is important to note that Player B will only
make this counter offer if S2 ! RA > RB. If this condition does not hold, then
Player B will prefer to make no offer in the second period. A little substitution and
algebra indicate that this is precisely the condition associated with the first sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome.
Continuing with the proof and assuming that this condition holds, Player A
knows that he must give at least S2 ! RA to Player B in order for him to accept a
first period offer. Since Player A wants to maximize his payoffs, as well, this is all
he will offer Player B. He will keep the rest, namely S1 ! S2 + RA, for himself.
Player A will want Player B to accept the initial offer, since the associated payoff is
larger than if the game continued into the second period. This situation is imme-
diately obvious, since S1 > S2. Thus, if Player A does make an initial offer, then
the agreement pair will be (S1 ! S2 + RA; S
2 ! RA), and an electoral coalition will
form in the first period.
The question is whether Player A will actually make this initial offer. The result
will depend on the payoffs he expects to receive if he does not make an offer in
period 1. Finding the answer requires examining the left-hand side of the timeline,
which has so far been overlooked. The important thing to note is that the second
period on this side of the timeline is identical to the one already examined. Thus,
we know that if the second period is reached, then Player B will make an electoral
coalition offer of (RA; S
2 ! RA). This offer will be accepted by Player A. Since we
already know that Player A can guarantee himself a payoff of S1 ! S2 + RA if he
makes an electoral coalition offer in period 1 (which is larger than RA), we know
that he will always make an offer in the first period. Thus, the sub-game perfect
Nash equilibrium outcome is one in which Player A makes an initial offer that is
accepted by Player B. The game never enters a second period. This equilibrium
outcome assumes that the condition RB < S
2 ! RA holds.
Q.E.D.
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Equilibrium 2:—If S2 ! RA # RB # S
1 ! RA, then Player A offers (X1 = S
1 – RB,
1 ! X1 = RB) in Round 1, and Player B accepts; if the game were to reach the sec-
ond round, Player B does not make an offer.
Proof: Given that there are two diverging paths in the timeline, I again focus first
on the one in which Player A makes an initial offer (the right-hand side). I have
already shown in the previous proof that if Player B makes an offer in the second
period, then it will be the agreement pair (RA; S
2 ! RA). However, it may be the
case that Player B prefers not to make a counter offer in the second period. This
case will be true if RB $ S
2 ! RA.
If this condition holds, then Player A knows that he only has to give RB to
Player B for him to accept an offer in the first period. Since Player A wants to max-
imize his payoff, he will propose the agreement pair (S1 – RB; RB) if he wants his
offer to be accepted. However, it may be the case that Player A prefers his initial
offer to be rejected if his expected payoff in the second period is larger. This will
be the case if RA > S
1 – RB. The second sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium relies
on the fact that this condition does not hold. In other words, it must be the case
that if Player A makes an offer in the first period, he does not want it to be reject-
ed.
The only remaining question at this point is whether Player A prefers to make
an offer that is accepted in the first period or make no offer at all. Finding the
answer requires examining the left-hand side of the timeline. Again, the second
period in this half of the timeline is identical to the one already examined. Thus,
Player A expects that Player B will make no offer in the second period. Given the
assumption that RA < S
1 – RB, we know that Player A will always make an offer
in the first period. Thus, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome is one
in which Player A makes an initial offer that is accepted by Player B. The game
never enters a second period. This equilibrium assumes that RB $ S
2 ! RA and RA
< S1 ! RB both hold. With a little algebra, it is clear that these conditions can be
rewritten as S2 ! RA # RB # S
1 ! RA, which is the condition associated with equi-
librium 2.
Q.E.D.
Equilibrium 3:—If RB > S
1 ! RA, then neither player makes an offer in either
round.
Proof: To a large extent, this proof is identical to the previous one. Again I focus
first on the right-hand side of the timeline, in which Player A makes an offer. I
have already shown that if Player B makes an offer in period 2, then Player A will
accept it. As in the previous proof, I now assume that Player B prefers not to make
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a counter-offer in period 2. This case will be true if RB $ S
2 ! RA. I have also
shown that if Player A wants his initial offer to be accepted, then he will propose
the agreement pair (S1 ! RB; RB). In the previous proof, I then assumed that
Player A would only make an initial offer if it was going to be accepted. In other
words, his payoff from having his offer accepted was larger than that from having
his offer rejected and Player B making no counter-offer. The precise condition was
that RA < S
1 ! RB. I now assume that this condition does not hold. This assump-
tion is the only thing that distinguishes equilibrium 3 from equilibrium 2.
The question that needs to be resolved is whether Player A would prefer to
make an offer that he knows is going to be rejected or make no offer at all. Finding
the answer requires examining the left-hand side of the timeline. Again, the sec-
ond period in this half of the timeline is identical to the one already examined.
Thus, Player A expects that Player B will make no offer in the second period. It is
clear that Player A will receive RA whether he makes no initial offer in the first
period or he makes an offer that gets rejected. Player A is, therefore, indifferent
between these actions. As I stated earlier, I assume that if a player is indifferent
between making an offer and not making an offer, then he will choose to do the
latter.10 Thus, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is one in which both players
fail to make an offer. This equilibrium assumes that RB $ S
2 ! RA and RA > S
1 !
RB both hold. With a minor bit of algebraic manipulation, it is easy to see that if
the second condition holds, the first automatically does, as well. The second con-
dition can be expressed as RB > S
1 ! RA, which is the condition associated with
the third equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
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CHAPTER FIVE
France and 
South Korea
In this chapter, I use a detailed investigation of electoral coalitions in Fifth
Republic France and post-1987 South Korea to begin evaluating the plausibility
and usefulness of the implications generated by the theoretical model presented in
the previous chapter. To a large extent, the selection of these specific countries is
somewhat arbitrary, since I believe that there is a general underlying logic of pre-
electoral coalition formation that is not country specific. However, an analysis of
electoral coalition history in France and South Korea is particularly informative for
a number of reasons. First, the two countries are very distinct in terms of their
geography, democratic history, and party systems. France is a well-established
democracy in Western Europe whose party system is characterized by a well-
entrenched left-right cleavage. In contrast, South Korea is a newly democratic
country in East Asia whose party system is characterized by an almost total absence
of ideological division. If similar factors are found to influence electoral coordina-
tion in such different contexts, then this would provide strong evidence that there
truly is a general underlying logic to pre-electoral coalition formation.
Second, the unusual nature of France’s semi-presidential regime offers an
almost unique opportunity to evaluate the impact of different institutions on pre-
electoral strategies while holding other country characteristics constant. For exam-
ple, the ability to observe legislative and presidential elections in the same country
allows us to explicitly examine whether the divisibility of office benefits affects the
likelihood of electoral coalition formation in a manner consistent with the theory
presented in the previous chapter. France is also particularly informative because it
offers so many clear examples of electoral coalition success and failure on both the
left and right of the political spectrum. Moreover, the ability (or inability) of polit-
ical parties to form electoral coalitions has often had a large impact on election
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outcomes in France. The result of the 2002 presidential election, in which the
extreme right candidate, Jean-Marie Le Pen, made it through to the second round
because the left-wing parties failed to coordinate their electoral strategies, is per-
haps the clearest example of this situation.
Third, the short overview of electoral coalitions in South Korea is useful for
illustrating the danger of putting too much stock in personal feuds as an explana-
tion for the inability of party leaders to reach pre-electoral agreements. Descriptive
accounts of electoral campaigns and elections in countries such as France often
emphasize the significant role that personal feuds and long-standing rivalries play
in the electoral coalition formation process (Bell 2000; Knapp 1999). Although
the absence of ideological divisions in Korean politics has meant that politics is
largely driven by personal enmity and disdain, the history of electoral coalitions in
South Korea clearly indicates that the most strident and long-held personal ani-
mosities threatening electoral coordination can be overcome if only party leaders
can resolve the distributional issues associated with electoral coalition formation.
Finally, the investigation of electoral coalitions in France and South Korea illus-
trate that my theory can be usefully employed to explain pre-electoral agreements
in semi-presidential and presidential regimes. Throughout the presentation of my
theoretical model in the previous chapter, I was careful to indicate how it applied
to both parliamentary and presidential regimes. However, as with the vast major-
ity of the government coalition literature, the statistical analyses conducted in
chapters three and six focus primarily on parliamentary democracies. Studying
France and South Korea in this chapter helps to show that my theory can also pro-
vide insights into the electoral coalition formation process in non-parliamentary
democracies.
5.1 French Fifth Republic
Pre-electoral coalitions have played an important and often dramatic role in deter-
mining electoral outcomes in France. Consider the surprising outcome of the first
round of the 2002 French presidential elections. It had been widely expected that
Jacques Chirac, the president and leader of the mainstream Right, would make it
through to the second round, along with Lionel Jospin, the Socialist prime minis-
ter and leader of the mainstream Left. The real question for months had been
which of the two men would win the second round. Then, unexpectedly, the left
vote was split among so many candidates that the Socialist leader came in third
behind the extreme-right politician Jean-Marie Le Pen. The French press described
the event as an earthquake, and the French elections were, for a couple of weeks,
the subject of world-wide speculation. Most analyses of this particular election will
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no doubt focus on the disturbing success of the extreme Right. However, it is
worth emphasizing that this political ‘earthquake’ had as much to do with the
inability of the French Left to form a coherent pre-electoral coalition as it did with
an increase in the strength of the extreme Right. After all, Le Pen enjoyed only a
rather modest increase in his vote share compared to what he had received in the
previous presidential elections of 1995.1
The outcome of the first round in 2002, though admittedly a surprise, is not
unprecedented. The Left had approached the 1969 presidential elections in such
“total disarray” that none of the left-wing candidates made it to the second round
(Pierce 1980). This situation enabled a little-known centrist candidate, Alain
Poher, to compete in the second round against Georges Pompidou. In 1981, the
unwillingness of Jacques Chirac to publicly encourage his electorate to support the
remaining mainstream right candidate (Valéry Giscard d’Estaing) after Chirac had
been eliminated in the first round of the presidential elections clearly contributed
to François Mitterrand’s electoral victory (Wright 1995; Ysmal 1989). The inabil-
ity of the moderate Right to form a cohesive electoral alliance in these elections
and at the subsequent legislative elections a few weeks later enabled the first left-
wing government to come to power since the Popular Front in 1936.
These examples raise the question as to why party leaders were willing and able
to form pre-electoral coalitions in some French elections, but not in others. The
bargaining model presented in the previous chapter suggests that it should be pos-
sible to explain the observed variation in terms of the changing concerns of party
elites with votes, office, and policy.
5.1.1 Votes
The first question to ask is whether parties in France have an electoral incentive to
form pre-electoral coalitions. As my analysis in chapter three indicates, party elites
are more likely to form pre-electoral coalitions when there are many parties and
the electoral system is disproportional. Since France is well known both for its
plethora of parties and its highly disproportional electoral institutions used to elect
its president and legislature, French party leaders nearly always have incentives to
form pre-electoral coalitions.
The French party system consists of numerous parties spread all across the
political spectrum. At the moment, the mainstream Left consists of the Socialist
Party (PS), the Communist Party (PCF), the Left Radical Party (PRG), and vari-
ous environmental parties such as the Green Party (Greens), the Independent
Ecological Movement (MEI), and Ecological Generation (GE-Les Bleus). On the
extreme left are several other parties such as Workers’ Struggle (LO), the
Communist Revolutionary League (LCR), and the Workers’ Party (PT). On the
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mainstream right there are the Gaullists (UMP), the Union for French Democracy
(UDF), and an environmental party called Citizen Action and Participation
(CAP21). On the extreme right there is the National Front (FN) and the break-
away National Republican Movement (MNR). There are also a number of per-
sonalistic parties such as Pasqua (Charles Pasqua) and Movement for France
(Philippe de Villiers), as well as several rural parties such as the Hunting, Fishing,
Nature and Tradition party (CPNT) and the Right to Hunt party (DC). Many of
these parties win a significant number of votes and legislative seats. Fully 16 
parties managed to win more than 1% each of the national vote in the 2002 leg-
islative elections and at least 10 of these parties won legislative representation,
according to the Election Politique website.
The French electoral system is highly disproportional. Presidential and legisla-
tive elections both have two rounds of voting, in which a limited number of can-
didates progress to the second round. If a presidential candidate wins an absolute
majority of the national vote in the first round, then he or she is automatically
elected president. If this is not the case, then the top two candidates go through to
the second round, which is held two weeks later; since the introduction of direct
presidential elections in 1962, all presidential elections have gone to a second
round. Whoever wins the most votes in the second round becomes president.
Legislative elections are very similar. Each electoral district is a single-seat district,
and any candidate who passes a threshold of electoral support in the first round of
voting is eligible to enter a second round one week later.2 The particular threshold
that must be overcome has changed twice since the foundation of the Fifth
Republic. It was originally set at a relatively low 5% of the vote in 1958. This per-
centage was subsequently increased to 10% for the 1967 election and 12.5% for
the 1978 election.3 The plurality winner in the second round of voting becomes
the elected deputy. The first-past-the-post nature of legislative and presidential
elections, along with the fact that only a limited number of candidates can progress
to the second round, clearly provides incentives for electoral coalitions to form. In
fact, the right-wing president Giscard d’Estaing specifically increased the thresh-
old that needed to be overcome to enter the second round of legislative elections
to 12.5% in 1978 in order to force centrist and center-right parties to merge or
form alliances with his own party. This move was motivated by the growing suc-
cess of the Socialists and the Communists at local elections in the mid-1970s
(Duhamel 1999).
Given the nature of the electoral system in France, party leaders have a range of
pre-electoral choices for legislative and presidential elections. One option is for
parties to compete independently at election time and refuse to form an electoral
coalition in either round of voting. This is what happened on the left prior to
1965, and it is what typically occurs now between the National Front and the
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moderate right-wing parties.4 A second option for party leaders is to compete
against each other in the first round and then form an electoral coalition for the
second round. This has been a common occurrence in legislative elections among
the mainstream parties on both the left and the right. A third option is for parties
to form an electoral coalition prior to the first round. This option requires choos-
ing a single candidate to run in each district. Although this option is not as com-
mon as the previous one, it does occur with some frequency on both the left and
the right. The last option is for parties to move beyond electoral coalitions and
simply merge into a single party. The center-left parties chose this option when
they merged to form the Socialist Party in 1969. The non-Gaullist parties on the
right also chose this option when they formed the UDF in 1978 (Massart 1999;
Portelli 1994; Bell & Criddle 1984). Something similar seems to have occurred
after the 2002 legislative elections, following the success of the UMP pre-electoral
coalition between the Gaullists, the Liberal Democrats (DL), and part of the UDF.
5.1.2 Office
The fact that the disproportional electoral institutions employed to elect presi-
dents and legislators are very similar might lead one to expect that pre-electoral
coalitions are equally common in presidential and legislative elections. One might
even argue that pre-electoral coalitions should be slightly more common in presi-
dential elections, given that only two candidates can actually enter the second
round. However, the information provided in table 5.1 illustrates that this is not
the case. While electoral coalitions are relatively frequent in legislative elections,
they are quite rare in presidential contests. In fact, pre-electoral coalitions have
only formed twice in presidential elections.
What explains this variation across legislative and presidential elections? The
bargaining model from the previous chapter notes that while party leaders should
react to the potential electoral gains that might accrue from forming an electoral
coalition, they are just as likely to be concerned with the expected office benefits
associated with the coalition. The salient point about presidential elections is that
only one party leader can win the presidency. The fact that the presidential office
is not divisible means that the other coalition partner essentially receives no office
benefits. As a result, the expected utility of joining a presidential electoral coali-
tion is likely to be quite low for at least one of the coalition parties. In contrast,
distributional issues are likely to be resolved more easily in legislative elections,
because ministerial portfolios and National Assembly seats are more divisible—
both coalition partners receive office benefits. Thus, one explanation for why
electoral coalitions form more often in legislative elections than in presidential
ones has to do with the relative divisibility of office benefits across these elections.
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Table 5.1
Electoral Coalitions in French Legislative and Presidential Elections
Election Year Presidential Elections Legislative Elections
Round 1 Round 2
1958 None None
1962 None UNR+UDT+RI
PCF+SFIO+PRG
1965 PCF+FGDS
(FGDS:SFIO+PRG+CIR)
1967 UNR+UDT+RI UNR+UDT+RI+CD
FGDS:SFIO+PRG+CIR FGDS+PCF+PSU
UNR+RI UNR+RI+PDM
FGDS+PCF
1969 None
1973 UDR+RI+UC UDR+RI+UC+REF
UGDS:PS+PRG UGDS+PCF+PSU
1974 PCF+PS
1978 UDF:CDS+PR+RI UDF+RPR
PS+PRG PS+PRG+PCF
1981 None RPR+UDF
PS+PRG PS+PRG+PCF
1986* RPR+UDF —
PS+PRG
1988 None RPR+UDF
PS+PRG PS+PRG+PCF
1993 RPR+UDF
PS+PRG PS+PRG+PCF
Greens+GE
1995 None
1997 RPR+UDF
PS+Greens+PRG PS+Greens+PRG+PCF
2002 None UMP:RPR+UDF+DL
PS+Greens+PRG PS+Greens+PRG+PCF
* indicates that the legislative elections employed proportional representation; there was no second
round. All coalitions that formed in the first round also formed in the second round; only addition-
al coalitions are listed as forming in the second round. If the parties ran under a common coalition
name, this is shown first followed by a colon and the names of the member parties.
Left-Wing Parties: Socialist Party (PS: 1969–, SFIO: 1905–69); Communist Party (PCF); Left
Radical Party (PRG: 1998–, PRS: 1996–98, MRG: 1973–96, MGRS: 1972–73, Radicals: 1901–72);
Generation Ecology (GE); Green Party Greens); Unified Socialist Party (PSU); Convention of
Republican Institutions (CIR).
Right-Wing Parties: Union for French Democracy (UDF); Gaullists (UMP: 2002–, RPR:
1976–2002, UDR: 1968–76, UDVe: 1967–68, UNR-UDT: 1962–67, UNR: 1958–62); Liberal
Democrats (DL); Democratic Union of Labor (UDT). Democratic Center (CD); Social Democratic
Center (CDS); Independent Republicans (RI); Progress & Modern Democracy (PDM); Republicans
(PR); Reform Movement (REF); Center Union (UC).
Electoral Coalition Names: Federation of the Democratic & Socialist Left (FGDS); Union for a
Presidential (Popular) Majority (UMP); Democratic & Socialist Union (UGDS); Union for French
Democracy (UDF). Several of these coalitions became single parties.
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This explanation is exactly as suggested by the theoretical model in the previous
chapter. I now illustrate the importance of distributional conflict in more detail
with a description of coalition formation in French presidential and legislative
elections.
Presidential Elections—The fact that only two candidates can go through to the
second round of French presidential elections would suggest that party elites
should have considerable electoral incentives to form pre-electoral coalitions.
Presumably, party leaders on the left would like to avoid the outcomes of the 1969
and 2002 elections, where the left-wing vote was split among so many candidates
that none of them made it into the second round. The electoral incentives for par-
ties to coordinate their pre-electoral strategies would not be so great if the presi-
dency held little power. However, the presidency is considered to be an extremely
important political prize. Indeed, when the president enjoys a legislative majority,
he holds the most powerful position in the country (Duhamel 1999; Keeler &
Schain 1996; Charlot 1994; Hayward 1993). It is only when the president lacks a
majority that the system behaves as if it were a parliamentary regime dominated
by the prime minister. The presidency has been the dominant political position
throughout the Fifth Republic, with the exception of the three periods of ‘cohab-
itation’ between 1986–88, 1993–95 and 1997–2002.5 The nature of the semi-
presidential regime in France means that party leaders care a great deal about con-
trolling both the legislature and the presidency.
Despite the obvious importance of the presidential position and the incentives
created by the electoral system, there have only ever been two examples where par-
ties on the left or the right actually coordinated their strategies so as to present a
single presidential candidate for election. In both cases, the Communist Party
(PCF) accepted a non-communist candidate as the main standard bearer for the
Left. Both times, the electoral coalition quickly collapsed under the strain of dis-
tributional conflicts, as the PCF came to realize that the chief beneficiary of these
pre-electoral agreements was the Socialist Party (Johnson 1981).
The willingness of the Communist Party to accept a Socialist candidate in 1965
and 1974 stems from the widely held belief that a Communist could never be elect-
ed president during the Cold War period. It is important to remember that the rise of
the Socialist Party (PS) as the dominant party on the left was almost unthinkable in
the 1960s and early 1970s. The PCF had been the largest party in 1945 and was still
the dominant party on the left by a considerable margin during the early years of the
Fifth Republic. To a large extent, the PCF could only expect to benefit from sup-
porting François Mitterrand as the single candidate of the left in the 1965 presiden-
tial elections. The PCF hoped to gain from a show of left-wing unity without ceding
any authority to the Socialists. In fact, the PCF probably did not expect Mitterrand
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to even make it into the second round, let alone make the election competitive—
Mitterrand won 44.8% of the vote in the second round compared to Charles de
Gaulle’s 55.2% (Johnson 1981). It was only because a centrist candidate, Jean
Lecanuet, managed to win 15.6% of the vote in the first round that a second ballot
involving Mitterrand and de Gaulle was actually required. It was this unforeseen occur-
rence that indirectly began to establish Mitterrand’s reputation as the leader of the Left.
It was the Socialists who were the most reluctant to consider an electoral coali-
tion with the Communists in the early years of the Fifth Republic. To some extent,
this reluctance can be traced to the traditional and deep-seated hostility on the
non-Communist left toward the PCF (Jackson 1990; Judt 1986). However, more
important were the relative positions of the two parties among the electorate. The
PCF was by far the dominant party on the left, and any alliance with the
Communists would automatically position the Socialists as minority partners.
Many feared that the emerging left-right polarization of the political system threat-
ened the very existence of the Socialist Party, given its small size relative to the
PCF. This situation helps to explain why one-third of Socialist voters refused to
support the PCF in the second ballot of the 1962 legislative elections (Williams,
Goldey, & Harrison 1970). A national electoral coalition with the Communists
also threatened the Socialists’ ability to conclude alliances with both the Center
and the Left. For example, it threatened the Socialist policy of allying with the 
center-Right in Marseilles but with the PCF in certain regions of Paris. Moreover,
an alliance with the PCF was expected to cause problems in winning over those
center-Left and center-Right voters who had not thrown in their lot with de
Gaulle in 1962. These voters were influential, since they represented the swing
vote throughout the 1960s (Portelli 1994; Ysmal 1989).
The Socialists ultimately accepted an electoral coalition in 1965 only after hav-
ing unsuccessfully attempted to build a federation of the center-Left around the
presidential candidate of Gaston Deferre.6 Deferre had wanted to build a ‘grande
fédération’ of progressive forces reaching rightward to the Christian democratic
movement (MRP) (Jenson 1991). However, center-Right voters seemed more like-
ly to vote for the Gaullists than for the center-Left (Hanley 2002). This center-Left
federation eventually fell apart at the end of 1964 because of reluctance on the part
of the MRP to participate in it. It also collapsed under the pressure exerted by the
Communists in municipal elections, from parts of the Socialist Party that refused
the centrist discourse, and from the reappearance of the Catholic school question
(Jenson 1991).7 The failure of the center-Left federation left the way open for
Mitterrand to run against de Gaulle in 1965. Mitterrand had organized the non-
Communist Left under the banner of the Fédération de la Gauche Démocrate et
Socialiste (FGDS) and allied it with the Communists. The relative success enjoyed
by his candidacy helped to cement the idea of a Left-Left alliance.
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The events of May 1968 and the presidential elections of 1969 provided fur-
ther evidence that a Left-Left alliance was capable of providing realistic opposition
to the Gaullists. In February 1968, the Socialists and the Communists reached an
agreement on a common electoral ‘platform,’ thereby consolidating the initiative
that had begun in the 1965 presidential elections. However, the left-wing alliance
soon began to disintegrate in May 1968, after several weeks of widespread strikes
and rioting by students and workers. Without consulting the leadership of the
PCF or the FGDS, Mitterrand announced that he was willing to lead the Left in
taking up its responsibilities for transition after the defeat of de Gaulle, which he
argued was imminent. This announcement appeared as a coup d’état to the FGDS
and “reeked . . . of Fourth Republic centrism” to the Communists (Jenson 1991).
The alliance between the FGDS and the PCF collapsed; the FGDS itself fell apart.
As a result, each party on the left put up its own candidate and refused to form
electoral pacts in the 1969 presidential elections. This situation meant that two
right-wing candidates, Poher and de Gaulle, contested the second ballot run-off.
The disastrous outcome of these elections for the Left provided further evidence
that a change in electoral strategy was needed.
With the Left balkanized as never before during the Fifth Republic, a number
of lessons cried out to be learnt from the disasters of 1969. First, [Socialist
candidate Gaston] Deferre’s exclusively Centre-Left version of Socialism had
been routed at the polls, securing indeed the lowest Socialist vote ever.
Second, the Communist go-it-alone strategy was shown to be no way for that
party to get a candidate through to the second round, despite a remarkably
avuncular performance by Jacques Duclos. It had been amply demonstrated
how not to play the presidential game, and the most certain long-term bene-
ficiary of the Left’s fragmentation of 1969 was François Mitterrand, who had
shown four years earlier how far a united Left could go. (Bell & Criddle 1984)
Thus, by the end of the 1960s, it had become apparent to the Left that there
were no electorally viable alternatives to a left-wing alliance. The total number of
votes cast for the Left as a whole had not dramatically declined in 1969. However,
the failure to coordinate meant that the Left lost a huge number of seats. This
result suggested that if the Left could only reach agreement, then they might
achieve electoral success. In 1972, the Communists, the Socialists, and the small
left-radical MRG successfully negotiated a ‘Common Program,’ in which they
agreed upon a platform for an eventual left-wing government, as well as coopera-
tion in future elections (Bell 2000; Frears & Parodi 1979; Johnson 1981). The Left
as a whole advanced in the 1973 legislative elections, drawing higher than usual
vote shares. The PCF was still the leader by a small margin, with 21.3% of the vote
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to the Socialists’ 20.4%. The PCF leadership, not yet worried about the increasing
strength of the Socialist Party, backed the Left’s most viable presidential candidate
(Mitterrand) in the 1974 presidential elections. Mitterrand led the vote in the first
round of balloting before narrowly losing to the mainstream-Right candidate,
Giscard d’Estaing; Mitterrand won 49.2% compared to Giscard d’Estaing’s
50.8%. Shortly thereafter, the Communist-Socialist alliance hit rocky ground
because of shifts in the electoral support for the two parties.
Even though opinion polls in 1977 foreshadowed an almost certain victory for
a united Left in the parliamentary elections of 1978, most analysts agree that the
electoral coalition collapsed under the weight of strong distributional conflicts
between the Communists and the Socialists. The Communist Party had agreed to
the Common Program at a time when it was the largest party on the left and could
expect to dominate a coalition government. However, the Socialist Party had been
the chief beneficiary of the Common Program and had displaced the PCF as the
dominant party on the left. The 1977 polls indicated that the Socialists could
expect to win 35% of the vote compared to 20% for the Communists (Wright
1995, 425). From this perspective, Mitterrand’s claim in the early 1970s that his
fundamental objective was to build a great Socialist Party on the terrain occupied
by the Communists in order to demonstrate that “out of five million communist
voters, three million can vote socialist” turned out to be remarkably prescient
(Portelli 1994; Bergounioux & Grunberg 1992). The Socialists could now expect
to call the shots in any left-wing coalition government. As Wright (1995, 426)
states, “To the Communist leadership, such a prospect must have seemed a worse
threat than a continuation of conservative rule.” Once the Communist leadership
realized that the Socialist Party was getting nearly as much support as the PCF,
they withdrew from the electoral alliance agreements in an attempt to arrest the
Socialist Party’s growing momentum (Melchior 1993; Johnson 1981; Frears &
Parodi 1979).
Ever since the late 1970s, the PCF has been fighting against Socialist hegemo-
ny on the left. This fight has meant refusing to form electoral coalitions with the
Socialist Party prior to the first round of both presidential and legislative elections.
Indeed, the PCF has sometimes taken steps to directly undermine the electoral
advance of the Socialists. For example, the candidacy of the Communist Party
leader Georges Marchais prior to the 1981 presidential elections “was an act of
pure defiance. It was motivated by the desire to build up, as in the elections of
1978 and 1979, a Communist resistance to Socialist advance, and by a particular
concern to establish a strong base from which to defend Communist positions in
the municipal elections due in March 1983” (Bell & Criddle 1984).
Unlike the Left, the parties on the right have never formed an electoral coali-
tion in presidential elections. Until the mid-1970s, the dominance of the Gaullist
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party meant that there was never a need to form a coalition. In the early years of
the Fifth Republic, de Gaulle had managed to sweep through the floating elec-
torate on the right and in the center that had not been tied down by party alle-
giances under the Fourth Republic.8 He picked up 50% of the vote from the
National Center of Independents and Peasants (CNIP), 30% from the People’s
Republican Movement (MRP), and 30% from the Radical Party in the 1962 leg-
islative elections, thereby wiping out most of the political center (Charlot 1971).
The dominant role played by the Gaullist party only came to an end in 1974,
when the party split following the death of the incumbent Gaullist president,
Georges Pompidou. The majority of the party supported Jacques Chaban-Delmas
in the 1974 presidential elections, while a minority followed the rising politician
Jacques Chirac in supporting Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and his new party (UDF).
This split initiated a long-standing power struggle between the Gaullists and the
UDF for supremacy on the mainstream right.
Although Giscard won the 1974 presidential elections, the Gaullists remained
the largest party in the legislature. As a result, Giscard relied on Gaullist support
to implement his policy and was forced to appoint a Gaullist prime minister,
Jacques Chirac. Although Chirac was a loyal prime minister at first, he soon began
to assert himself as the real leader of the mainstream Right and as the only candi-
date capable of arresting the electoral rise of the Left. By 1976, the tension
between the two men had become so great that Chirac resigned and positioned
himself to challenge Giscard in future presidential elections (Portelli 1994).
Following an acrimonious presidential campaign in 1981, first-round loser Chirac
conspicuously failed to encourage his supporters to vote for Giscard in the second
round (Bell 2000; Becker 1994; Ysmal 1989). The leaders of the two parties were
fighting for supremacy of the Right more than they were fighting against their left-
wing opponents (Bell 2000; Martin 1993). When Chirac was unable to advance
to the second round, he may well have calculated that a second presidential man-
date for the UDF leader would give the UDF too much of an advantage over his
own party. Ultimately, Giscard lost the election, even though the aggregate score
for the Right had been higher than that for the Left in the first round (Du Roy &
Schneider 1982; Bréchon 1995).
Ongoing coordination failures on the right have had significant consequences
in terms of its ability to enter government and control policy (Bréchon 1995;
Ysmal 1989, 76–77). In fact, the Right was only able to control the government
for six years in the period from mid-1981 to mid-2002. The Socialist Party was
the primary beneficiary of this internal fighting. The most egregious example of
conflicts on the right helping the Left was perhaps the 1981 presidential election,
in which the Right lost control of the presidency for the first time in the history
of the Fifth Republic. Since then, voters have not coordinated on a single preferred
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mainstream right party, and party elites have been largely unwilling to compro-
mise. As a result, the Left was able to dominate French government for a couple
of decades.
Given the high political cost and the incentives generated by the electoral 
system, it is hard to explain the unwillingness and inability among right-wing 
leaders to coordinate their pre-electoral strategies without emphasizing the distri-
butional issues that separated them. After all, there were very few ideological dif-
ferences between the two mainstream parties in this period (Golder 2000). Some
scholars have pointed to the personal animosities or plain ‘stupidity’ of party lead-
ers to explain the dearth of right-wing presidential coalitions (Bell 2000; Knapp
1999). However, these accounts are unconvincing for several reasons. For exam-
ple, they cannot explain why the non-Communist Left managed to merge into the
Socialist Party in 1969 and why the Left managed to form two presidential coali-
tions in 1965 and 1974 despite party leaders sharing personal animosities at least
as large as those on the right (Alexandre 1977). Nor do they explain why the Right
has been able to form successful coalitions for legislative elections.
Legislative Elections—Table 5.1 illustrates that electoral coalitions on both the
left and right have been much more common in legislative elections than in pres-
idential elections. Although some pre-electoral agreements are concluded in par-
ticular districts in the first round of voting in legislative elections, most occur prior
to the second round. Pre-electoral coalitions for legislative elections have become
increasingly comprehensive over time on the mainstream left and right, and this
fact has resulted in a sharp decrease in the number of second-round contests with
more than two candidates. This case is shown quite clearly in table 5.2.
The catalyst for these increasingly comprehensive agreements was the conclu-
sion of the 1972 Common Program committing the Socialists and the
Communists to a policy of withdrawal in favor of the best-placed candidate on the
left after the first round. The goal of this agreement was to avoid splitting the left-
wing vote in the second round. It was remarkably successful, given that only one
of the 81 second-round presidential contests with three or more candidates in
1973 involved multiple left-wing candidates. Seventy-eight of these second-round
contests involved multiple mainstream-right candidates. Moreover, a left-wing
candidate managed to win the seat in four of these 78 contests, even though the
right-wing candidates won a majority of the votes. It was in response to the Left’s
success in 1973 that the Gaullists and the UDF signed a ‘Majority Pact’ in June
1977 with a similar withdrawal policy (Jaffré 1980; Frears & Parodi 1979). As
with the Left, the effect on the number of mainstream-right candidates competing
in the second round was quite dramatic. Table 5.2 illustrates that there was only
one second-round contest in 1978 with more than two candidates. While there
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were 79 second-round contests with more than two candidates in 1997, all 
but three of these contests were the result of an extreme-right (FN) candidate
maintaining his candidacy and not the result of multiple candidates from the
mainstream left or right maintaining their candidacies.9
In order to further match the success of the Left’s withdrawal agreements, the
mainstream-right parties have made efforts to nominate a single right-wing candi-
date for the first round in each of the legislative elections since 1978.10 For
instance, the Gaullists and the UDF agreed on 385 unique candidates for the first
round of the 1981 elections (Bell 2000). The fact that nearly all of these ‘unique’
candidates were incumbents suggests that agreeing to allow sitting deputies to run
unopposed from fellow moderate-Right politicians is one way that party elites on
the right have been able to resolve distributional issues associated with electoral
coalition formation. Of course, making such agreements is likely to work only in
those districts where a reasonably popular deputy is seeking reelection. Despite
attempts by party leaders to coordinate their electoral strategies through nomina-
tion agreements such as these, some politicians refuse to step down. Electoral con-
tests where this situation occurs are referred to as unapproved primaries (primaires
sauvages). For example, although the mainstream-Right parties designated over
450 unique candidates for the 1993 elections, many politicians who were not
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Table 5.2
Electoral Thresholds and Second-Round Candidates in France
Election Year
Threshold (% of 
Registered Voters)
Average Number of 
Candidates Eligible for 
2nd Round
Number of 2nd Round 
Contests with More than 
Two Candidates
1958 5* 5.02 351
1962 5* 4.33 140
1967 10 3.08 74
1968 10 2.76 48
1973 10 3.32 81
1978 12.5 2.93 1
1981 12.5 2.33 1
1988 12.5 2.14 9
1993 12.5 1.96 15
1997 12.5 2.19 79
2002 12.5 2.04 10
* indicates that the threshold is based on the number of actual votes cast rather than on the number
of registered voters. Figures in columns three and four are calculated based on the official election
results from the Ministry of the Interior.
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selected decided to run anyway (Backman & Birenbaum 1993). On the whole,
though, the pre-electoral coalitions (withdrawal and nomination agreements)
between parties on the mainstream left and right have been successfully imple-
mented and have been instrumental in reducing the number of candidates who
compete in the second round of legislative elections. Indeed, the nomination
agreement reached by the mainstream Right prior to the first round of the legisla-
tive elections in 2002 was the most comprehensive and successful electoral coali-
tion in the history of the French Fifth Republic.11
One might argue that the sharp reduction in the number of second-round con-
tests with more than two candidates after 1973 was caused by the introduction of
a larger electoral threshold (12.5%) for the 1978 elections and not the increasing
use of pre-electoral withdrawal agreements on the left and right. While it is fairly
obvious that rising electoral thresholds have reduced the average number of can-
didates qualifying for the second round, table 5.2 suggests that the higher thresh-
olds do not fully explain the drop-off in the number of second-round contests with
more than two candidates. For example, the number of second-round contests
with more than two candidates in 1997 (79) was similar to that in the 1960s,
despite the use of the higher (12.5%) electoral threshold. As I have already stated,
all but three of these 79 contests in 1997 involved an extreme-Right (FN) candi-
date maintaining his candidacy in the second round. The important point here is
that these FN candidates were precisely those candidates who were not partici-
pants in any pre-electoral pact. Thus, it seems safe to say that both electoral thresh-
olds and pre-electoral agreements have clearly helped the reduction in the number
of second-round contests with more than two candidates.
Empirically, table 5.1 indicates that electoral coalitions are much more com-
mon in the second round of legislative elections than in the first. Why might this
be the case? Traditional explanations have claimed that the French two-round
majority system does not provide any incentives to form a coalition in the first
round, because parties are free to compete in the first round and coordinate in the
second (Massart 1999). This notion of how the electoral system works fits with the
popular refrain that “in the first round, you choose; in the second round, you elim-
inate” (Cayrol 1971; Mény 1996). I believe that these traditional explanations are
wrong.
The presence of electoral thresholds creates incentives for parties to form elec-
toral coalitions in the first round rather than waiting until the second round. The
most obvious reason is that a pre-electoral pact might be the only way for a party
to make it into the second round. However, it is worth noting that there may be
benefits to forming an electoral coalition in the first round even if a party already
knows for sure that it is going to make it into the second round. Unlike American
elections, in which there are often several months between party primaries and leg-
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islative elections, there is only one week between the two in French elections. As
Tsebelis (1990, 191) argues, this short delay means that if “the two partners of a
coalition go too far in criticizing each other in the first round, they will not have
time to change their strategies in the second round and heal the wounds (even if
they wish to).” Parties could avoid these difficulties if they formed an electoral
coalition in the first round. It must also be remembered that the transfer of votes
between rounds from one candidate to another is often far from perfect. Thus,
waiting until the second round before forming an electoral coalition can be a dan-
gerous strategy (Cole & Campbell 1989). For example, Jaffré (1986) notes that
right-wing losers in the first round do not necessarily offer their full support to the
right-wing politician who continues on to the second round, even when this
politician is facing a left-wing opponent. The fact that the number of parties com-
peting in the first dual-ballot election in 1958 was half that typically found in the
proportional representation elections of the Fourth Republic provides tentative
evidence to suggest that party elites were already aware of these strategic incentives
at this early date (Bourcek 1998, 119). It is for these reasons that the traditional
explanation as to why electoral coalitions are more common in the second round
is not entirely convincing.
A more plausible explanation for the observed variation in the timing of elec-
toral coalitions in French legislative elections has to do with the distributional
issues at stake in coalition formation. Though party leaders may have an incentive
to coordinate their pre-electoral strategies in the first round and have a single can-
didate representing their camp, it is not always possible to find an agreement that
suits everyone. Hanley (1999) makes this point when he states:
If proximate parties can agree on a single candidacy on the first ballot, their
chances are maximized even more. Voters’ attention is focused on the sole real
choice (assuming that not too many are put off by the withdrawal of their tra-
ditional champion), and the possibility of winning more seats at the first
round increases. If désistement [withdrawal agreement] is one way of restrict-
ing competition, then first-ballot agreements are, potentially, an even better
one. The main problem is to strike an agreement among the competitors that
suits everyone.
Striking an agreement that suits everyone is the problem. Even if it is easier to
reach pre-electoral agreements in legislative elections than in presidential ones, this
does not mean that there are no distributional issues to overcome. For example,
such agreements still require some candidates to step down in favor of candidates
from other parties. To some extent, these distributional problems can be overcome
in those districts in which one party has a clear competitive advantage over its
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potential coalition partner. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this is precisely what
happens in those districts where electoral coalitions are formed in the first round
(Hecht & Mandonnet 1987; Spoon 2004). However, it is not immediately obvi-
ous how party leaders can reach agreement in those districts where both candidates
are competitive. After all, why would a candidate be willing to step down if he or
she has a distinct possibility of progressing to the second round and winning?
Waiting until the second round to form a coalition allows these divisive choices to
be made by the electorate. All the party elites have to agree to is to abide by the
decision made by the voters and support whichever candidate from their camp
receives the most votes. It is arguable, then, that electoral coalitions are less com-
mon in the first round of legislative elections, because party leaders prefer to let
the electorate solve distributional disputes for them.
5.1.3 Policy
Distributional disputes that lie at the heart of the coalition formation process help
to explain why pre-electoral coalitions in France are more common in legislative
elections than in presidential elections. However, they do not explain why the Left
did not consistently engage in electoral coalition building prior to the 1970s or
why the Right was more divided in the 1980s than it had been in the early years
of the Fifth Republic. Distributional issues cannot explain this temporal variation.
It is only by focusing on the policy differences among potential coalition partners
and between opposing electoral coalitions that one can explain this observed vari-
ation. The bargaining model that I presented in the previous chapter suggests that
potential coalition members with widely divergent ideologies will find it difficult
to reach pre-electoral agreements. It also predicts that electoral coalitions are more
likely to form when the opposition party or coalition is more extreme in its poli-
cy preferences. The history of electoral coalitions in France provides significant
support for these predictions.
Differences within Electoral Coalitions—One explanation for why left-wing elec-
toral coalitions were relatively rare prior to the 1970s is that the Socialist Party was
vehemently opposed to the Communist Party’s dogmatic allegiance to Stalinism.
Many Socialists believed Guy Mollet’s famous remark that the French Communist
Party was “not on the left, but in the East” (Du Roy & Schneider 1982, 25).
During the height of the Cold War, the close ties between the PCF and the Soviet
Union were a distinct electoral liability (Hanley 2002). Although the PCF was the
largest party on the left, a majority of the French electorate opposed its ideology.
This situation probably contributed to common perceptions of it as an undesir-
able coalition partner. The fact that the other parties on the left were small and
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fragmented meant that these parties could not credibly offer the electorate a mod-
erate policy if they were to govern with the Communists (Bell & Criddle 1984).
As a result, the PCF found few willing electoral partners.
The Communists did begin to seek out some limited withdrawal arrangements
for the second round of legislative elections following the disastrous results of the
1958 election. The PCF leaders had little choice but to reach some kind of elec-
toral agreement with the other parties on the left if they were to avoid being mar-
ginalized. Although these withdrawal agreements were far from perfect, they were
sufficiently effective to increase the number of seats received by the Communists
from 10 in 1958 to 41 in 1962.12 The non-Communist parties on the left also ben-
efited, increasing their number of seats from 65 to 106 (Williams, Goldey, &
Harrison 1970).
Although the PCF abandoned its strategy of militant autonomy in favor of lim-
ited left-wing alliances for the 1962 elections, it was not until the reorganization
of the Socialist Party and the Communist Party’s sustained policy of ‘destaliniza-
tion’ and democratization in the late 1960s that pre-electoral agreements on the
left became common. The revision of the PCF’s Stalinist policies derived from its
desire to reenter mainstream politics, prevent the Socialists from drifting into an
alliance with the centrist parties, and regain some of the popularity it had lost
owing to its ‘betrayal’ of the student and worker uprising in Paris in 1968 and its
timid reaction to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Besides making a com-
mitment to party pluralism, negotiated programs, and internal democratization,
the Central Committee’s manifesto of Champigny-sur-Marne in December 1968
acknowledged that while the revolution remained an end, it was no longer a means
(Gildea 1997). This revision of PCF ideology showed that the Communists had
adopted a more conventional interpretation of electoral democracy and were will-
ing to play by a set of coalitional rules that were more acceptable to its potential
left-wing allies (Jenson 1991).
The reorganization of the Socialist Party also made electoral coalition formation
on the left easier. In 1969, various non-Communist parties merged into the
Socialist Party (PS). This move was seen as part of a larger plan to eventually con-
tain the PCF within a wider left-wing alliance (Melchior 1993; Bell & Criddle
1984; Johnson 1981; Frears & Parodi 1979). By this stage, the leaders of the mod-
erate left-wing parties had accepted the conclusion that a broad electoral coalition
encompassing the entire Left was a necessary prerequisite to winning national elec-
tions.13 To some extent, this reorganization of the Socialist Party created a greater
ideological affinity between the PS and the PCF. The new Socialist Party united
three currents of the non-Communist Left that each had some sort of ideological
affinity with the ‘reformed’ Communist party. The PS accepted the dogma of the
necessary ‘break with Capitalism,’ and the PCF accepted that democracy would
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not be replaced by a dictatorship of the proletariat if the Left won. This acceptance
made it much easier for the party elites to form a programmatic alliance in 1972.
Despite these ideological changes, it would be wrong to overstate the extent to
which the PCF and the PS shared similar policy objectives. Moderate voters on the
left were never entirely willing to vote for the Communists (Frears & Parodi 1979;
Williams, Goldey, & Harrison 1970). Since Communist voters were typically will-
ing to support Socialist candidates, the shifting of the electoral fortunes of the two
parties is not entirely surprising. By the mid-1970s, the PS attracted more votes
than the PCF did. Leaders on the right still played on the electorate’s fear of
Communist rule, as this had always proven to be an effective campaign tactic. The
rupture of the left-wing coalition prior to the 1978 legislative elections was par-
ticularly advantageous for the Right (Hanley 2002; Du Roy & Schneider 1982;
Fabre 1978). The PCF actually campaigned against the Socialists, and many mod-
erate voters seemed hesitant to support a potentially unstable PS-PCF government
(Jaffré 1980). The day after the first round of the legislative elections, the Socialists
and the Communists tried to reestablish their electoral alliance (Lavau & Mossuz-
Lavau 1980). However, by then it was too late. By not agreeing to the electoral
coalition publicly and further ahead of time, the transfer of votes was not suffi-
ciently effective to obtain the left-wing victory that had been expected (Bell 2000).
Jaffré (1980) argues that “the incessant quarrels between the Communist party and
the Socialists . . . destroyed the Left’s credibility as an alternative governing coali-
tion [in 1978]. An important segment of public opinion felt that Communist par-
ticipation in a Government would have a negative effect in many areas.” The elec-
tion results confirmed the Socialist Party’s new dominance on the left—the PS
received 24.4% of the vote, compared to 20.5% for the PCF. From this point on,
there was little the PCF could do to prevent increasing levels of support for the
Socialists. In the end, being the smaller partner of a victorious Left coalition may
have seemed better than continuing with the Right’s conservative policies
(Johnson 1981). This idea helps to explain the PCF’s willingness to form cohesive
second-round (though still not first-round) electoral coalitions with the Socialists
through the 1980s and 1990s.
While ideological differences have often made the formation of left-wing elec-
toral coalitions difficult, this has never really been the case on the right. Among
the elites of the moderate Right, there are “very few real differences of policy”
(Frears & Parodi 1979, 23–24). There is also strong evidence that the electorates
of the Gaullist party (RPR) and the UDF share similar policy preferences and are
willing to support candidates from either party. At least one poll asked RPR and
UDF voters in 1986 whom they would vote for in the upcoming legislative elec-
tion according to two different hypotheses: (i) if the UDF and RPR ran separate
lists, and (ii) if the UDF and RPR ran a single list. Using voter intentions and sim-
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ulations, pollsters concluded that the unified list would receive 15 more seats than
the two parties could expect to receive running separately. Given that the Right
only had a majority of two seats in the 1986 elections, an extra 15 seats would have
been a significant gain (Bourlanges 1986).14 Other survey data have consistently
shown that most voters on the mainstream right were in favor of a union of the
two parties (Jaffré 1986; Charlot 1993; Wilson 1998; Duhamel 2000). These sur-
vey data were echoed by a growing number of French political scientists and com-
mentators (Duhamel 1995, 319–20; Donegani & Sadoun 1992; Duverger 1996,
473; Jaffré 1986, 66; Wilson 1998, 40; Cole & Campbell 1990, 133).
The 1995 presidential election provided further evidence that the mainstream
Right cannot be separated into two parties with substantive policy differences. The
UDF failed to present its own candidate and simply divided its support between
two RPR candidates, Jacques Chirac and Edouard Balladur. Although the UDF
split its support between these two candidates, there were no real policy differences
between them (Mazey 1996, 13; Fysh 1996, 74; Goldey 1997, 56; Gaffney 1997,
78). The weight of the evidence suggests that there was little division between the
‘Orleanist’ UDF and the ‘Bonapartist’ RPR in these elections.15 Instead, it seemed
that the divisions in the UDF were related to what they expected each RPR can-
didate to offer them if he won.
If ideological divisions among potential coalition partners were the only deter-
minant of how easy it is to reach pre-electoral agreements, then the Right should
have found it easier to form electoral coalitions than the Left. The fact that the
Right was much more divided in the 1980s and 1990s than earlier, even though
the UDF and RPR remained ideologically similar, therefore suggests that other
factors are also important. The bargaining model in the previous chapter suggests
that the ideological position of the likely opposition party or coalition might be
able to explain this temporal variation in electoral coalition formation on the right.
Differences between Electoral Coalitions—The French case offers considerable
evidence that electoral coalitions are easier to form when parties face a more
extreme opposition party. For example, one explanation for why the Right was
more divided in the 1980s and 1990s than it had been previously focuses on the
collapse of the PCF as the dominant left-wing party in the 1970s. The threat posed
by the Communists was largely responsible for the rise of the Gaullist hegemony
on the right and the electoral collapse of the centrist parties (CNIP, MRP, and
Radicals) between 1958 and 1962. Moderate voters were simply unwilling to sup-
port center parties if doing so risked increasing the likelihood of a Communist
government. Moreover, vote transfers on the right in the second round of legisla-
tive elections were more effective when the Left candidate was a Communist rather
than a Socialist (Frears & Parodi 1979; Williams, Goldey, & Harrison 1970). In
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sum, electoral coordination on the right was strong when there was a realistic
threat of a Communist-led government. It was only when the Socialists had obvi-
ously become the dominant party on the left that the non-Gaullist parties on the
mainstream right broke away from the Gaullists to form their own united party
(UDF) in 1978. Right-wing parties no longer had to worry about a Communist-
led opposition coming to power if they failed to sufficiently coordinate their elec-
toral strategies. The moderate nature of Socialist policies in the 1980s and 1990s
has not created overwhelming incentives for the Right to overcome its internal dis-
tributional conflicts. Mitterrand’s experiment with nationalization, state subsidies,
and minimum wage increases between 1981 and 1983 was relatively short-lived.
Since then, the Socialists have consistently implemented moderate neoliberal eco-
nomic and social policies (Schmidt 1996).
To some extent, the fact that the mainstream parties on the left and right are
now so similar has increased the relative importance of distributional conflicts in
French politics. Individual party leaders seem to be less willing to make compro-
mises under these circumstances. In the 2002 presidential elections, there were
nine candidates representing the Left.16 The parties on the left no longer felt
obliged to support a single left-wing candidate. In fact, many of the extremist par-
ties on the left justified presenting their own candidates by saying that this was the
only way to give the electorate a meaningful choice. Although extreme-left candi-
dates have typically been inconsequential, they gathered so much support in the
2002 presidential elections that the Left lost its realistic chance to regain control
of the presidency. Prior to the election, it was not clear whether the Left or Right
would win the presidency. Thus, it was all the more devastating a blow to the Left
that their candidate was unable to advance to the second round because so many
Left voters turned to parties on the extreme left.
The reaction of mainstream parties to the rise of the extremist National Front
(FN) also underscores the importance of policy differences to coalition formation.
Parties on the extreme right in France have typically failed to enjoy electoral suc-
cess or political longevity. For example, while the Poujadists managed to win
11.7% of the national vote in 1956, their support had diminished to 1.2% by
1958, and they did not compete in any other elections. Jean-Marie Le Pen’s
National Front represents an exception. Since its breakthrough in the early 1980s,
it has managed to consistently win over 10% of the vote in legislative elections.
Although the FN’s electorate does come from both the traditional left and right,
most FN voters place themselves on the right of the ideological spectrum. This sit-
uation has put pressure on the UDF and the RPR, since they have been losing vot-
ers to the moderate Left and the extreme Right. The RPR and the UDF have also
been deeply aware that the electorate is unlikely to judge them favorably if their
ongoing electoral divisions allow the National Front to win seats in the National
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Assembly.17 This situation explains why the leaders of the moderate Right have
consistently made public statements denouncing local alliances with the extreme
Right.
As time has passed, these developments have increasingly forced the leaders of
the mainstream Right to overcome their remaining coordination problems. As I
mentioned in the previous section, the leaderships of the two mainstream-Right
parties have attempted to coordinate on a single candidate in the first round of leg-
islative elections. Recently, this is less a reaction to the Left as it might have been
in the early days of the republic than a reaction to the threat of the extreme-Right
opposition gaining national power. For example, it was in response to Le Pen’s
strong showing in the 2002 presidential elections that the Right formed the most
comprehensive and cohesive pre-electoral coalition to have emerged during the
Fifth Republic. Partly as a result, the FN candidates were unable to win any seats
in the 2002 legislative elections despite the party’s strong showing in the presi-
dential elections a few weeks earlier.
The rise of the extreme Right has even led to pre-electoral agreements between
the Left and the Right. If the National Front appears to have a realistic chance of
winning a legislative seat, then the Left and Right occasionally form a ‘Republican
Front,’ in which the best-placed candidate from either camp is given a free run to
compete against the FN candidate in the second round.18 The increasingly similar
position of the mainstream parties on the left and the right has led to a situation
in which the moderate Right is arguably closer to the moderate Left in ideological
terms than to the anti-system FN. In sum, there is strong evidence that the ideo-
logical position of opposition parties influences the ease with which electoral coali-
tions form.
5.1.4 Summary
The French analysis is replete with instances where pre-electoral strategies on the
left and right have had a significant impact on who becomes president, which
party wins a legislative majority, and who gets to implement policy. It is impossi-
ble to deny that electoral coalitions matter in important substantive ways to
French voters. Although electoral coalition failure is often blamed on the person-
al animosities or plain stupidity of party leaders, the evidence presented here sug-
gests that there are some underlying systematic factors that influence electoral
coalition formation.
While the electoral systems employed in presidential and legislative elections cre-
ate incentives for party leaders to coordinate pre-electoral strategies, it seems that dif-
ficulties overcoming distributional issues have meant that electoral coalitions are
much rarer in presidential elections than in legislative ones. As I indicated in the pre-
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vious chapter, party leaders pay close attention to the electoral viability of pre-elec-
toral coalitions when making their decisions whether to coordinate their electoral
strategies. If a potential electoral coalition is unlikely to attract significant votes, then
distributional conflicts become a moot point. The early reluctance on the part of the
Socialists to join forces with the Communists illustrates this point, since the
Socialists feared that the coalition might end up losing votes, with disgruntled vot-
ers moving toward the Center and the moderate Right. When pre-electoral coali-
tions look like they are going to be electoral failures, they soon collapse. For exam-
ple, Deferre’s attempt to create a coalition between the Left and the Center in the
early 1960s failed because it did not attract a sufficiently large number of voters.
As my theoretical model predicts, ideological differences within coalitions can
influence the ease with which pre-electoral agreements are reached. For example,
the history of the Left in France suggests that the growing ideological affinity
between the Socialists and the Communists was important for reaching an agree-
ment on the Common Program in the early 1970s. Note, though, that the histo-
ry of the Right shows that ideological affinity between potential coalition partners
is not sufficient to guarantee that an electorally beneficial coalition will form. Also,
as predicted, electoral coalitions form more easily if opposition parties are ideo-
logically extreme. This finding was illustrated by the fact that the French main-
stream Right was more willing to overcome their divisions in the 1960s and 1970s,
when they faced a powerful Communist Party, than in the 1980s and 1990s, when
they faced a powerful Socialist Party.
The French analysis indicates that the timing of electoral coalition formation
matters. For example, the failure of the Socialists and the Communists to form a
pre-electoral coalition until late in the game in 1978 clearly benefited the Right.
In contrast, the Right’s early and very public announcement that they would form
a coalition in the legislative elections of 2002 bore fruit with a large legislative
majority. These examples provide some support for my decision to add a cost of
delay into the two-stage bargaining model in the previous chapter.
Finally, when French party leaders choose unique candidates prior to the first
round of legislative elections, the number of districts given to a particular party is
largely in proportion to that party’s overall level of national support. Thus, when
the small Left Radical Party forms first-round coalitions with the larger Socialist
Party, the Socialists get to put up candidates in the lion’s share of the districts.
Similar patterns have emerged, with first-round coalitions between the Socialists
and the Greens in the elections of 1997 (Boy & Villalba 1999) and 2002 (Spoon
2004). The fact that the bargains reached between party leaders in France seem to
reflect the relative electoral strength of parties provides some support for my
assumption in the bargaining model that office benefits and coalition policy are
determined by the proportional size of the players.
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5.2 South Korea (Sixth Republic)
The history of pre-electoral coalitions in France suggests that the assumptions and
implications of the theoretical model presented earlier are plausible. But are they
generalizable? In this section, I briefly evaluate the extent to which the model can
also help explain the history of electoral coalitions in South Korea. There has been
enormous variation in electoral coalition formation in South Korea since the first
democratic elections in 1987. At some points in time, pre-electoral agreements
have been reached between feuding party leaders, despite striking personal ani-
mosities. Yet it has also been the case that ideologically similar, pro-democracy
presidential candidates preferred to compete against each other rather than form a
winning coalition against the official candidate of the former military dictatorship.
As in the French case, conflict over the distribution of office benefits plays a cen-
tral role in explaining the variation in coalition formation. Unlike France, though,
electoral coalitions have been relatively common in presidential elections. I argue
that the use of constitutional term limits in the South Korean case reduces the dis-
tributional conflict that plagues party leaders who are deciding whether to form a
coalition in presidential elections.
5.2.1 Office
South Korea has not been a democracy in much of the postwar period. It was
arguably under authoritarian rule, even in the ‘democratic’ period of Syngman
Rhee between 1948–60 (Henderson 1988). After a brief flirtation with democra-
cy following Rhee’s downfall, military rule was imposed. It was not until 16 years
later, in 1987, that the first direct presidential elections were held in South Korea.
The intense coalition negotiations that have preceded every presidential election
since then have centered on the distribution of office benefits.
Consider the transitional elections of 1987. As one might expect, the only
important cleavage in this election was between the supporters of the authoritari-
an regime and those of the democratic opposition. The presidential election was
to be held under simple plurality rule, and it was clear that a majority of the elec-
torate preferred the democratic opposition to General Roh Tae Woo, the official
candidate of the military regime. General Roh was the hand-picked successor of
the military dictator, President Chun Doo Hwan. The wide gap between the pro-
democracy policies that the opposition camp wanted to implement and the poli-
cies that the military incumbent preferred created strong incentives for the oppo-
sition to present a single candidate. However, the pro-democracy camp split its
support between two leaders of the democracy movement, Kim Young Sam and
Kim Dae Jung. In spite of the significance of the elections and the tremendous
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pressure on the two pro-democracy candidates to form an electoral alliance, nei-
ther would yield. In the end, General Roh won the 1987 elections with 36.6% of
the vote. Kim Young Sam came in second with 28.0%, and Kim Dae Jung came
in third with 27.0%. Kim Jong Pil, a leader in the 1961 military coup and former
prime minister during the military dictatorship, came in last with 8.1% of the
vote. It is typically assumed that had the pro-democracy forces united behind a
single candidate, then they would have won these transitional elections (Oh 1999,
109–10; Han 1997, 52–55; Nam 1989, 317; Dong 1988, 170, 185–86,; Kihl
1988, 15).
One explanation for why the pro-democracy candidates failed to form a pre-
electoral coalition in these elections focuses on the uncertainty that surrounded the
electoral outcome. Electoral uncertainty tends to be high in new democracies,
where polls are often unreliable and voters, as well as candidates, do not have pre-
vious election results on which to base their expectations. Thus, one interpretation
of the 1987 pre-election coordination failure is that Kim Dae Jung thought his
prospects were so ‘favorable’ in a four-party race that he was willing to split from
Kim Young Sam and form his own opposition party (Kim 2000b). According to
one country expert, “It appears that both camps truly believed that their candi-
dates would win the election even with both Kims running” (Kim 1997, 91).
However, others have argued that the opinion polls prior to the election clear-
ly indicated that if both candidates were to remain in the presidential race, then
the pro-democracy forces would likely lose (Kihl 1988b). Why would the two
opposition leaders take this chance? Remember that both Kim Young Sam and
Kim Dae Jung considered themselves to be the legitimate leader of a democratic
South Korea. In terms of the theoretical model outlined in the previous chapter, it
may be the case that the expected payoff from running alone was high enough,
given that the election outcome was in doubt that neither candidate was willing to
withdraw. Certainly, the cost of reaching an electoral agreement was high for the
candidate who would be forced to withdraw from the competition. After all, step-
ping aside in this foundational election likely meant running the risk of relin-
quishing all political power in the future. The candidates may not have considered
a potential electoral loss from running a separate campaign to be such a terrible
thing, especially if they could increase their bargaining power in future elections
by polling a significant percentage of the vote.19 In many respects, this situation
mirrors the competition between Jacques Chirac and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing for
supremacy over the moderate Right in the 1980s in France. In both situations,
party leaders were willing to suffer the loss associated with having the opposition
implement policy in order to guarantee their survival as influential political actors.
The Korean political scene has witnessed a whirlwind of party mergers and
splits since the transitional elections in 1987. To some extent, this situation has
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been aided by the fact that there is an unusual absence of policy differentiation
among the various parties (Kim 2000b; Jaung 2000; Oh 1999; Park 1990). The
issue of democracy has been absent from electoral politics since the 1987 elections,
and no divisive subject other than geographical affiliation has really emerged to
take its place. With no substantive ideological or policy differences, political com-
petition in South Korea has been characterized primarily by personal animosity
and long-standing political enmity.
Despite this situation, personal animosities have regularly been put aside in the
pursuit of votes and office. For example, Kim Young Sam decided in 1990 to
merge his party with those of two former members of the military regime,
President Roh and Kim Jong Pil. Kim Jong Pil became the party leader, and Kim
Young Sam was rewarded with becoming the party’s next presidential candidate.
This coalition emerged despite the fact that Kim Young Sam had been imprisoned,
placed under house arrest, and expelled from the National Assembly during the
military regime’s rule. Similarly, despite having nearly been executed by the mili-
tary regime in 1971 (before being put under house arrest, imprisoned, and sent
into exile), Kim Dae Jung later formed an electoral alliance with Kim Jong Pil for
the 1996 legislative elections and 1997 presidential elections (Oberdorfer 2001).
These examples represent just a few of the cases in which personal enemies put
aside their differences to form electoral coalitions. The history of these coalitions
in Korea represents as compelling a case as can be made against those who would
explain pre-electoral coordination failures purely in terms of personal animosities
between party leaders.
Unlike France, pre-electoral coalitions in presidential elections are common in
South Korea. This fact raises the question as to how party leaders in Korea have
been able to overcome the distributional issues that lie at the heart of presidential
coalition formation, whereas their French counterparts have not. Part of the expla-
nation for this empirical difference might lie in the absence of ideological divisions
between Korean parties. While there is presumably some truth to this statement,
it is important to remember that a lack of ideological conflict also characterized
several instances of coordination failure within the French mainstream Right.
Perhaps a more compelling explanatory factor is the fact that according to the
Korean constitution, the president is permitted to serve only a single five-year term
(Kihl 1988a).
Consider the 1990 coalition between President Roh, Kim Jong Pil, and Kim
Young Sam. Although the presidency is by far the most important position in
Korea, the legislature does have the ability to hold up legislation if it is controlled
by the opposition (Morriss 1996).20 It was because he did not enjoy a majority fol-
lowing the 1988 legislative elections that President Roh eventually suggested
merging his party with those of Kim Young Sam and Kim Jong Pil. The new party
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that emerged in 1990 controlled a majority of the seats in the National Assembly.
The point here is that Kim Young Sam and Kim Jong Pil were probably more will-
ing to enter into this sort of electoral arrangement because they knew that
President Roh could not run again for office and would retire from politics at the
end of his term. It is precisely because a president can stay in office for only a sin-
gle term that the promise of stepping down in favor of one’s coalition partner
becomes somewhat credible. In this case, President Roh had promised to step
down and support Kim Young Sam as the new party’s official presidential candi-
date in the 1992 elections. It seems fairly clear that Kim Young Sam would have
been less willing to merge his party with that of President Roh without the insti-
tutional feature of term limits.
In fact, pre-electoral agreements of this sort are quite common. Kim Jong Pil
had formed his own party in 1992 but was able to command only about 10% of
the vote. While this result was certainly not enough to win an election on his own,
it was sufficiently large to be useful in an electoral coalition. Kim Jong Pil eventu-
ally formed an electoral alliance with another former enemy, Kim Dae Jung. Kim
Dae Jung had finished second to Kim Young Sam in the 1992 presidential elec-
tions. His problem was that although he typically won almost all of the votes in
his native Cholla region, he was unsuccessful elsewhere.21 As a result, Kim Dae
Jung was unlikely to ever win a national election on his own. The pre-electoral
coalition bargain reached between these two men involved Kim Dae Jung becom-
ing the presidential candidate for the 1997 elections and Kim Jong Pil becoming
the prime minister, with the right to choose his own cabinet.22
President Kim Young Sam was unable to run for reelection in 1997, and his
party was unable to field a unique candidate against the Kim Dae Jung-Kim
Jong Pil electoral alliance. Instead, two candidates, Lee Hoi Chang and Rhee In-
je, competed for the votes of the president’s party. Lee Hoi Chang was able to
co-opt a fifth candidate, Cho Soon, into an electoral alliance of his own. Cho
agreed to merge his party with that of Lee Hoi Chang and withdraw his candi-
dacy from the presidential race. In exchange, Cho became leader of the new
party, a position that was ‘guaranteed’ for two years (Kim 2000a). The results of
the 1997 presidential election were close: Kim Dae Jung received 39.7% of the
votes, Lee Hoi Chang 38.2%, and Rhee In-je 18.9% (Kim 2000b, 61). Kim Dae
Jung clearly benefited from the alliance with Kim Jong Pil. His support from
Kim Jong Pil’s Ch’ungch’ong region was 20% higher than in any previous elec-
tion. Given the slim margin of victory, it seems likely that the support from Kim
Jong Pil’s region was instrumental in finally getting Kim Dae Jung elected (Kim
2000b).
The fact that a coalition partner can be promised a prime ministerial position
and support as the official presidential candidate in future elections with some
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credibility, thanks to the institutional feature of term limits, has clearly facilitated
the formation of electoral coalitions during presidential elections in South Korea.
Term limits are important because they make the presidential office more divisible
across time. They are also influential because they place a constraint on the power
of the president. By weakening the power of the office that party leaders are fight-
ing over, term limits make it easier for them to compromise.
It is important to remember, though, that even if term limits make electoral
coalition proposals more credible, they do not make them sacrosanct. For exam-
ple, Kim Young Sam offered the role of prime minister and future presidential can-
didate to Kim Jong Pil in exchange for his support and that of his electorate in the
1992 elections. However, following his successful election with 42% of the vote,
President Kim Young Sam changed his mind about his successor.23 He announced
in the middle of his term that he now supported a general policy of ‘generational
change.’ This declaration enabled him to fill most of the leadership posts with his
own supporters and consolidate his grip on his party and on the government (Kim
2000b). This experience made Kim Jong Pil very wary of future coalitions, and it
was only after “two years of an intense courtship” that Kim Dae Jung was able to
get him to agree to his ‘power sharing’ plan for the 1997 elections outlined above
(Kim 2000b).
Even if term limits ease the coalition formation process in Korea, they can only
go so far in helping party leaders overcome their conflicting preferences concern-
ing the distribution of office benefits. Party leaders still have to agree on who is
going to step down in favor of whom. It turns out that South Korean presidential
candidates have employed highly imaginative mechanisms to make these types of
decisions easier. For example, in the 2002 presidential elections, two presidential
candidates used opinion polls to decide which of them would withdraw from the
race in an attempt to avoid defeat by a third candidate. Poll results indicated that
the opposition leader Lee Hoi Chang would win in a three-way race, but that
either Roh Moo Hyun or Chung Mong Joon might beat Lee in a two-way race.
The second- and third-placed candidates agreed to form an electoral coalition. The
question of who would withdraw from the race was decided by polling a sample
of the electorate after a televised debate between Roh and Chung. According to the
few thousand people voting in the private poll, Chung came in second, and he
promptly withdrew from the presidential campaign. Chung began acting as Roh’s
campaign manager, and it was widely assumed that Roh had promised him signif-
icant spoils if they won the election.24 It is interesting to note that Chung and 
Roh used the electorate to take the decision about who was going to run for the
presidency out of their hands in a similar way to how the French parties use the
electoral vote in the first round of legislative elections to decide who is going to
withdraw prior to the second round.
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5.2.2 Summary
This brief analysis of South Korea provides further evidence of the important role
played by office-seeking preferences in the formation of electoral coalitions. Other
than the foundational election of 1987, none of the Korean presidential elections
have had a significant policy element to them. Thus, policy did not hinder coali-
tions from forming. Nor did extreme ideological positions on the part of one party
encourage opposing coalitions to form, as occurred in France. Distributional con-
flict was the only significant issue in the coalition formation process. In 1987, Kim
Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung both preferred to fight each other instead of guar-
anteeing a victory for the pro-democracy forces against the incumbent military
dictator. Quite possibly, this preference was because neither wanted to jeopardize
his future role in a democratic South Korea. Since that election, various electoral
coalitions have formed between former adversaries. One factor that has facilitated
electoral coalition formation in presidential elections is the use of term limits that,
in practice, enable the benefits of the presidential office to be divided across time.
5.3 Conclusion
The theory presented in the previous chapter suggests that the distribution of
office benefits, the ideological location of potential coalition partners, and the ide-
ological location of opposition parties play an important role in the formation of
electoral coalitions. It is easier to reach an agreement to form a pre-electoral coali-
tion if the parties that are bargaining have similar policy preferences. Also, a large
enough ‘pie’ of expected office benefits is crucial. This requirement is because each
party leader will compare the expected share of office benefits and the utility of the
coalition policy if part of an electoral coalition to what he or she could get by com-
peting independently. Though party leaders will trade off the two types of bene-
fits, the bottom line is that they agree to join an electoral coalition only if they
expect doing so to make them better off. They will be more willing to sacrifice
some office benefits if necessary and join an electoral coalition when they expect
that by doing so they will be able to prevent an ideologically ‘extreme’ opposition
group from coming to power. By providing incentives to form electoral coalitions,
electoral institutions that favor larger parties will also play an important role here.
These hypotheses were supported in this chapter with evidence from France and
South Korea.
The French analysis illustrated that parties had to be sufficiently ideologically
compatible for coalitions to form. For instance, the Socialists and the Communists
were willing to consider forming electoral coalitions only after their ideological
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positions drew sufficiently close to each other in the 1970s. There was also com-
pelling evidence that coalition formation was facilitated if the policy proposed by
the likely opposition was extreme. Right-wing parties and voters in France were
able to coordinate much more effectively when the Communist Party was consid-
ered the dominant party on the left. Likewise, moderate parties on the left and the
right occasionally coordinate their pre-electoral strategies if doing so will help
defeat a candidate from the extreme right.
In addition to policy and electoral incentives, the history of electoral coalitions
in both France and South Korea clearly show that the divisibility of office benefits
matters. The bargaining model suggests that it is easier to form electoral coalitions
when the benefits of office can be divided in a manner that makes members of
both parties better off than they would have been if competing independently.
Evidence in support of this idea comes from the fact that electoral agreements have
been much more common in legislative elections in France than in presidential
ones. One explanation for this variation across elections has to do with the fact
that there are nearly 600 offices and government portfolios to share out in legisla-
tive elections compared to a single office in presidential elections. It is simply eas-
ier to divide office benefits in legislative elections to the satisfaction of both par-
ties in a coalition.
While forming pre-electoral coalitions is easier in legislative elections, the
Korean case illustrates that presidential electoral coalitions can form in certain
circumstances. In particular, the use of term limits in South Korea makes electoral
coalition formation easier by providing for the temporal divisibility of the presi-
dential office. This example suggests that institutional features that can reduce
distributional disputes between potential coalition partners will make electoral
coalitions more likely. Evidence from both South Korea and France indicate that
party leaders try to avoid conflict over the distribution of office by allowing vot-
ers to choose the coalition candidate when they can. The institutional feature of
the French two-round electoral system helps in this regard. In general, electoral
rules that allow voters to vote for more than one party should be especially con-
ducive to the formation of pre-electoral coalitions. Finally, the evidence from
France and South Korea suggests that party leaders’ personal animosity and
myopia, which receive so much emphasis in the description of campaigns and
politics in particular countries, play no systematic role in pre-electoral coalition
formation. This argument is particularly striking in the South Korean analysis.
Indeed, the old adage that ‘politics makes strange bedfellows’ is perhaps the more
appropriate observation.
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CHAPTER SIX
Empirical Implications
Testing the Theoretical Model
As I mentioned in chapter one, single parties are unable to command a majority of
support in the legislatures of most democracies. Thus, political parties who wish to
exercise executive power are typically forced to enter some form of coalition. They can
either form a pre-electoral coalition prior to the election or wait to form a government
coalition afterwards. The analysis conducted in chapter three took as its starting point
the implicit claim in the coalition literature that pre-electoral coalitions are a simple
function of electoral rules. Although the results presented in that chapter showed that
the incentives to form electoral coalitions are shaped by the specific electoral rules
employed in each country, they also indicated that the size of the party system mat-
tered, as well. Specifically, the results showed that electoral coalitions are more likely
to form and be successful only when a country employs disproportional electoral
institutions and there are a large number of parties. The size of the party system mat-
ters because there are simply fewer opportunities or incentives to form electoral coali-
tions in countries where the number of parties is small. This is the case whether the
electoral system is highly disproportional or not.
The problem with this initial analysis was that it took account only of the elec-
toral incentives to form a pre-electoral coalition. It ignored the obvious costs that
parties incur when they accept pre-electoral agreements. For example, parties that
agree to form an electoral coalition have to make compromises on a coalition policy
and a division of office benefits. Party leaders ultimately have to weigh the benefits
that accrue from forming an electoral coalition against the associated costs. The costs
may be so great that party leaders may well decide that they are unwilling to sign a
pre-electoral agreement, even if such a coalition could win them more votes or seats.
In chapter four, I presented a bargaining model that described the decision calculus
facing two party leaders who are deciding whether to form an electoral coalition.
Solving the model for sub-game perfect Nash equilibria revealed equilibria in which
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party leaders either agreed to form an electoral coalition in the first round or decid-
ed to run independent electoral campaigns. The comparative statics generated by the
model indicated that the probability of electoral coalition formation increases when:
1. the ideological distance between the potential coalition partners (lAB)
decreases.
2. the probability that the coalition wins (Pu
1, Pu
2) increases.
3. the probability that the party wins after running alone (Pi_d) decreases.
4. the ideological distance between the party’s policy and that of the oppo-
sition (li_opp) increases as long as the coalition is electorally beneficial
(Pu
t > Pi_d).
In chapter five, I evaluated these implications using detailed analyses of electoral
coalition history in France and South Korea. The evidence that I presented indi-
cated that not only were the assumptions and implications of the bargaining game
plausible, but that they were also informative for explaining the particular patterns
of electoral coalition formation observed in these two countries. My theoretical
model provided an explanation as to why electoral coalitions were more common
in legislative elections as opposed to presidential elections in France, why they were
more common in the second round of French legislative elections than in the first,
and why they were more common at some points in time than at others. The
model also helped to explain why electoral coalitions were much more common in
presidential elections in South Korea compared to presidential elections in France,
and why South Korean presidential candidates were willing to form electoral
alliances with personal rivals and enemies.
Of course, these are but two countries, and the model that I outlined in chap-
ter four purports to provide a general logic of pre-electoral coalition formation that
applies in multiple settings. As a result, I now provide a more systematic test of the
implications generated by the bargaining model using data on electoral coalitions
from 20 advanced industrialized parliamentary democracies from 1946 to 1998.
6.1 Hypotheses
As I show above, the bargaining model provides clear, testable implications. The
problem is that some of the variables in the model are difficult to accurately meas-
ure with real-world data. For example, how would one measure the probability of
a coalition winning (Pu
t ) when no coalition actually forms, or the probability of
a party winning on its own (Pi_d) when a coalition does form? While it is theo-
retically possible to calculate these probabilities through the use of survey data asking
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individuals how they would vote when faced with a variety of different coalition envi-
ronments, these data do not exist for the elections in my data set.1 Because of these
difficulties, it is necessary to reformulate the model’s implications into hypotheses
that can actually be tested with real-world data.
The model’s first implication is straightforward and can be tested directly. As is the
case with government coalitions, pre-electoral coalitions should form more easily
between parties with similar ideological positions (Budge & Laver 1992). This is the
case because the utility loss associated with having policy set at the coalition’s ideal
point rather than one’s own ideal point is minimized to the extent that the coalition
members are ideologically similar. Moreover, a party’s electorate, along with its rank-
and-file members, should be more willing to support the pre-electoral coalition if
there is no need to make significant policy concessions. Thus, the first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1:—Pre-electoral coalitions are less likely to form when the ideologi-
cal distance between potential coalition members increases.
The second implication from the model is that electoral coalitions are more
likely the greater the probability that the electoral coalition is going to win. The
probability that the coalition is going to be successful is clearly a function of the
seat share that the coalition members eventually obtain: the larger the coalition,
the greater its chance of electoral success. However, it is important to note that if
the coalition becomes sufficiently large, then at least one of the coalition members
may begin to think that it has a realistic chance of entering government by run-
ning independently. According to the model’s third implication, parties will be less
likely to form a coalition if this occurs. This line of reasoning suggests that an
increase in the potential electoral coalition size should make coalition formation
more likely when the coalition is small, but should make coalition formation less
likely when the coalition size is large. Thus, a combination of the model’s second
and third implications generates the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2:—The probability that an electoral coalition forms is a quadratic
function of the size of the potential pre-electoral coalition. It should be increasing
in the first term (size) and decreasing in the second term (size2).
This last hypothesis suggests that electoral coalitions will be less likely to form if
the coalition becomes too large, because at some point at least one of the coalition
parties will start to believe that it can enter government by running independent-
ly. It naturally follows that the point at which the electoral coalition becomes ‘too
large’ will depend on the relative size of the coalition parties. For example, imag-
ine two potential two-party coalitions, and that each expects to win 40% of the
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seats. In the first coalition, each party expects to win the same percentage of seats
(20%). In the second coalition, one party expects to win 30% of the seats, while
the other expects to win only 10%. It seems obvious that the larger party in this
second coalition is more likely to want to compete independently than are either
of the smaller parties in the first potential coalition. This is the case even though
the expected size of the two coalitions is the same. In other words, potential coali-
tions between parties that are asymmetric in size should be less likely to form when
the overall coalition size becomes sufficiently large. Thus, the third hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 3:—If the expected coalition size is sufficiently large, then pre-elec-
toral coalitions are less likely to form if there is an asymmetric distribution of elec-
toral strength among the potential coalition parties.
The fourth implication of the model suggests that when parties are faced with an
opposition party or coalition that is ideologically extreme relative to their own ideal
point, they will be more likely to form an electoral coalition, so long as the probabil-
ity of winning is larger as a coalition than running separately. This is because not
entering government and being in the opposition means receiving no utility from
office benefits and suffering a utility loss from having policy implemented by the gov-
ernment. This loss in utility might be quite significant if the government is ideologi-
cally extreme relative to one’s own ideal point. Parties will presumably want to do all
that they can to keep such an ‘extreme’ government from coming to power. Parties
will be likely to form a pre-electoral coalition in these circumstances if the probabili-
ty of entering government is larger as a coalition than from running independently.
In other words, parties will be more likely to form a pre-electoral coalition if this is
the best way of keeping an ‘extreme’ government from coming to power. As I have
argued in chapter three, there is strong empirical evidence to suggest that dispropor-
tional electoral institutions provide an electoral bonus to large parties or coalitions
through their mechanical effect on the translation of votes into seats (Clark & Golder
2006). Thus, the probability of entering government as an electoral coalition com-
pared to running independently should be larger the more disproportional the elec-
toral system. While it is not possible to know the precise identity of the potential gov-
ernment prior to the election, parties should expect to suffer a greater utility loss from
government policy when the party system is ideologically polarized. This line of rea-
soning generates two related hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4:—Party system polarization increases the likelihood of pre-electoral
coalitions when the electoral system is sufficiently disproportional.
Hypothesis 5:—An increase in the disproportionality of the electoral system will
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increase the probability of forming a pre-electoral coalition. This positive effect
should be stronger when the party system is polarized.
Although coalition analysts have suggested for years that government coalitions
are more likely to form between parties with similar policy preferences, four of the
five hypotheses presented here have not appeared in the government coalition lit-
erature. To some extent, this fact should not come as a surprise. After all, the dis-
proportionality of the electoral rules should not affect the government coalition
formation process. However, one would think that party leaders who are deciding
whether to form a coalition and contemplating possibly being in opposition
should take account of the ideological position of other potential governments,
regardless of whether this coalition bargaining process is occurring prior to the
election or afterward. Nevertheless, it is rare for the government coalition litera-
ture to address the ideological positions of other potential governments.
6.2 Empirics
6.2.1 Data and Model
The data set used in the following analysis comprises electoral coalitions in 293
legislative elections in 20 advanced industrialized parliamentary democracies
between 1946 and 1998. The countries included are Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. I do not include Israel, Malta, or Greece as I did in
chapter three, because data were not available for the ideological variables. The
slightly shorter time frame (1946–98 rather than 1946–2002) compared to that in
chapter three is also the result of limited ideological data. The data are organized
in dyadic format, both to match the formal model and to reflect the fact that the
majority of pre-electoral coalitions in my sample (68%) are between two parties.2
Therefore, each observation is a potential two-party coalition. Using a dyadic for-
mat yields 4,460 potential two-party electoral coalitions.
An example might help illustrate the data structure. In the 1983 Australian
election, there were three parties, and thus three dyads: Labor Party-National
Party, National Party-Liberal Party, and Liberal Party-Labor Party. If the two par-
ties in a dyad formed a pre-electoral coalition (PEC), then the dependent variable
is coded as one; it is zero otherwise. If a coalition forms among more than two par-
ties, each of the relevant dyads can be coded accordingly as part of the coalition.
For instance, if a pre-electoral coalition forms among three parties on the French
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left, then the dyads Communist-Socialist, Communist-Greens, and Socialist-
Greens would each be coded as one.
I follow Budge et al. (2001) and include “all the significant parties which are
represented in the national assembly” in the data set, where the significance of a
party is defined in terms of government coalition or blackmail potential.3 In effect,
no parties with less than 1% of the vote are included. Of the 4,460 potential two-
party electoral coalitions in the data set that could have formed, only 245 actual-
ly formed; this number is slightly more than 5%. As is often the case with dyadic
data, the phenomenon of interest occurs only rarely (King & Zeng 2001). The
more substantively interesting figure to note, though, is that pre-electoral coali-
tions competed in 37% of all the elections in the dyadic data set.
Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, I use a probit model
to test my hypotheses. In this model, the latent variable PEC* measures the under-
lying propensity of party leaders in a dyad to form a pre-electoral coalition. The
propensity to form a pre-electoral coalition, PEC*, is modeled as a linear function
of several independent variables:
PEC* = b0 + b1Ideological Incompatibility + b2Polarization
+ b3Effective Threshold + b4Polarization × Effective Threshold
+ b5Coalition Size + b6Coalition Size2 + b7Asymmetry
+ b8Asymmetry × Coalition Size + e
where PEC* is a latent variable that is assumed to be less than zero when we do
not observe a pre-electoral coalition and greater than zero when we do.
Ideological Incompatibility measures the absolute ideological distance between
the parties in the dyad and is a proxy for the lack of ideological compatibility in
the coalition. Data on the ideological position of each party are taken from the
Manifesto Research Group, which evaluates each party on a one-dimensional scale
that ranges from !100 (extreme Left) to +100 (extreme Right) (Budge et al. 2001).
The most ideologically incompatible electoral coalition to form occurred in the
Australian elections of 1954 between the Liberal Party and the National Party. Out
of a possible 200-unit difference, they were 99.1 units apart.
Polarization is a measure of the ideological dispersion in the party system and
is calculated as the absolute ideological distance between the largest left- and
right-wing parties in the party system. The most polarized party system in which
a pre-electoral coalition formed was in Sweden in 1985 (80.9 units), and the least
polarized party system was in Belgium in 1978 (0.79 unit). The data are again
taken from the Manifesto Research Group. This particular measure of party sys-
tem polarization is most appropriate because of the fact that government coali-
tions are almost always going to contain either the main party on the left or the
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main party on the right. Thus, parties worried about an ‘extreme’ government
(relative to their own ideological positions) coming to power will be concerned
primarily with the ideological positions taken by these parties.
As in chapter three, Effective Threshold measures the effective electoral thresh-
old (Lijphart 1994). The effective electoral threshold ranges from a low of 0.7 in
the Netherlands since 1956 to a high of 35 in countries with single-member dis-
tricts such as Canada and the United Kingdom. This variable acts as a proxy for
the disproportionality of the electoral system: the higher the effective threshold,
the larger the disproportionality. Qualitatively similar results to those presented
here are found if the log of average district magnitude is used instead of the effec-
tive threshold. The interaction term Polarization × Effective Threshold is included
to test the conditional nature of Hypotheses 4 and 5.
Coalition Size measures the percentage of the total seats won by the two parties
in the dyad in the previous election. This variable is a proxy for the expected suc-
cess of the potential coalition in the current election. The largest pre-electoral
coalition to form occurred in the Austrian elections of 1959 between the People’s
Party and the Socialist Party. Between them, the coalition members controlled
95% of the legislative seats. In order to test the quadratic nature of Hypothesis 2,
it is necessary to also include Coalition Size 2.
Asymmetry measures the asymmetric strength of the two parties in the potential
coalition dyad and ranges from 0 to 1, with larger numbers indicating a higher
level of asymmetry. It is calculated as the ratio of the seat shares of the two parties
in the dyad (Party 1 and Party 2): 
where Seatlagi is the percentage of seats won by party i in the previous election. To
make interpretation easier, this variable is then normalized to range from 0 to 1 by
subtracting 0.5 and multiplying by two. The interaction term Asymmetry ×
Coalition Size is included to test the conditional nature of Hypothesis 3.
The predictions from the hypotheses are shown in table 6.1. The coefficient on
Ideological Incompatibility (b1) should be negative, since the likelihood of electoral
coalition formation is expected to decline as the potential coalition partners
become more ideologically incompatible. The marginal effect of party system
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polarization is b2 + b4Effective Threshold. This marginal effect is expected to be
positive when the electoral system is sufficiently disproportional, i.e., when
Effective Threshold is high. Thus, b4 must be positive. The marginal effect of elec-
toral system disproportionality is b3 + b4Polarization. This marginal effect should
be positive irrespective of the level of Polarization. It follows then that b3 should
be positive. The coefficient on Coalition Size (b5) is expected to be positive,
whereas the coefficient on Coalition Size 2 (b6) is expected to be negative. This is
because the probability of pre-electoral coalition formation should initially
increase with coalition size and then decrease. This should be the case irrespective
of the level of Asymmetry. The marginal effect of Asymmetry is b7 + b8Coalition
Size. This marginal effect should be negative, since Asymmetry is expected to
reduce the likelihood of pre-electoral coalition formation when the potential coali-
tion size is sufficiently large. Thus, b8 should be negative.
6.2.2 Results and Interpretation
The results from two models are provided in table 6.2. The first column presents
results from a random effects probit model, where observations are clustered by
election in order to take account of any unobserved factors specific to each elec-
tion that might influence pre-electoral coalition formation.4 The second column
reports results from a probit model with robust standard errors. The results across
the two models are very similar. However, a likelihood ratio test indicates that the
random-effects probit model is superior.5 As a result, my inferences are based on
this model. Note, however, that the standard probit model with robust standard
errors shows qualitatively similar results.
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Table 6.1
Predicted Effect of Row Variables on PEC Formation
Variable Prediction
Ideological Incompatibility (b1) Negative
Effective Threshold (b 3) Positive
Polarization × Effective Threshold (b 4) Positive
Coalition Size (b 5) Positive
Coalition Size 2 (b 6) Negative
Asymmetry × Coalition Size (b 8) Negative
b 3 + b 4Polarization Always positive
b 2 + b 4Effective Threshold Positive when Effective Threshold is high
b 7 + b 8Coalition Size Negative when Coalition Size is high
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The results presented in table 6.2 indicate that all of the coefficients have the
predicted signs and are statistically significant where expected. However, the inter-
pretation of these coefficients is complicated by the use of multiple interaction
terms and the fact that the coefficients relate to the latent propensity to form pre-
electoral coalitions rather than the actual quantity of interest—the probability of
forming a pre-electoral coalition. Much more revealing and substantively mean-
ingful information can be obtained if we explicitly examine the marginal effect of
each variable on the probability of pre-electoral coalition formation.
A good way to examine the marginal effects of variables in interaction models
is graphically (Brambor, Clark, & Golder 2006). Hypothesis 5 states that an
increase in the disproportionality of the electoral system will increase the proba-
bility of pre-electoral coalition formation and that this positive effect should be
stronger when the party system is more polarized. In figure 6.1, I plot the marginal
effect of a one-unit increase (from its mean) in the effective threshold on the prob-
ability that an electoral coalition forms across the observed range of party system
polarization when all other variables are held at their means. The solid black line
indicates how this marginal effect changes with party system polarization. The
95% confidence intervals around this line allow us to determine the conditions
under which electoral thresholds have a statistically significant effect on the likeli-
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Table 6.2
Determinants of the Propensity to Form Pre-Electoral Coalitions
Dependent Variable: Did a Pre-Electoral Coalition Form? 1 Yes, 0 No
Regressor  
PROBIT1 
(random effects)  PROBIT2 
   
Ideological Incompatibility  
-0.007*** 
(0.003) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
Polarization  
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
Effective Threshold  
0.019* 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.005) 
Polarization × Effective Threshold  
0.0005* 
(0.0003) 
0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
Coalition Size  
0.053*** 
(0.011) 
0.044*** 
(0.008) 
Coalition Size 2 
-0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
Asymmetry 
-0.066 
(0.297) 
-0.041 
(0.218) 
Asymmetry × Coalition Size  
-0.030*** 
(0.009) 
-0.025*** 
(0.006) 
Constant 
-2.40*** 
(0.31) 
-2.08*** 
(0.18) 
Observations  3495 3495 
Log Likelihood  -625.8 -681.3 
 
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses (robust for PROBIT2). Random effects are clustered
on each election. Data: 4,460 dyads, 20 advanced industrialized countries, 1946–98.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed).
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hood of pre-electoral coalition formation.6 The marginal effect is statistically sig-
nificant whenever both the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval are
above (or below) the zero line. Figure 6.1 clearly indicates that more dispropor-
tional electoral systems increase the probability of electoral coalition formation
once the level of party system polarization is above zero. In other words, electoral
system disproportionality nearly always makes pre-electoral coalitions more likely.
This finding is exactly as predicted. Figure 6.1 also indicates that this positive
effect increases with party system polarization. Again, this result is exactly as pre-
dicted. Overall, Hypothesis 5 is strongly confirmed by the evidence.
Hypothesis 4 states that party system polarization should increase the likeli-
hood of pre-electoral coalitions only when the electoral system is sufficiently dis-
proportional. In figure 6.2, I plot the marginal effect of a one-unit increase in
party system polarization across the observed range of electoral system dispropor-
tionality when all other variables are held at their means. Again, the solid black line
indicates how this marginal effect changes with the effective threshold when all
other variables are set at their means. The dashed lines here represent 90% confi-
dence intervals. Figure 6.2 indicates that party system polarization makes pre-elec-
toral coalitions more likely only when the effective threshold is greater than 17. To 
get a sense of the substantive significance of this result, it should be noted that
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Figure 6.1
Marginal Effect of a One-Unit Increase in Effective Threshold (from Its Mean) 
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10% of the sample has an effective threshold greater than 17.
Hypothesis 3 states that an increase in the asymmetric distribution of electoral
strength among coalition partners should reduce the likelihood of electoral coalition
formation when the potential coalition size is sufficiently large. I plot the marginal
effect of a 0.01-unit increase in electoral coalition asymmetry across the possible
range of coalition size in figure 6.3. Again, all other variables are held at their means.
It is easy to see that Asymmetry makes electoral coalition formation less likely only
when the potential coalition size is greater than 11% of the legislative seats. This
finding is exactly as predicted and is substantively significant, since 81% of the sam-
ple observations involve potential coalitions that expect to win more than 11% of
the seats. Thus, figure 6.3 provides strong support for Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 2 states that pre-electoral coalition formation should be a quadratic
function of expected coalition size—the likelihood that a pre-electoral coalition forms
should initially rise with expected coalition size and then fall. In figure 6.4, I plot the
marginal effect of a one-unit increase in expected coalition size at all possible values
of coalition size, and at varying levels of Asymmetry: when Asymmetry is one standard
deviation below its mean (figure 6.4a), when Asymmetry is at its mean (figure 6.4b),
and when Asymmetry is one standard deviation above its mean (figure 6.4c).
Consider figure 6.4a first. If the expected size of the coalition is less than 34%
of the seats, then an increase in coalition size is expected to make pre-electoral
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Figure 6.2
Marginal Effect of a One-Unit Increase in Party System Polarization (from Its Mean)
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coalition formation more likely. Again, to provide some substantive meaning to
this result, it should be noted that nearly 59% of the sample falls into this catego-
ry. However, if the potential coalition is expected to win more than 43% of the
seats, then increasing the coalition size any more is expected to make electoral
coalitions less likely. Roughly 29% of the potential coalition dyads expect to win
more seats than this percentage. Thus, figure 6.4a provides strong evidence that an
increase in coalition size will make electoral coalitions more likely when the
expected size of the coalition is small, but less likely when the expected size is large.
While figures 6.4b and 6.4c provide corroborating evidence for this hypothesis,
they also allow the reader to see how increasing the asymmetry between coalition
parties modifies the effect of an increase in coalition size. The point to note is that
as we increase Asymmetry (move from 6.4a to 6.4b to 6.4c), the coalition size at
which making the coalition any larger would reduce the probability of electoral
coalition formation falls. For example, increasing coalition size makes pre-electoral
coalitions less likely when the coalition is expected to win more than 43% of the
seats if Asymmetry is one standard deviation below its mean. However, an increase
in coalition size is expected to make electoral coalitions less likely when the coali-
tion is expected to win just 29% of the seats if Asymmetry is one standard deviation
above its mean. Overall, the evidence presented in figure 6.4 provides strong sup-
port for both Hypotheses 2 and 3.
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Figure 6.3
Marginal Effect of a 0.01-Unit Increase in Asymmetry (from Its Mean)
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Figure 6.4
Marginal Effect of a One-Unit Increase in Expected Coalition Seatshare
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Thus far, I have shown that each of the explanatory variables affects the probabil-
ity of electoral coalition formation in the predicted manner. All of the hypotheses
were borne out by the results. However, it is natural to ask whether these effects are
substantively significant.7 How much more likely is a pre-electoral coalition to form
if I increase one of the variables by a standard deviation? How many more (or fewer)
pre-electoral coalitions would be observed in a sample of this size if I increased one of
the variables by a standard deviation? This information is presented in table 6.3.
The first column in table 6.3 indicates the predicted probability that a pre-elec-
toral coalition forms when the row variable is at its mean and all of the other vari-
ables are held at their means (unless otherwise specified). Thus, the predicted
probability that a coalition forms when all the variables are at their means is .034,
with a 95% confidence interval [.021, .050]. Similarly, the predicted probability
when Effective Threshold is at its minimum observed value but all of the other vari-
ables are at their means is .018 [.009, .031].8
The second column indicates the predicted probability of pre-electoral coali-
tion formation when the row variable increases by one standard deviation above its
mean, while all other variables are held at their means (again, unless otherwise
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Table 6.3
Substantive Effect of Explanatory Variables on PEC Formation
Notes: The first and second columns present the predicted probability of a pre-electoral coalition
forming when the row variable is either at its mean or one standard deviation higher, while all other
variables are held at their means (unless otherwise specified). The third and fourth columns present
the difference and percentage change in the two predicted probabilities respectively. Given a sample
size of 4,460, the final column indicates how many more (or fewer) electoral coalitions are expected
to form if the row variable was one standard deviation above its mean. All estimates have 95% confi-
dence intervals in parentheses. Confidence intervals were calculated via simulation.
Table 6.3 
Substan ive Effect of Explanat ry Variables on PEC Formation  
 
Variable 
Predicted Probability  
Mean                         Plus 1 Std. Dev.  
Difference in 
Probability  
Percent Change 
in Probability  
Numerical 
Significance  
      
Ideological Incompat ibility .034 
[.021, .050]  
.024 
[.013, .039]  
-.010 
[-.017, -.004] 
-29.1 
[-45.1, -11.3] 
-44.6 
[-75.8, -17.8] 
Polarization  
(Effective Threshold at min)  
.018 
[.009, .031]  
.016 
[.007, .031]  
-.002 
[-.010, .007]  
-11.2 
[-47.1, 38.0]  
-8.9 
[-44.6, 31.2]  
Polarization 
(Effective Threshold at max)  
.180 
[.109, .267]  
.267 
[.165, .384]  
.087 
[.009, .170]  
150.8 
[104.6, 209.9]  
+388.0 
[40.1, 758.2]  
Effective Threshold  
(Polarization at min)  
.032 
[.015, .057]  
.048 
[.023, .086]  
.016 
[-.001, .039]  
154.5 
[98.4, 233.6]  
+71.3 
[-4.5, 173.9]  
Effective Threshold  
(Polarization at max)  
.045 
[.011, .110]  
.148 
[.058, .281]  
.103 
[.037, .198]  
387.3 
[180.9, 780.9]  
+459.4 
[165.0, 883.1]  
Asymmetry  
(Coalition Size at min)  
.009 
[.003, .019]  
.008 
[.003, .019]  
-.0004 
[-.005, .004]  
2.7 
[-42.2, 52.8] 
-1.8 
[-22.3, 17.8]  
Asymmetry  
(Coalition Size at max)  
.833 
[.433, .994]  
.573 
[.167, .921]  
-.259 
[-.425, -.070] 
-33.4 
[-64.6, -7.1] 
-1155.1 
[-1895.5, -312.2] 
 
Notes: The first and second columns present the predicted probability of a pre -electoral coal ition forming when the row variable is either at its mean or one 
standard deviation higher, while all other variables are held at their means (unless otherwise specified). The third and fourth columns present the difference and 
percentage change in the two  pr dicted probabilities resp ctively. Given a sample size of 4,460, the final column indicates ow many more (or fewer) electoral 
coalitions are expected to form if the row variable was one standard deviation above its mean. All estimates have 95% confide nce intervals in parentheses. 
Confidence intervals were calculated via simulation.  
 
Golder_CH_6_3rd.qxp  6/8/2006  3:57 PM  Page 97
specified). For instance, the predicted probability of electoral coalition formation
is .024 [.013, .039] when Ideological Incompatibility is one standard deviation
above its mean and all of the other variables are at their means.
The third column indicates the change in predicted probability between the
first and second column. In other words, the third column captures the effect of a
one-standard-deviation increase in the named variable on the predicted probabili-
ty of electoral coalition formation. Thus, an increase of one standard deviation in
the effective electoral threshold above its mean increases by .13 [.037, .198] the
probability that an electoral coalition forms when Polarization is at its maximum
observed value and the other variables are at their means.
The fourth and fifth columns provide the most substantively interesting infor-
mation. The fourth column indicates the percentage change in predicted proba-
bility that arises from a one-standard-deviation increase in the named variable.
This number is often referred to as the ‘relative risk.’ Thus, a one-standard-devia-
tion increase in Ideological Incompatibility above its mean reduces by 29.1% [11.3,
45.1] the probability that a pre-electoral coalition will form when all the other
variables are set at their means. It should be noted that although the predicted
probabilities associated with the different scenarios presented in table 6.3 appear
quite small, it is clearly the case that changes in each explanatory variable can be
of significant substantive importance. As King and Zeng (2001, 711) note, “rela-
tive risks are typically considered important in rare event studies if they are at least
10–20%” when we increase an explanatory variable from one standard deviation
below its mean to one standard deviation above its mean. Note that here I am
increasing each variable by only one standard deviation above its mean.
Finally, the fifth column indicates how many more (or fewer) electoral coalitions
there would be in a sample of this size (4,460) if the named variable increased by one
standard deviation above its mean. This number is calculated as the difference in pre-
dicted probability multiplied by the sample size. Thus, a one-standard-deviation
increase in Ideological Incompatibility above its mean would lead to 45 [17.8, 75.8]
fewer electoral coalitions when all of the other variables are held at their means. If the
effective threshold were increased by a standard deviation when party system polar-
ization is at its maximum observed value, then we would expect to see an extra 459
[165.0, 883.1] electoral coalitions. Given that there were only 245 pre-electoral coali-
tions in the data set, the numbers in this column represent quite substantial changes.
Taken together, the results presented in table 6.3 indicate that the explanatory
variables not only have a statistically significant effect on pre-electoral coalition
formation, but that they have a substantively meaningful effect as well. Even a
small change in the effective electoral threshold (all else equal) can have a signifi-
cant effect on the likelihood of pre-electoral coalition formation. If all of the coun-
tries in the sample were to move from a very low threshold of 2% (Denmark in
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the 1970s) to a slightly higher threshold of 8.9% (Norway in the 1970s) while
keeping all other variables at their means, then the percentage increase in the pre-
dicted probability of electoral coalition formation would be 175%, and we would
expect to see an additional 64 pre-electoral coalitions. More dramatic changes to
the electoral threshold would have even larger effects on pre-electoral coalition for-
mation, particularly in countries with smaller or medium-sized parties.
6.3 Conclusion
Given that it is often infeasible for a single party to govern alone in parliamentary
democracies, party leaders are faced with a strategic choice. They can either form
an electoral coalition prior to the election or participate in government coalition
bargaining afterwards. The fact that one regularly observes electoral coalitions
across a broad range of countries suggests that they must offer some form of polit-
ical advantage—at least some of the time. Since electoral coalitions do not always
emerge, it must equally be true that there are costs associated with party leaders
coordinating their pre-electoral strategies. As a result, I presented a simple bar-
gaining model in chapter four, in which the decision of party leaders to form a pre-
electoral coalition depended on the associated costs and benefits. These costs and
benefits were modeled in terms of preferences over policy and the division of office
benefits. The hypotheses generated by this model were subjected to several tests in
this chapter using a data set containing information on potential coalition dyads
in 20 industrialized parliamentary democracies from 1946 to 1998. The results
indicate that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form when the expected
coalition size is large, but not too large, and when the potential coalition partners
are similar in size. They are also more likely to form if the party system is polar-
ized and the electoral institutions are disproportional.
Chapter one opened with an empirical question: Why did pre-electoral coalitions
form in the 2002 French legislative elections but not in the 2002 Dutch elections?
The results from the statistical model presented here clearly throw light on this spe-
cific question. While France typically had the highest predicted probabilities of coali-
tion formation in the sample, the Netherlands consistently had the lowest. The results
presented in table 6.2 indicate that the proportionality of a country’s electoral system
plays a major role in the likelihood of electoral coalition formation. While the aver-
age district magnitude in France is one, the average district magnitude in the
Netherlands is the largest in the sample (150). This situation suggests that it should
not be surprising to see that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form in France
compared to the Netherlands. Moreover, the fact that party system polarization is rel-
atively low in the Netherlands compared to France provides a further explanation for
the observed variation in coalition formation in these countries.
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Appendix:The Disproportionality Hypothesis Revisited
In my initial analysis of electoral coalitions in chapter three, I found evidence in
support of what I called the Disproportionality Hypothesis. Specifically, I showed
that parties are more likely to be in pre-electoral coalitions, and that these coali-
tions are more likely to be successful, in countries that have both a disproportion-
al electoral system and a large number of parties. At the time, I indicated that the
Disproportionality Hypothesis should also apply to the actual probability of elec-
toral coalition formation—electoral coalition formation should be more likely in
countries that have disproportional electoral rules and a large party system. I can
now test this hypothesis using the dyadic data set presented in this chapter.
When examining the probability of electoral coalition formation, one might think
to treat each election as a single observation and distinguish between elections in
which pre-electoral coalitions form and those in which they do not. The problem
with this response is that such an approach treats all elections with at least one pre-
electoral coalition as the same, regardless of the number of electoral coalitions that
form, the electoral significance of these coalitions, and the number of parties involved
in these coalitions. This approach is clearly problematic. The dyadic data set described
in this chapter avoids these problems and has the advantage of being able to take
account of the number of electoral coalition opportunities in a given election.
To test the Disproportionality Hypothesis as it relates to the actual likelihood
of electoral coalition formation, I use the same explanatory variables as in chapter
three, but I now employ a random-effects probit model, where observations are
clustered by election:
PEC* = b0 + b1Effective Threshold + b2Electoral Parties
+ b3Effective Threshold × Electoral Parties + e
(6.1)
As before, PEC* is a latent variable that is assumed to be less than zero when no
pre-electoral coalition forms and greater than zero when one does; Electoral Parties
measures the effective number of electoral parties in each election; and Effective
Threshold measures the effective electoral threshold. If the Disproportionality
Hypothesis is correct, then the coefficient on the interaction term (b3) should be
positive. More importantly, the marginal effect of electoral thresholds should sig-
nificantly increase the probability of electoral coalition formation once the party
system becomes sufficiently large.
The results from my analysis are presented in table 6.4. As predicted, the coef-
ficient on the interaction term is both positive and significant. But does electoral
system disproportionality significantly increase the probability of electoral coali-
tion formation when the party system is sufficiently large? To see whether this is
the case, I plot the marginal effect of a one-unit increase in the effective threshold
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across the observed range of party system size in figure 6.5.
As predicted, effective thresholds increase the probability of electoral coalition
formation only once the party system is sufficiently large. Specifically, the party
system must have more than 2.5 effective electoral parties before an increase in the
effective threshold encourages party leaders to form pre-electoral coalitions. Since
roughly 90% of the sample has a larger party system than this requirement, this
finding indicates that electoral system disproportionality nearly always increases
the probability of electoral pacts. As figure 6.5 illustrates, this effect is much
stronger when the party system is large.
It is clear that effective thresholds affect the probability of electoral coalition
formation in the expected manner. But is the effect substantively meaningful? If I
increase the effective threshold from its mean to one standard deviation higher
when holding the effective number of electoral parties at its mean, then electoral
coalitions are 203.3% [160.8, 253.9] more likely to form. Again, 95% confidence
intervals are shown in brackets. In a sample the size of the one analyzed here, an
increase in the effective threshold by one standard deviation above its mean would
be expected to produce an additional 108.1 [64.4, 164.3] pre-electoral coalitions.
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Table 6.4
Disproportionality Hypothesis Revisited
Dependent Variable: Did a Pre -Electoral Coalition Form? 1 Yes, 0 No  
 
Regressor  
PROBIT3 
(random effects)  
  
Electoral Parties  
-0.133*** 
(0.047) 
Effective Threshold  
-0.009 
(0.013) 
Effective Threshold × Electoral Parties  
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
Constant 
-1.63*** 
(0.24) 
Observations  4395 
Log Likelihood  -816.47 
 
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Random effects are clustered on each election. Data
come from 4,460 dyads in 20 advanced industrialized countries from 1946 to 1998.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed).
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Remember that this is quite a significant number, given that there were only 245
observed coalitions in the data set.
In sum, the analysis conducted here confirms the Disproportionality
Hypothesis and produces results remarkably similar to those presented in chapter
three. Taken together, the evidence presented here and in chapter three indicates
that electoral coalitions are more likely to form and be successful in countries with
disproportional electoral rules and a large number of parties.
At this point, the reader might wonder why I did not simply combine the
analyses conducted in chapters three and six in a single model. Why, for example,
do I not just include Electoral Parties and its interaction with Effective Threshold in
the model (6.1) specified in this chapter? The primary reason is that the
Disproportionality Hypothesis was not explicitly generated by the bargaining
model outlined in chapter four. Since my goal in this chapter was to specifically
test the generalizability of the bargaining model, I did not include the additional
variables necessary to test the Disproportionality Hypothesis as well. Moreover, it
is arguable that the effective number of parties or party system size is already being
taken into account in model (6.1) by the Coalition Size variable. While these rea-
sons may not convince all readers that the strategy I followed was correct, I should
note that the inclusion of the additional variables would not substantively change
any of the inferences drawn from the results in table 6.2.
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Figure 6.5
Disproportionality Hypothesis Revisited
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Pre-Electoral 
Agreements 
and Government 
Coalitions
Thus far, I have developed and tested a theory of pre-electoral coalition formation.
I found that factors such as the disproportionality of the electoral system, the ideo-
logical compatibility and relative size of potential coalition partners, and the ideo-
logical polarization of the party system affect the probability that parties will form
pre-electoral coalitions. By focusing solely on electoral coalitions, I have, to some
extent, ignored the larger context in which party elites choose pre-electoral strate-
gies. While this is a useful place to start, given our lack of theoretical and empirical
knowledge about electoral coalitions, it is important to remember that pre-electoral
coalition formation is part of a larger dynamic process, in which party leaders are
ultimately interested in government coalition formation. In other words, party
elites make choices about their electoral strategies based on how they think that
these choices will affect post-electoral outcomes. Indeed, the theory presented in
chapter four explicitly recognizes this idea by assuming that party leaders who are
deciding whether to coordinate their electoral strategies will consider the impact
that forming a pre-electoral coalition would have on their party’s chance of enter-
ing government following the election. I now begin to investigate in more detail the
relationship between pre-electoral agreements and government coalitions.
Although the literature on government coalitions is voluminous and well devel-
oped, there are almost no analyses that ever allow for the possibility of pre-electoral
103
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coalitions in a systematic manner. In effect, scholars of coalition politics know very
little about the relationship between pre-electoral agreements and government
coalitions. In this chapter, I begin to remedy this lack of knowledge by addressing
four main questions. Are government coalitions based on pre-electoral agreements
more likely to form? Do government coalitions based on electoral pacts take less
time to form? Are government coalitions based on electoral alliances more ideolog-
ically compatible? And are government coalitions based on electoral coalitions more
stable and less prone to collapse? The answers to these questions are theoretically,
substantively, and normatively important.
The answers are theoretically important, because I have argued that one reason
why party elites choose to form pre-electoral coalitions is that these coalitions
increase the probability that they get to enter government. In chapter three, I indi-
cated that pre-electoral coalitions will be electorally advantageous in many cir-
cumstances, because they can enable parties to overcome electoral thresholds or
take advantage of the electoral bonus provided to large parties by disproportional
electoral rules (Clark & Golder 2006; Cox 1997; Duverger 1963 [1954]). I also
suggested that electoral coalitions can be advantageous in situations where voters
are risk averse in regard to the policy positions of potential future governments
(Ashworth & Bueno de Mesquita 2006; Snyder & Ting 2002). Ultimately,
though, party leaders will typically only be interested in increasing the percentage
of seats or votes that they receive to the extent that doing so will help them enter
government. As of yet, I have presented no evidence that pre-electoral coalitions
actually do increase the probability that parties get to enter government. Clearly,
if electoral coalitions do not help parties enter government, then the theory pre-
sented in this book might rightfully be called into question.
The answers to the questions posed in this chapter are substantively important
as well. Consider the question about how long it takes to form a government coali-
tion. As Martin and Vanberg (2003, 323–24) note:
delay [in forming government coalitions] has important implications for gov-
ernance. The caretaker governments that administer the affairs of state while
negotiations proceed generally have no authority to take major policy initia-
tives. In addition, delay in government formation creates uncertainty. The
identity of government parties, the allocation of portfolios to particular politi-
cians and the content of policy compromises among coalition partners have
yet to be determined. Consequently, the future direction of government pol-
icy is uncertain, which may have important implications for domestic and
international economic and political actors.
Indeed, there is growing empirical evidence that uncertainty about the identity of
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government coalitions can have serious consequences on the economy (Bernhard
& Leblang 2006). For example, uncertainty over government coalition formation
has been found to affect exchange rate markets (Bernhard & Leblang 2002), the
likelihood of speculative attacks (Leblang 2002), stock market volatility (Leblang
& Mukherjee forthcoming), and the types of assets in which market actors choose
to invest (Bernhard & Leblang 2006, chapters 3–4). Given this recent evidence,
pre-electoral coalitions could conceivably have a significant substantive effect on
the economy, and on governance in general, if they are found to reduce the length
of time that it takes a government to form.
Finally, the answers to these questions are also normatively important. As I noted
in the introduction, it is reasonable to think that pre-electoral coalitions have signif-
icant normative implications for the representative nature of government (Powell
2000), because electoral coalitions increase the identifiability of government alterna-
tives, thereby allowing voters to explicitly register their support for a particular gov-
ernment coalition. Arguably, pre-electoral coalitions also increase the transparency of
the government formation process and provide government coalitions with greater
legitimacy and stronger mandates. It is worthwhile to investigate whether this added
legitimacy and stronger mandate actually translate into more directly observable
political outcomes, such as more stable and longer-lived governments. It is also
worthwhile to examine whether pre-electoral coalitions have other normative bene-
fits that can be directly observed. For example, are government coalitions that are
based on pre-electoral agreements more ideologically compatible? After all, it seems
reasonable to consider ideological compatibility as a good quality for government
coalitions to have, because it indicates a greater ideological congruence between the
electorate of the government and the policy position of the government coalition.
To foreshadow some of the analyses to come, I find that pre-electoral coalitions
do increase the probability that parties in these coalitions will enter government.
In fact, a government coalition based on pre-electoral agreements is (on average) a
staggering 123 times more likely to form than an identical coalition that is not
based on a pre-electoral pact. I also find that government coalitions that are based
on electoral coalitions are more ideologically compatible than other types of gov-
ernment coalitions. In fact, government coalitions based on pre-electoral coalitions
are almost twice as likely to contain parties that are adjacent in the ideological
space as governments that are not based on pre-electoral arrangements. In addi-
tion, I find that governments that are based on pre-electoral coalitions take much
less time to form than other types of government coalitions, so long as the gov-
ernment coalition is sufficiently large. Although pre-electoral coalitions shorten
the length of time that it takes to form a government coalition after an election, I
find that PECs do not make those government coalitions any more stable or
enduring than other types of government coalitions.
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7.1 Identity of Government Coalitions
After the voters have gone to the polls and the ballots have been counted, does
being part of an electoral coalition make parties more likely to get into govern-
ment? We know that coordinating an electoral coalition prior to an election can
increase the share of votes and seats won by the member parties. But do the ben-
efits of joining a pre-electoral coalition end after the allocation of legislative seats,
or do they continue to influence the government coalition formation process?
Elections rarely determine who gets into government in any final sense. While
some parties will be seen as winners and others as losers at election time, the pre-
cise identity of the government is normally determined only later in negotiations
between different political parties (Laver & Shepsle 1996; Cheibub, Przeworski, &
Saiegh 2004; Gallagher, Laver, & Mair 2001, 57–66). Once the votes have been
tallied and legislative seats have been distributed, there are many government
coalitions that could potentially form. In fact, the precise number of potential
coalitions in any bargaining situation after an election is 2p ! 1, where p is the
number of legislative parties. The analysis in this section builds on the political sci-
ence literature examining those factors that influence which of these potential
coalitions becomes the government coalition (Martin & Stevenson 2001; Warwick
1996; Franklin & Mackie 1984; Browne 1970).
While it has been hypothesized that various factors (such as whether the poten-
tial coalition includes a strong party, whether it is minimal winning or not, and
whether it is composed of ideologically compatible parties) affect the identity of
the government coalition that ultimately forms, the principal hypothesis of inter-
est here is the following:
Government Coalition Hypothesis:—Potential government coalitions that are
also electoral coalitions are more likely to be chosen as the government than poten-
tial government coalitions that are not based on pre-electoral agreements.
7.1.1 Data and Model
Although there are numerous potential government coalitions that could form
after an election, only one is actually ‘chosen’ to do so. Given this choice situation,
it is necessary to model the government formation process “as an unordered dis-
crete choice problem where each formation opportunity (not each potential coali-
tion) represents one case and where the set of discrete alternatives is the set of all
potential combinations of parties that might form a government” in that forma-
tion opportunity (Martin & Stevenson 2001, 38). In the analysis that follows, I
employ a conditional logit model to address this unordered discrete choice prob-
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lem (McFadden 1973; McFadden 1974).1 While conditional logit models are per-
haps more common in the political science literature addressing questions of voter
choice (Alvarez & Nagler 1995; Alvarez & Nagler 1998; Alvarez & Nagler 2000),
they have recently begun to be used more widely to examine government forma-
tion (Bäck 2003; Druckman, Martin, & Thies 2004; Warwick 2005).
According to the conditional logit model, the probability that individual i
chooses outcome m when the dependent variable y has J unordered, discrete out-
comes (potential government coalitions) is:
P(yi = m | xi) = for m = 1 to J
(7.1)
where b represents a vector of coefficients and xim represents a row vector of inde-
pendent variables associated with outcome m for the ith individual (Long 1997).
The model is called ‘conditional’ because it is specified conditional on the attrib-
utes of each outcome (or coalition) as perceived by individual i. Thus, the coeffi-
cients for the independent variables are the same for each outcome (b is not
indexed by outcome m), but the values taken by the independent variables for each
individual do differ by outcome (x is indexed by both i and m).
In testing my Government Coalition Hypothesis, I build explicitly on the
work of Martin & Stevenson (2001). They provide perhaps the most compre-
hensive overview of the government formation literature as it stands at present,
and they test a large number of hypotheses with a variety of model specifications.
I employ the model that they conclude is the best predictor of government for-
mation as a baseline against which to compare the results obtained when I take
account of whether potential government coalitions are based on pre-electoral
agreements. This baseline specification incorporates multiple attributes of poten-
tial government coalitions that have been hypothesized over the years to affect
government formation. For example, is the potential coalition a minority coali-
tion, a surplus coalition, or a minimal winning (connected) coalition (Riker
1962; Laver & Shepsle 1996; Axelrod 1970)? How many parties are members of
the coalition, and does it contain the largest legislative party, the median ideo-
logical party, the previous prime minister, or the formateur (Leiserson 1968; van
Deemen 1989; Laver & Schofield 1998; Austen-Smith & Banks 1988)? Is it the
incumbent coalition (Strøm, Budge, & Laver 1994)? How large are the ideolog-
ical divisions in the coalition and in the opposition (De Swaan 1973; Warwick
1994; Laver & Schofield 1998)? Is there an anti-system party present in the coali-
tion (Budge & Keman 1990)? Is there a ‘Very Strong Party’ or a ‘Merely Strong
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Party’ in the coalition (Laver & Shepsle 1996)? And does it matter if the poten-
tial government coalition is faced with an investiture vote (Strøm 1990)?
Martin & Stevenson do, in fact, include a variable indicating whether the
potential government coalition is based on a pre-electoral agreement. One prob-
lem is that their variable is not particularly comprehensive. For example, they find
that 19% of elections in their sample have pre-electoral pacts, whereas my own
data reveal that 42% of the same elections have electoral coalitions. The correla-
tion between my measure of electoral coalitions and Martin & Stevenson’s is less
than 0.6. Although I find more than twice the number of electoral coalitions as
Martin & Stevenson do in their sample of formation opportunities, my own total
actually remains a somewhat conservative estimate. This finding is because some
pre-electoral coalitions of two or more parties are included as a single party in the
Martin & Stevenson data set owing to the fact that their data on political parties
do not list all of the parties separately. For instance, none of the Israeli pre-elec-
toral coalitions is coded as such, since the coalitions themselves are included as
though they were single parties.
Using their somewhat limited measure of pre-electoral pacts, Martin & Stevenson
conclude that electoral coalitions do increase the probability that member parties
will enter government. The question is whether this conclusion will remain valid
once the pre-electoral coalition variable is measured more accurately. One reason
why this conclusion might be open to question is that Martin & Stevenson’s data are
based entirely on country studies in Laver & Budge (1992). The electoral pacts list-
ed in these country studies were likely mentioned precisely because many of them
had gone on to form government coalitions after the election. This situation obvi-
ously has the unfortunate consequence that less successful electoral alliances are sys-
tematically omitted from Martin & Stevenson’s sample, thereby potentially biasing
their results in favor of finding that government coalitions based on pre-electoral
pacts are more likely to form. Another problem with Martin & Stevenson’s analysis
as it relates to pre-electoral pacts is that it examines all government formation oppor-
tunities irrespective of whether these formation opportunities occur after an election
or in an inter-election period. This is a problem because pre-electoral coalitions
should only influence the identity of the government if the government coalition is
formed after an election.2 I do not expect pre-electoral coalitions to play a role in the
formation of replacement governments, i.e., those governments that take office fol-
lowing the collapse of the previous government but without a new election being
called. In effect, Martin & Stevenson’s decision to include all formation opportuni-
ties probably results in their underestimating the real effect of pre-electoral coali-
tions. Thus, there are reasons to believe that Martin & Stevenson overestimate or
underestimate the impact of electoral coalition membership on parties entering gov-
ernment. The analysis that follows resolves these problems.
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Except where otherwise indicated, I use the Martin & Stevenson (2001) data
for the upcoming analysis. The data cover the following countries and years:
Austria (1949–86), Belgium (1946–87), Denmark (1945–88), Germany
(1961–87), Iceland (1946–87), Ireland (1965–89), Italy (1953–87), Luxembourg
(1945–89), the Netherlands (1977–86), Norway (1961–89), and Sweden
(1948–88). As with Martin & Stevenson’s analysis, I focus only on those forma-
tion opportunities in which no single party controls a majority of the legislative
seats. This leaves a total of 170 formation opportunities and 24,932 potential gov-
ernment coalitions.
Before presenting the results from my analysis, I should note that the condi-
tional logit model assumes the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)
(Alvarez & Nagler 1998). This assumption requires that the relative probability of
choosing one alternative (potential government coalition) over another does not
depend on any of the other alternatives in the choice set. To evaluate the assump-
tion of IIA, I conducted a test similar to that employed by Martin & Stevenson.3
The results clearly indicated that I was unable to reject the null hypothesis that IIA
holds. As a result, the conditional logit model can be employed to investigate gov-
ernment coalition formation.
7.1.2 Results and Interpretation
The results from four slightly different models are shown in table 7.1. The first
model acts as a baseline and corresponds to the model that Martin & Stevenson
(2001, 45) find best predicts government formation (Model 10 in their paper). I
was able to replicate their results exactly. Arguably, there is reason to believe that
this model is misspecified. Although Single Party is interacted with both Very
Strong Party and Merely Strong Party, it does not appear as a separate term in their
model. This is a problem because it is well established that all constitutive terms
should be included in interaction models except in extremely rare circumstances
(Friedrich 1982; Braumoeller 2004; Brambor, Clark, & Golder 2006). If the
coefficient on an omitted constitutive term is not precisely zero, then all of the
parameters of interest will be estimated with bias.4 Because of this potential for
bias in Martin & Stevenson’s model, I present results from a model in which
Single Party is included as a constitutive term (Model 2). As I stated before,
Martin & Stevenson analyze all formation opportunities including those that
occur in the inter-election period when a government falls but no new election is
called. Because of my specific interest in the impact of pre-electoral coalitions on
government formation, Model 3 presents results when I focus solely on forma-
tion opportunities that occur following an election. Finally, Model 4 presents
results when I replace Martin & Stevenson’s Pre-Electoral Coalition (M-S) meas-
109PRE-ELECTORAL AGREEMENTS AND GOVERNMENT COALITIONS
Golder_CH_7_3rd.qxp  6/8/2006  3:58 PM  Page 109
ure with my own, more comprehensive one, Pre-Electoral Coalition (G ). Thus,
the four models allow the reader to see how the results change as I first estimate
a fully specified version of Martin & Stevenson’s model, then focus solely on post-
election formation opportunities, and then use my new measure of pre-electoral
coalitions. I show these four models to avoid confounding the effect of my new
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Table 7.1
Identity of Government Coalitions
Dependent Variable: Did the Potential Government Coalition Form the Government? 1 Yes, 0 No
All Formation Opportunities Post-Election Formation Opportunities
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
M-S Replication Add Single Party Post-Election Only PEC (Golder)
Pre-Electoral Coalition (M -S) 3.51***
(0.78)
3.40***
(0.77)
6.54***
(1.99)
Pre-Electoral Coalition (G) 4.81***
(0.73)
Minority Coalition 0.05
(0.57)
-0.20
(0.60)
-0.42
(0.89)
-0.83
(0.91)
Minimal Winning Coalition 0.92***
(0.32)
1.32***
(0.34)
2.12***
(0.56)
2.05***
(0.57)
Number of Parties -0.26
(0.17)
-0.10
(0.17)
-0.07
(0.26)
-0.10
(0.26)
Largest Party 0.99***
(0.30)
0.95***
(0.30)
0.96**
(0.38)
1.03***
(0.39)
Median Party 0.10
(0.24)
0.18
(0.24)
0.46
(0.36)
0.51
(0.35)
Ideological Divisions -4.72***
(1.14)
-3.50***
(1.19)
-4.86***
(1.75)
-4.90***
(1.77)
Ideological Divisions 
in Majority Opposition
1.04
(1.12)
1.86
(1.19)
2.36
(1.52)
3.12**
(1.56)
Previous Prime Minister 0.00
(0.27)
0.05
(0.28)
-0.02
(0.37)
0.10
(0.36)
Incumbent Coalition 1.69***
(0.24)
1.55***
(0.24)
1.81***
(0.35)
1.52***
(0.37)
Minority Coalition with Investiture -1.12***
(0.38)
-1.00***
(0.38)
-0.13
(0.55)
-0.12
(0.55)
Anti-System Presence -17.05***
(3.72)
-17.43***
(3.73)
-12.15**
(4.92)
-12.31***
(5.00)
Single Party 1.47***
(0.43)
1.51**
(0.62)
1.80***
(0.79)
Very Strong Party 1.12**
(0.48)
1.43***
(0.51)
1.78**
(0.79)
1.76**
(0.62)
Very Strong Party × Single Pa rty 0.93**
(0.39)
0.17
(0.45)
0.20
(0.63)
0.23
(0.63)
Merely Strong Party 0.34
(0.33)
0.60*
(0.35)
-0.23
(0.50)
-0.30
(0.48)
Merely Strong Party × Single Party -1.91*
(1.09)
-2.59**
(1.11)
-2.03
(1.28)
-2.25*
(1.26)
Log Likelihood -410 -404 -184 -177
Formation Opportunities 170 170 96 96
Potential Coalitions 24932 24932 11912 11912
Correct Predictions
a
42.4% 42.9% 47.9% 49%
Average p-value for rejecting IIA
b
0.75 0.69 0.89 0.74
Notes: ‘Model 1’ replicates Model 10 from Martin & Stevenson (2001, 45). ‘Model 2’ adds Single
Party as a constitutive term. ‘Model 3’ drops inter-election formation opportunities and only exam-
ines post-election formation opportunities. ‘Model 4’ uses my measure of pre-electoral coalitions
rather than Martin & Stevenson’s measure.
a indicates the percentage of the time that the coalition with the highest predicted probability actual-
ly formed.
bA p-value < 0.05 indicates that we can reject IIA.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed). Standard errors are in parentheses.
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measure of pre-electoral coalitions with the effect of the other adjustments made
to Martin & Stevenson’s original model.
Before explicitly addressing the effect of pre-electoral arrangements on govern-
ment formation, it is worth briefly considering how my adjustments to Martin &
Stevenson’s model affect some of their results more generally. Model 1 indicates
that single parties that are very strong are more likely to enter government because
the coefficient on the interaction term Very Strong Party × Single Party is both pos-
itive and significant.5 A Party S is defined as a ‘strong party’ if it participates in any
cabinet preferred by a legislative majority to the cabinet in which Party S holds all
of the ministerial portfolios. If there is no alternative cabinet preferred by a major-
ity to the one in which S has all of the portfolios, then S would be considered to
be a ‘very strong party’ (Laver & Shepsle 1996, 69–71). If a cabinet that includes
S in a coalition is preferred by a majority to one in which S makes up the govern-
ment on its own, then S is a ‘merely strong party.’ The results from Model 1 would
seem to support the central claim made by Laver & Shepsle in their much-cited
model of portfolio allocation that single parties that happen to be very strong par-
ties are likely to be in government. However, it is important to remember that
Model 1 omits the constitutive term Single Party. As a result, all of the coefficients
are potentially biased. It turns out that the inferences that one can draw change
quite dramatically once Single Party is included as a separate variable.
Consider the following results from Model 2. The coefficient on Very Strong
Party × Single Party shrinks by about 80% and stops being significant.6 In contrast,
the coefficient on the constitutive term Single Party is both positive and highly sig-
nificant. The coefficient on Merely Strong Party × Single Party remains negative and
significant. Together, these three coefficients indicate that being a very strong party
or a merely strong party does not make it any more likely that a single party will
enter government. This conclusion runs directly counter to the received wisdom
that single parties have a better chance of forming a government when they are
very strong or merely strong (Laver & Shepsle 1996).
In Model 3, I drop all government formation opportunities that do not take
place after an election. Doing so reduces the number of formation opportunities
from 170 to 96 and the number of potential government coalitions from 24,932
to 11,912. While the focus on post-election formation opportunities appears to
leave many of the results unaffected, there are some interesting changes. For exam-
ple, investiture votes no longer seem to make it harder for minority coalitions to
enter government after an election—the coefficient on Minority Coalition with
Investiture drops in magnitude by nearly 90% and is no longer statistically signif-
icant. This result suggests that Strøm’s (1984, 1990) widely cited claim that
investiture votes make minority governments less likely should be qualified. The
evidence presented here indicates that investiture votes pose a hurdle only for
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minority governments that form in the inter-election period and not those that
form after an election. Why this would be the case, however, is unclear. While
there are no additional changes in significance among the other variables in Model
3, the size of the coefficients on Minimal Winning Coalition and Pre-Electoral Pact
change quite markedly. These changes indicate that potential coalitions that are
minimal winning or based on pre-electoral arrangements are significantly more
likely to enter government after an election than they are in the inter-election peri-
od.7 Note that this finding provides support for my earlier claim that Martin &
Stevenson underestimate the effect of pre-electoral coalitions by including all gov-
ernment formation opportunities. What these results indicate is that the existing
literature on government coalitions may be missing important features of the gov-
ernment formation process by treating post-election and inter-election formation
opportunities as identical.
In Model 4, I finally replace Martin & Stevenson’s Pre-Electoral Coalition meas-
ure with my own, more comprehensive one. The results in Model 4 confirm
Martin & Stevenson’s claim that potential coalitions based on pre-electoral agree-
ments are significantly more likely to enter government than potential coalitions
without electoral pacts. More precisely, potential coalitions are 123 [29, 514]
times more likely to become the government if they are based on a pre-electoral
arrangement than if they are not.8 Again, 95% confidence intervals are shown in
brackets. Clearly, pre-electoral coalitions do help political parties enter govern-
ment, as I argued in the introduction and in chapter four.
How do my results compare with those of Martin & Stevenson, though? The
first thing to note is that my measure of pre-electoral coalitions produces a much
more precise estimate of the effect of electoral pacts on government formation
than Martin & Stevenson’s measure—the standard error associated with the coef-
ficient on Pre-Electoral Coalition in Model 4 is about one-third the size of that in
Model 3. This finding provides some evidence to suggest that I have measured pre-
electoral coalitions more accurately than Martin & Stevenson.
Recall also that there are reasons to think that Martin & Stevenson may have
either overestimated or underestimated the impact of a pre-electoral agreement on
the government formation process in their original analysis. The results from
Model 1, where all formation opportunities are included, indicate that potential
coalitions are only 33 [7, 155] times more likely to become the government if they
are based on an electoral coalition than if they are not. Thus, Martin & Stevenson’s
reported results underestimate the positive effect of pre-electoral coalitions by
369%. This finding should not come as a surprise, given that I have already stat-
ed that pre-electoral coalitions should only be able to influence government for-
mation after elections. By including inter-election formation opportunities,
Martin & Stevenson significantly underestimate the impact of pre-electoral coali-
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tions. What would have happened if Martin & Stevenson had focused solely on
post-election formation opportunities, as I do? Although I do not show the results
from such a model in table 7.1, they would indicate that potential coalitions are
695 [14, 34,061] times more likely to become the government if they are based on
an electoral pact than if they are not. Thus, Martin & Stevenson would now have
overestimated the impact of pre-electoral coalitions by 566%. Again, this finding
should not come as a surprise, since I have already stated that Martin &
Stevenson’s data on pre-electoral coalitions is likely to be systematically biased in
favor of including only those electoral coalitions that actually entered government
owing to the source that they employed (Laver & Budge 1992). In sum, there is
evidence that Martin & Stevenson both underestimated and overestimated the
effect of pre-electoral agreements on the government formation process.
How well do these models predict the identity of the government that actually
emerged in each formation opportunity? To address this issue, I calculated the pre-
dicted probability that each potential coalition in a formation opportunity became
the government and found the one with the highest predicted probability. In
Model 1, the government alternative with the highest predicted probability
formed the government in 72 of the 170 formation opportunities. Thus, Model 1
predicts the correct government 42.4% of the time. As Martin & Stevenson
(2001, 47) themselves note, this rate “is a real improvement over the usual pre-
dictive success of empirical models of government formation.” The predictive
accuracy of the model increased when I focused solely on post-election formation
opportunities. The potential government with the highest predicted probability
now formed the government 47.9% of the time (46 out of 96 formation oppor-
tunities). This last result indicates that scholars of government coalitions are much
better at predicting the identity of government coalitions that form after elections
than those that form in inter-election periods. Finally, the predictive accuracy of
the model increases even further if I use my more comprehensive measure of pre-
electoral pacts. Model 4 now correctly predicts the identity of 47 out of 96 gov-
ernments (49%). Thus, my preferred model improves by 16% the already high
predictive accuracy of Martin & Stevenson’s model.
Another way to think about the predictive accuracy of the models in table 7.1
is simply to compare the average predicted probability of those potential coalitions
that form the government with those alternatives that do not do so. If the former
is higher, then we have some indication that the model performs better than sim-
ple chance alone. In Model 4, the average predicted probability for those govern-
ment alternatives that did form was .38, whereas the average predicted probabili-
ty for the government alternatives that were not chosen was only .005. Clearly,
Model 4 does significantly better than one would expect by chance alone.
To conclude, the results in table 7.1 clearly show that the benefits of forming a
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pre-electoral coalition do not end on election day. Even after the votes have been
counted and the legislative seats have been allocated, being part of an electoral
coalition increases the probability that member parties will enter government.
Thus, parties have good reasons to join a pre-electoral coalition, even ignoring the
mechanical and strategic effect of electoral rules benefiting large parties. Note that
the analysis conducted here may help to resolve an issue raised in chapter three.
For example, the results in table 7.1 help to explain why parties might form pre-
electoral coalitions even in countries such as the Netherlands and Israel that have
fairly proportional electoral rules—pre-electoral coalitions help member parties
enter government.
7.2 Duration of Government Formation
Once legislative seats have been allocated after an election, the process of bargain-
ing over the next government cabinet begins. The analysis conducted in the pre-
vious section indicates that pre-electoral coalitions increase the probability that
member parties will enter government. But do they also have an effect on how
long it takes for a government to form? The duration of negotiations preceding the
formation of a new cabinet is a relatively understudied area of coalition politics.
With the exception of studies by Martin & Vanberg (2003) and Diermeier & van
Roozendaal (1998), very little is known about the factors that affect the length of
time that it takes a government to form. To date, no previous study has examined
the effect of electoral pacts on the duration of government formation. This dearth
of studies is somewhat surprising, given the growing evidence that ongoing uncer-
tainty over a government’s identity has been found to affect various domestic and
international economic indicators, such as exchange rate markets (Bernhard &
Leblang 2002), stock market volatility (Leblang & Mukherjee 2005), and invest-
ment decisions (Bernhard & Leblang 2006).
As table 7.2 indicates, there is considerable cross-national variation in the
length of time that it takes to form a government following an election. If one
party obtains a majority of the seats, then it is normally understood that this party
will form a cabinet on its own, and the only question is who will get which port-
folio. This situation explains why it takes only about a week (7.8 days), on aver-
age, for a cabinet to form in the United Kingdom. In countries where many par-
ties gain legislative representation, it can take much longer to form a cabinet
because it is not always obvious which combination of parties will be able to form
the government, how these parties will allocate portfolios amongst themselves, and
what the coalition policy will be.9 For example, the average length of the govern-
ment formation process in the Netherlands is about three months (85.7 days). In
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fact, the longest delay in government formation in this sample of countries
occurred in the Netherlands, at almost seven months (208 days) (Timmermans &
Andeweg 2000, 370). It is not uncommon for a formateur to fail to form a coali-
tion on the first or even the second attempt in some countries without single-party
majorities. For example, it took seven different government coalition proposals
over 106 days for a government to finally form after the 1979 Belgian legislative
elections (De Winter, Timmermans, & Dumont 2000, 315). Overall, the mean
length of time that it takes to form a government after an election is about a
month (31.8 days).10
There is good reason to think that parties that have already reached a pre-elec-
toral agreement should be able to form governments more quickly than parties
that start the bargaining process after an election. Indeed, several of the country
experts who contributed to the Müller & Strøm (2000a) volume on coalition gov-
ernments in Western Europe mention electoral coalitions (or the lack thereof )
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Table 7.2
Descriptive Data on Duration of Government Formation Process
Country Min Max Mean N
Austria 23 129 52.1 15
Belgium 2 148 59.7 17
Denmark 0 35 9.5 21
Finland 25 80 54.7 14
France (5th Republic) 1 11 3.5 11
Germany 23 73 36.4 14
Iceland 1 76 30.6 16
Ireland 7 48 18.7 16
Italy 11 126 47.3 14
Luxembourg 19 52 32 9
Netherlands 31 208 85.7 16
Norway 0 16 2.5 13
Portugal 1 45 24 7
Spain 2 58 28.6 7
Sweden 0 25 5.7 17
United Kingdom 1 18 7.8 14
ALL 0 208 31.8 221
Type of Government*
No Pre-Electoral Coalition 0 208 47.1 93
Pre-Electoral Coalition 0 129 29.2 46
All Government Coalitions 0 208 41.2 139
Notes: Data come from the Parliamentary Democracy Data Archive (Müller & Strøm 2000a, Strøm,
Müller & Bergman 2003) and cover governments that form after an election between 1946 and 1998.
Bargaining duration measures the number of days between the election and the day on which the new
government is officially inaugurated. 
* indicates that data are based only on coalition governments, i.e., single-party governments are omitted.
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when discussing the duration of government formation in their country of inter-
est. For example, Nousiainen (2000, 272) states that coalition building in Finland
is a “complicated and time-consuming process,” owing in part to the fact that
there are no party alliances. As table 7.2 illustrates, this observation is reflected in
the fact that Finnish governments take about 54.7 days, on average, to form.
Thiébault (2000, 506) makes a similar point when he points out that government
formation in France tends to be rapid precisely because the parties are so often
“linked by an electoral alliance.” This situation helps to explain why it takes only
about 3.5 days on average for a French government to take office after an election.
Likewise Saalfeld (2000, 47) claims in his discussion of German governments that
the “phase of orientation and intra-party talks about important policy issues and
possible coalition partners . . . can be very short or skipped if there has been a pre-
election pact.” Thus, there is already considerable anecdotal evidence suggesting
that governments based on electoral coalitions should take less time to form than
other governments.
Slightly more systematic evidence is shown in the bottom of table 7.2, where I
compare the average length of time that it takes a coalition government to form
after an election when it is based on a pre-electoral agreement and when it is not.
This section of table 7.2 only includes data on coalition governments and, there-
fore, omits the single-party cabinets found in the United Kingdom and Spain. The
data indicate that it takes a government 47.1 days on average to form if it is not
based on a pre-electoral coalition, and only 29.2 days if it is. This difference in
average bargaining time is statistically significant at the 99% level. This prelimi-
nary look at the effect of pre-electoral coalitions on the length of time it takes to
form a government suggests that electoral pacts do speed up the process of gov-
ernment formation.
Note, though, that one would expect pre-electoral agreements to have an effect
on bargaining delays only if there are a sufficient number of parties bargaining over
government formation. For example, if the number of parties in the government
is zero (a non-partisan government) or one (a single-party government), then it is
impossible for such a government to be based on a pre-electoral pact. Thus, logi-
cally it must be the case that the number of parties in the government is two or
more for pre-electoral coalitions to have an effect. Note, also, that it probably takes
longer to form a government when there are many parties bargaining over gov-
ernment formation (Martin & Vanberg 2003). This longer period is because an
increase in the number of parties in a potential government is likely to induce
delay by exponentially expanding the number of possible portfolio allocations. It
is also because an increase in the size of the potential government is likely to reduce
the range of policies acceptable to all of the potential members and create a need
for a more detailed coalition agreement; this result, in turn, is likely to cause a fur-
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ther delay in government formation (Tsebelis 2002). It follows that pre-electoral
coalitions should have an even stronger reductive effect on the length of time that
it takes to form a government if that government contains many parties. Thus, the
principal hypothesis to be tested in this section is the following:
Pre-Electoral Coalition Hypothesis:—Pre-electoral agreements will reduce the
length of time that it takes to form a government so long as there are at least two
parties in the government. The size of this reductive effect will increase with the
number of parties in the government.
A detailed examination of how pre-electoral agreements affect the delay in govern-
ment formation should probably control for other factors, such as whether the
incumbent government wins the election, the ideological compatibility of the poten-
tial government, and the existence of investiture requirements, that might plausibly
be thought to affect the length of time that it takes to form a government. For exam-
ple, it should be the case that governments that were in power prior to an election
should form more quickly than governments that include non-incumbent parties.
This prediction is because these ‘incumbent’ governments have presumably already
resolved some of their policy differences while in power and may well have already
begun negotiations on an allocation of portfolios and coalition policy prior to the
election. Governments that are ideologically compatible should also reduce the dura-
tion of coalition negotiations compared to those that are not, because party leaders
should “be better able to judge which kinds of proposals are acceptable to parties that
are ideologically close to their own than for parties that are more ideologically dis-
tant” (Martin & Vanberg 2003, 325). Finally, investiture votes are thought to pose
a particular hurdle for the formation of minority governments (Strøm 1990, 25). As
a result, one might reasonably infer that an investiture requirement slows the for-
mation process for minority governments. One reason is that the formateur has to
spend more time gathering information to make sure that the proposed government
coalition can actually pass the investiture vote in this situation. In contrast to minor-
ity governments, investiture requirements pose no real obstacle to other forms of
government because, by definition, they already control majority support in the leg-
islature. Thus, the additional hypotheses to be examined are as follows:
Incumbent Government Hypothesis:—Governments that were in power prior to
an election should take office more quickly than governments that include non-
incumbent parties.
Ideological Compatibility Hypothesis:—Governments that are more ideological-
ly incompatible should take longer to form.
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Investiture Hypothesis:—Investiture requirements should slow the formation of
minority governments.
7.2.1 Data and Model
I tested these hypotheses using survival (event history) analysis. The central con-
cept in survival analysis is the hazard function or hazard rate, h(t). This hazard rate
is the probability that an ‘event’ will occur at a particular point in time, given that
the ‘event’ has yet to occur. In terms of the analysis here, the ‘event’ in question is
the formation of a government.11 One of the issues with employing survival analy-
sis is in choosing a model that appropriately parameterizes this baseline hazard rate
(or time dependency). In the analysis that follows, I base my inferences on results
from a Weibull model that allows for monotonically increasing or decreasing haz-
ard rates.12 Although I show the results from a Cox proportional hazards model
alongside those from the Weibull model in table 7.3 to indicate their equivalence,
I prefer to base my inferences on the Weibull analysis, because I wish to evaluate
the effect of pre-electoral coalitions on the expected duration of government bar-
gaining delays rather than simply on the hazard ratios (Cleves, Gould, & Gutierrez
2004, 232).
With the exception of the variable Pre-Electoral Coalition, indicating whether the
government is based on a pre-electoral pact, the data employed in the upcoming
analysis come from the Parliamentary Democracy Data Archive (PDDA), unless
otherwise stated (Müller & Strøm 2000a; Strøm, Müller, & Bergman 2003).13
Government Parties indicates the number of parties in the government. The inter-
action term Pre-Electoral Coalition × Government Parties is required to test the con-
ditional nature of the Pre-Electoral Coalition Hypothesis. Incumbent Government
indicates whether the government was the incumbent government at election time.
Investiture indicates whether the government faced an investiture vote, and Minority
Government specifies whether the government was a minority government. The
interaction term Investiture × Minority Government is required to test the condi-
tional nature of the Investiture Hypothesis. Finally, Ideological Range measures the
absolute difference in the ideological positions of the two governmental parties that
are furthest apart on the left-right policy dimension according to data from the
Manifesto Research Group (Budge et al. 2001). This variable is simply calculated as
*xR!xL*, where xR is the ideological position of the governmental party furthest to
the right and xL is the ideological position of the governmental party furthest to the
left. Government Formation Duration is the dependent variable that measures the
number of days from the election to the day on which the new government is offi-
cially inaugurated. The sample includes data on all cabinets that formed after an
election from 1946 to 1998 in the 16 countries listed in table 7.2.
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7.2.2 Results and Interpretation
The results from my analysis are shown in table 7.3. The coefficients in table 7.3
are expressed as proportional hazard estimates. As a result, a positive coefficient
indicates that the covariate in question increases the hazard rate or reduces the
length of time that it takes to form a government. Conversely, a negative coeffi-
cient implies that the covariate reduces the hazard rate or delays the formation of
a government. I employ robust standard errors clustered by country to take
account of the fact that the observations in each country may not be independent.
The principal hypothesis of interest relates to the effect of pre-electoral coali-
tions on the duration of government bargaining delays. The fact that the coeffi-
cient on Pre-Electoral Coalition is indistinguishable from zero indicates that elec-
toral pacts have no effect on the duration of government formation when the
number of parties in government is zero (or the government is non-partisan). This
finding is exactly as predicted. However, there is strong evidence that pre-electoral
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Table 7.3
Determinants of the Duration of Government Formation Process
Independent Variables Weibull Cox
Pre-Electoral Coalition !1.16
(0.92)
!1.38
(0.99)
Government Parties !0.35***
(0.12)
!0.40***
(0.13)
Pre-Electoral Coalition × 
Government Parties
0.60**
(0.28)
0.68**
(0.31)
Incumbent Government !0.002
(0.19)
0.02
(0.19)
Ideological Range !0.002
(0.006)
!0.001
(0.006)
Investiture 0.06
(0.33)
0.11
(0.33)
Minority Government 0.67
(0.47)
0.66
(0.47)
Investiture × 
Minority Government
!0.75
(0.50)
!0.79
(0.51)
Constant !3.47***
(0.89)
ln r (shape parameter) 0.16
(0.12)
Log Likelihood !261.74 !743.06
Observations 182 182
Notes: Weibull and Cox proportional hazards estimates; robust standard errors clustered by country
in parentheses. A test using Schoenfeld residuals indicates that the proportional hazards assumption
is not violated. The Efron method is employed for handling ties in the Cox model. Data are based on
post-electoral coalition cabinets from the 16 countries shown in table 7.2 between 1946 and 1998. 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 (two-tailed).
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agreements do start to increase the hazard rate or shorten the time it takes to form
a government as the number of government parties increases. This finding is
because the coefficient on the interaction term Pre-Electoral Coalition ×
Government Parties is positive and significant, as predicted.
To better illustrate the effect of pre-electoral coalitions on government bargain-
ing delays, I plot the marginal effect of electoral pacts on expected bargaining
duration, measured in days, across the observed range of the number of govern-
ment parties in figure 7.1, using the results from the Weibull model.14 Ideological
Range is set at its mean value, while Investiture, Minority Government, and
Incumbent Government are all set to zero. The solid line is the marginal effect of
pre-electoral arrangements on expected bargaining duration, and the dashed lines
are 95% confidence intervals. The marginal effect is significant whenever both the
upper and lower bounds are above (or below) the zero line. (Please refer to equa-
tion (7.2) in note 14.)
As predicted, pre-electoral coalitions never have a significant reductive effect on
expected bargaining delays when the number of parties in government is less than
two. This result should come as no surprise, since electoral coalitions require at
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Figure 7.1
Marginal Effect of PECs on Expected Bargaining Duration in Days
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least two parties. However, electoral pacts do significantly shorten the time that it
takes to form a government once there are more than 2.9 governmental parties.
This finding is substantively meaningful, since roughly 50% of all coalition cabi-
nets comprise more than two parties. A three-party government not based on a
pre-electoral pact would take about 22 additional days to form than an identical
cabinet based on an electoral coalition. Thus, in this case one would have about
three extra weeks without an operational government. A four-party government
not based on a pre-electoral coalition would mean about seven extra weeks (50
days) without an operational government. Clearly, pre-electoral agreements short-
en the time that it takes a government to take office after an election.
What about the other hypotheses? First, there is strong evidence that increasing
the number of parties in the potential government will increase the length of coali-
tion negotiations so long as there is no pre-electoral pact, because the coefficient
on Government Parties is negative and significant. In fact, the results from the
Weibull model indicate that an extra party in the government when there is no
pre-electoral coalition will decrease the hazard rate by 29% [10, 44]. Again, 95%
confidence intervals are shown in brackets. At first sight, this result might seem to
confirm Martin & Vanberg’s (2003, 327) claim that large coalitions have longer
government bargaining delays. However, it should be noted that increases in coali-
tion size do not cause additional bargaining delays if the government is based on
a pre-electoral coalition, because the marginal effect of Government Parties when
there is a pre-electoral coalition is now positive rather than negative (!0.35 + 0.60
= 0.25). Perhaps this is evidence that pre-electoral pacts resolve the bargaining dif-
ficulties that arise with large government coalitions prior to the election, rather
than leaving them to be resolved after the election. Thus, coalition size affects gov-
ernment bargaining delays only when there is no pre-electoral agreement.
Second, there is no evidence to support Martin & Vanberg’s (2003, 332) claim
that “minority governments must endure a longer bargaining process than major-
ity governments.” The fact that the coefficient on Minority is not significant indi-
cates that minority governments that do not face an investiture vote have no sig-
nificant effect on government bargaining delays. Although the coefficient on
Investiture × Minority Government is negative as predicted, it is statistically insignif-
icant. Together, these results clearly indicate that minority governments have no
more trouble putting a government together than do majority governments, irre-
spective of whether they face an investiture vote or not. The results also confirm
the findings made by Diermeier & van Roozendaal (1998, 621–22) that investi-
ture votes have no significant effect on government bargaining delays.
Finally, what about the effect of incumbency status and ideological compatibil-
ity? Contrary to expectations, experience of being in office together in the imme-
diate past does not seem to shorten the time that it takes to form a cabinet. Also
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contrary to expectations, ideological divisions within an incoming government
have no significant effect on government bargaining delays.15 This last finding con-
tradicts Martin & Stevenson’s (2003, 331) claim that ideological divisions signifi-
cantly increase government bargaining delays.
To conclude, countries that routinely have government cabinets consisting of
more than two parties could significantly reduce the period of time in which no
major policies can be implemented while everyone waits for a new government to
take office by promoting pre-electoral coalition formation. Given the effect of the
extra uncertainty over the identity of the government that bargaining delays are
likely to induce, such a reduction may well have significant positive consequences
for various political and economic indicators.
7.3 Ideological Compatibility of Government Coalitions
Thus far, I have shown that pre-electoral coalitions affect the likelihood that mem-
ber parties will enter government and how long those governments take to form.
But do they also affect the ideological compatibility of the government coalition
that forms? In chapter six, I showed that ideological compatibility between poten-
tial coalition partners makes it more likely that these parties will reach a pre-elec-
toral agreement. A similar result holds in the existing coalition literature regarding
government coalitions—strong evidence indicates that government coalitions are
more likely to form between ideologically similar parties. The question addressed
in this section is whether governments based on pre-electoral agreements are more
ideologically compatible than government coalitions that are not based on elec-
toral pacts.
In chapter four, I speculated that governments based on pre-electoral agree-
ments would be more ideologically compatible. This speculation rested on the
belief that the ideological compatibility constraint facing potential coalitions will
be stronger prior to elections than afterward, because voters might be unwilling to
vote for electoral coalitions comprising parties with incompatible or incoherent
policy preferences. At the very least, parties with wildly different policy agendas are
unlikely to form an appealing coalition in the eyes of their electorates, with regu-
lar voters probably hesitating to support such an electoral pact. This concern with
how the ideological divisions within a potential electoral coalition might affect its
electoral success is often reflected in the decision of party elites to invest consider-
able resources to explicitly measure the coalition’s expected electoral consequences
(Kaminski 2002). For example, there is evidence that party leaders sometimes
employ private polling companies to carry out surveys asking voters whether they
would support particular coalition arrangements (Kaminski 2001).
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Note that I am not claiming that government coalitions do not face ideological
compatibility constraints; of course, they do (Warwick 2005). It is entirely rea-
sonable to think that parties feel constrained in their coalition choices even after
an election, owing to the fact that voters could potentially punish ideologically
incompatible governments at subsequent elections. However, if party leaders think
that a particular ‘incompatible’ coalition is likely to be successful in office, then
they may gamble that voters will not punish them in the next election. Party lead-
ers might also be willing to form incompatible government coalitions after an elec-
tion if they have a high discount rate. In other words, party leaders might prefer
to get the benefits of office and the ability to make policy today, even though they
know that they will be punished in the future. Indeed, we know empirically that
ideologically incompatible coalitions do sometimes form after elections (Brams,
Jones, & Kilgour 2002). All I am claiming is that one might expect that parties
have additional leeway to form more ideologically incompatible coalitions after an
election, because voters are no longer such an immediate constraint on their
actions. Of course, whether this is the case is an empirical question and one that,
to my knowledge, has never been addressed before. Thus, the principal hypothe-
sis tested in this section is the following:
Ideological Compatibility Hypothesis:—Governments based on pre-electoral
arrangements should be more ideologically compatible, on average, than govern-
ments that are not.
7.3.1 Data and Results
I employ a variety of different measures of ideological compatibility to test this
hypothesis. I use data from the Manifesto Research Group detailing the positions
of parties on the traditional left-right policy dimension to construct measures of
the range and spread of ideological diversity in coalition governments for 17 par-
liamentary democracies from 1946 to 1998 (Budge et al. 2001). The left-right pol-
icy dimension ranges from !100 on the left to +100 on the right. The countries
covered are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France (both the
Fourth and Fifth Republics), Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden. Canada, Spain,
and the United Kingdom are excluded, since the data indicate that these countries
have never experienced coalition governments.16 As in the previous section, the range
of ideological diversity is calculated as *xR!xL*, where xR is the ideological position
of the governmental party furthest to the right and xL is the ideological position of
the governmental party furthest to the left. The spread of ideological diversity 
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is calculated as where pi is party i’s proportion of government-con-
trolled seats in the legislature, xi is party i’s ideological position on the left-right 
policy scale, x is the weighted mean policy position of the government
and n refers to the number of  parties in the government (Warwick 1994, 154).
Some descriptive statistics are shown in table 7.4. The most incompatible gov-
ernment coalition in terms of its ideological range (90.5) is a Finnish government
coalition in 1946 that includes the Swedish People’s Party, Center Party,
Conservatives, and Liberals (the parties are listed from furthest left to furthest
right). This government is not based on a pre-electoral agreement. In contrast, the
three government coalitions with the lowest range of ideological diversity are all
based on pre-electoral agreements. The data in table 7.4 clearly indicate that the
average range of ideological diversity for governments that are not based on an
electoral agreement (29.0) is higher than that for governments that are based on
pre-electoral coalitions (22.3). A difference in means test indicates that we can be
98% confident that governments that are not based on electoral pacts are more
incompatible in terms of their ideological range than governments that are based
on electoral pacts. The data also indicate that governments that are not based on
pre-electoral agreements have greater ideological spread (11.4) on average than
governments that are based on pre-electoral agreements (9.2). A difference in
means test confirms that we can be 95% confident of this result. Thus, govern-
ments that are based on pre-electoral coalitions are more ideologically compatible
in terms of both their range and their spread than those that are unconstrained by
electoral alliances.
While these data are informative and support my Ideological Compatibility
Hypothesis, one might reasonably question whether it is meaningful to compare
the ideological compatibility of government coalitions across countries in this way.
The data from the Manifesto Research Group may indicate that Party A and Party
B in country 1 are ideologically further apart than, say, Party C and Party D in
country 2. But is it meaningful to compare these two distances? For example, it
might be the case that the party system in country 1 is simply more ideologically
diverse than the party system in country 2. If this were the case, then voters in
country 1 might very well have a different view of what constitutes an ideologi-
cally incompatible coalition than voters in country 2. Even if one ignores the dif-
ficulties that arise if one party system is more ideologically diverse than the other,
it might also be the case that Parties A and B in country 1 are actually adjacent to
each other in the ideological space, while Parties C and D in country 2 are sepa-
rated by some other party or parties. Again, this type of scenario would probably
affect voters’ perceptions of the ideological compatibility of a particular coalition.
An alternative measure of ideological compatibility that sidesteps these poten-
tial problems focuses on whether or not the government coalition is a ‘connected’
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coalition. Since a connected coalition is one in which the coalition members are
all adjacent to each other in the ideological space, they are more ideologically com-
patible than unconnected coalitions (Riker 1962). I constructed two different
measures of whether a government coalition is connected or not. The first meas-
ure is based on data from Müller & Strøm (2000a) and Indriðason (2004) and
covers Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France (Fifth Republic only),
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
and Sweden from 1946 to 1998. Using this measure, I found that 82.6% of gov-
ernments based on pre-electoral coalitions have members who are adjacent in the
ideological space; only 46.4% of governments that are not based on electoral coali-
tions have connected members. A difference in proportions test indicated that we
can be over 99% confident that this difference is statistically significant. The sec-
ond measure is based on data from the Manifesto Research Group (Budge et al.
2001). This second measure includes all of the countries just mentioned, as well
as Australia, the French Fourth Republic, Japan, and New Zealand. Using this
measure, I found that 61.7% of governments based on pre-electoral coalitions
have members who are adjacent in the ideological space; only 42.4% of govern-
ments that are not based on electoral coalitions have connected members. A dif-
ference in proportions test indicated that we can be 95% confident that this dif-
ference is statistically significant. Thus, both measures of connected coalitions pro-
vide support for my Ideological Compatibility Hypothesis.
To conclude, there is strong evidence that governments based on pre-electoral
coalitions are more ideologically compatible than those that are not. I have illus-
trated this idea with several different measures of ideological compatibility and a
variety of data sources. It seems clear that governments that have no electoral
alliances to take into account are less constrained by ideological compatibility con-
cerns than are governments based on electoral alliances. As I argued earlier, this
result should not come as a surprise, since voters are likely to be put off by a pre-
electoral coalition that they judge to be ideologically incompatible. One of the
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Table 7.4
PECs and Ideological Compatibility
All Governments No Pre-Electoral Pact Pre-Electoral Pact
Measure Min Max Mean N Mean N Mean N
Range 0 90.5 26.0 159 29.0 99 22.3 60
Spread 0 36.2 10.6 159 11.4 99 9.2 60
Notes: Data come from the Manifesto Research Group (Budge et al. 2001) and cover 159 govern-
ments that formed after an election in 17 parliamentary democracies from 1946 to 1998.
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implications of this analysis is that the policy position of a government based on
an electoral pact is likely to be more congruent with that of its electorate than the
policy position of governments that are not constrained by a pre-electoral agree-
ment. This is another normatively appealing feature of pre-electoral coalitions.
7.4 Stability of Government Coalitions
I have shown that pre-electoral coalitions improve the chances that a party will
enter government, they shorten the time that is needed to form a government, and
they make governments more ideologically compatible. Few government scholars
would deny that these consequences of electoral coalitions are positive from a nor-
mative standpoint. In the introduction, I also argued that pre-electoral coalitions
offer significant normative advantages, owing to their effect on the representative
nature of government (Powell 2000). Electoral pacts increase the identifiability of
government alternatives and allow voters to make a meaningful choice between
them. By making the government formation process more transparent, it is
arguable that pre-electoral agreements also provide the incoming government with
increased legitimacy and a stronger mandate. It seems reasonable to think that this
added legitimacy and stronger mandate might translate into the more directly
observable effect of more stable and longer-lived governments. The fact that cabi-
nets based on pre-electoral agreements also tend to be more ideologically compat-
ible provides another reason to suspect that they would survive longer than gov-
ernments that have not reached an electoral pact. This expectation is because ide-
ological compatibility should reduce the occurrence of policy conflicts and, hence,
the likelihood of government breakdown (Warwick 1994; Laver & Schofield
1998). In addition, one might also think that pre-electoral coalitions improve gov-
ernment stability by increasing the speed with which governments actually take
office, because a speedy government formation probably indicates a less complex
bargaining environment and, hence, a more stable political situation (King et al.
1990). Given these claims, the principal hypothesis to be tested in this section is:
Government Survival Hypothesis:—Governments based on pre-electoral agree-
ments should last longer than governments that are not.
In order to test this hypothesis, one might want to control for other factors that
are hypothesized to affect government survival. Over the past few decades, there
have been numerous studies of government duration (Warwick 1979; Cioffi-
Revilla 1984; Browne, Frendreis, & Gleiber 1986; King et al. 1990; Warwick &
Easton 1992; Warwick 1994; Alt & King 1994; Lupia & Strøm 1995; Grofman
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& van Roozendaal 1997; Diermeier & Stevenson 1999; Druckman & Thies
2002). Although few would deny that this literature has significantly improved
our understanding of government survival, it is arguable that the accumulation of
knowledge in this area is often overstated. One reason for being critical of the
existing literature is its disproportionate focus on empirical analysis in the absence
of a coherent theoretical model (Laver 2003).17 This situation often results in one
set of scholars providing a plausible, but ad hoc, theoretical argument why the
effect of a particular variable should come out one way, and a different set of schol-
ars providing an equally plausible and ad hoc theory suggesting that it should
come out another way.18 While this criticism is obviously of some concern, a big-
ger problem revealed by my own investigatory analyses is that many of the results
reported in the literature are not robust to the sample of countries examined; the
precise specification of the survival model; the variables that are included; how
those variables are constructed; and whether one focuses only on those govern-
ments that form after an election, or whether one also includes governments that
form in the inter-election period.
A logical approach to examining the effect of pre-electoral coalitions on gov-
ernment duration would be to start with a sound baseline model that is well
accepted in the literature. However, such a model does not really exist; Laver
(2003) is correct when he complains that it is not entirely clear at this point
which independent variables ought to be included in a model of government
duration. Part of the problem is that the existing literature often shows more
interest in the specific methodology employed to examine government duration
than in the substantive results themselves.19 While this focus on methodological
issues has clearly been fruitful, it appears to have had the consequence that some
scholars have adopted pre-existing models without explicitly addressing whether
the included variables are suitable or constructed appropriately to test their the-
ories. For example, some recent studies have adopted a model by Warwick as
their starting point (Diermeier & Stevenson 1999; Druckman & Thies 2002).
These studies do not mention the problems that arise from the fact that this
baseline model was generated using “a backward-elimination stepwise proce-
dure” (Warwick 1994, 41).20 Depending on one’s theoretical question, the
appropriateness of this baseline model may also be called into question by
Warwick’s decision throughout most of his book to define the government as
including parties in the cabinet, as well as formal or declared support parties in
the legislature (Warwick 1994, 30–32).21 Given my interest in the effect of pre-
electoral coalitions on government duration, this definition is clearly inappro-
priate for testing the Government Survival Hypothesis—theoretically, I am
interested only in the parties that are formally in the cabinet. I should be very
clear here that my purpose is not to criticize Warwick’s model in particular, but
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simply to illustrate that there is no baseline model of government duration that
is well accepted in the literature.
Regardless of the absence of a solid and widely accepted baseline model, it is
still necessary to control for other factors when testing my Government Survival
Hypothesis. In the upcoming analysis, I control for various attributes of the gov-
ernment, the legislature, and the country. In terms of government attributes, one
would expect governments that control a majority of seats to survive longer than
minority governments, because they are less likely to be defeated in the legislature
(King et al. 1990; Warwick 1994; Laver & Schofield 1998). One would also
expect single-party governments to survive longer than coalition governments,
because they should be able to reach agreements more easily (Warwick 1994). It is
also plausible that ideological compatibility should help governments stay in office
longer. Again, this expectation is because the government should have fewer poli-
cy conflicts and be able to reach agreements more easily (Warwick 1994; Laver &
Schofield 1998). Caretaker governments should not last as long as other forms of
government, because the very nature of a ‘caretaker’ government is that it should
be in power for only an interim period while a proper government is formed (King
et al. 1990; Warwick 1994). There is some dispute as to whether governments that
form after multiple formation attempts should be less likely to survive than those
that form more quickly. On the one hand, King et al. (1990, 859) and Laver &
Schofield (1998, 162) claim that a higher number of foiled attempts will reduce
government duration, because a higher number of attempts indicate a difficult
bargaining environment and a higher number of potential governments. On the
other hand, Warwick (1994, 37) suggests that the very difficulty experienced in
forming the government might oblige parties to stick with the existing coalition.
In terms of legislature attributes, one would expect legislative fragmentation to
reduce government duration, because it indicates a more complex bargaining envi-
ronment and a larger number of potential governments (King et al. 1990;
Warwick 1994; Laver & Schofield 1998). In terms of country attributes, several
scholars have argued that investiture votes should diminish average government
duration by causing some governments to fail very quickly (King et al. 1990;
Warwick 1994; Diermeier & Stevenson 1999; Druckman & Thies 2002). For this
reason, investiture requirements are included in nearly all models of government
duration. Note, though, that the underlying logic of this causal claim is deeply
problematic and depends crucially on how one measures government duration,
because a ‘proposed’ government that faces an investiture requirement does not
formally take office unless it passes the investiture vote. Thus, ‘proposed’ govern-
ments that fail investiture votes are not actually governments and have no dura-
tion—they never enter office. If one measures government duration accordingly,
there is no reason to believe that investiture votes should affect government dura-
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tion; if anything, one might expect governments that face investiture votes to sur-
vive longer, because they had to enjoy enough legislative support to pass this addi-
tional formal hurdle.
7.4.1 Data and Model
I test my government survival hypothesis using a Cox survival model. Just as with
many parametric survival models such as the Weibull, the hazard rate in the Cox
model can be expressed in terms of a baseline hazard and a set of covariates:
h(t | x) = h0(t)e
xb
(7.3)
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard. In contrast to the analyst using the parametric
models, though, the analyst employing a Cox model has the advantage that she
does not have to choose a particular parameterization of the baseline hazard func-
tion.22 Because the Cox model analyzes the order in which observations ‘fail’ (or
governments collapse), it may be the case that more than one observation would
fail at the same time. I employed the Efron method to handle these ties in the data
(Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004, 55). A global test of the Schoenfeld residuals
indicated that the assumption of proportional hazards underlying the Cox model
is not violated.
One issue that did not arise in my earlier analysis of government bargaining
delays was that of censoring and truncation.23 In line with the literature, I avoided
problems with left-truncation by only including observations that began on or
after the first day of my data set, and there were no right-censoring issues, because
I observed the completion of the government formation process in all cases. My
current analysis of government survival does not face any left-truncation issues,
because I again only included cases that began on or after the first day of my data
set. However, it does face right-censoring issues, because some governments are
still in power when my sample period ends. For these governments, all I know is
that they have survived up until the last period in my data set; I do not know how
long they will survive. Although one might think of dropping these censored
observations, doing so potentially introduces selection bias because it typically
means omitting stable governments. Fortunately, it is possible to include censored
observations and take account of the information that such governments provide,
so long as the censoring point is known, as is the case here (Box-Steffensmeier &
Jones 2004, 16–19). Other issues with right-censoring also occur because each
country has a constitutionally mandated length of time after which new elections
must be held. For instance, the constitutional inter-election period (CIEP) is five
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years in the United Kingdom and three years in Sweden. Thus, any cabinet in
power prior to a regularly scheduled election is forced to ‘fail,’ even though some
of them might have continued for years if new elections had not been mandated.
Ever since King et al. (1990, 853–55), analysts have addressed this complicating
feature of the data by treating all failures in the 12 months prior to the end of the
CIEP as censored. I followed this practice here as well.
With the exception of the Pre-Electoral Coalition variable, I employ two differ-
ent sources of data to test the Government Survival Hypothesis. The first is
Warwick (1994). These data cover Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France
(Fourth), Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom from 1946 to 1988.24
Warwick’s data are the most widely employed data in the government survival lit-
erature. The second data source is the Parliamentary Democracy Data Archive
(Müller & Strøm 2000; Strøm, Müller, & Bergman 2003).25 These data are brand
new and cover the same set of countries (except France Fifth instead of France
Fourth) from 1946 to 1998. The Parliamentary Democracy Data Archive
(PDDA) does not contain information on the ideological characteristics of gov-
ernments. Instead, I obtained the required ideological data from the Manifesto
Research Group (Budge et al. 2001).
Although the dependent variable (Government Duration) is measured in days,
these two sources of data actually calculate government duration differently. Both
sources of data treat government termination in the same way. They measure the
end of a government as being when (i) parliamentary elections are held, (ii) the
head of government changes, (iii) the party composition of the government
changes, or (iv) the government tenders its resignation. However, they differ on
when a new government starts. On the one hand, Warwick follows King et al.
(1990) in measuring the start of a government as the time at which it is announced
by the head of state. A consequence of this practice is that government duration
may start prior to any investiture vote and, hence, prior to the government for-
mally taking office. On the other hand, the Parliamentary Democracy Data
Archive measures the start of a government as the time at which the cabinet is
installed or inaugurated. In other words, it does not measure government duration
prior to an investiture vote. As I have already suggested, this difference in how the
dependent variable is calculated is likely to show itself in different estimated effects
of investiture requirements across the two data sets.
7.4.2 Results and Interpretation
The results from my analysis are shown in table 7.5. Because of my interest in pre-
electoral coalitions, I consider only governments that form after an election. As
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before, the coefficients in table 7.5 are expressed as proportional hazard estimates.
As a result, a positive coefficient indicates that the covariate in question increases
the hazard rate for governments or reduces government duration. Conversely, a
negative coefficient implies that the covariate reduces the hazard rate or increases
government survival. Once again, I employ robust standard errors clustered by
country to take account of the fact that the observations in each country may not
be independent.
Note that government failure can lead to either the dissolution of the legislature
and new elections, or simply to a replacement government. Recent research sug-
gests that it is important to distinguish between these different termination modes,
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Table 7.5
Determinants of Government Survival
Dependent Variable: Duration of Government Survival in Days for Governments Forming after Elections (Cox Model)
Pooled Dissolution Replacement
Independent Variables Warwick PDDA Warwick PDDA Warwick PDDA
Government Attributes:
Pre-Electoral Coalition 0.38
(0.29)
0.44
(0.27)
1.00**
(0.43)
1.06*
(0.62)
-0.16
(0.45)
0.29
(0.38)
Majority Government -0.94***
(0.34)
-0.90***
(0.30)
-0.87**
(0.36)
-1.54***
(0.52)
-0.59
(0.48)
-0.71***
(0.24)
Single Party Government 0.06
(0.54)
0.11
(0.33)
1.75***
(0.65)
0.68
(0.67)
-0.001
(0.44)
0.10
(0.38)
Ideological Range 0.20
(0.16)
0.001
(0.01)
0.57
(0.44)
-0.001
(0.01)
0.10
(0.24)
0.01
(0.01)
Caretaker Government 1.90***
(0.56)
2.53***
(0.52)
— —
2.27***
(0.65)
2.33***
(0.65)
Formation Attempts 0.22***
(0.07)
0.09
(0.09)
0.26***
(0.08)
0.10
(0.16)
0.16**
(0.08)
0.10
(0.06)
Legislature Attributes:
Legislative Fragmentation 0.12
(0.13)
0.14
(0.11)
0.28**
(0.11)
0.15
(0.14)
0.06
(0.12)
0.19*
(0.11)
Country Attributes:
Investiture 0.75***
(0.22)
0.16
(0.20)
0.80**
(0.34)
0.15
(0.43)
0.63*
(0.37)
0.04
(0.30)
Log Likelihood -347.94 -629.62 -189.83 -217.75 -290.89 -599.66
Observations 138 208 138 208 138 208
Notes: Results are Cox proportional hazards estimates where the Efron method was employed for han-
dling ties; robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. A test using Schoenfeld residu-
als indicates that the proportional hazards assumption is not violated. Dissolution: The government
ended in dissolution and new elections. Replacement: The government ended in a replacement gov-
ernment without new elections. Pooled: The government ended in dissolution or replacement.
Warwick: Data come from Warwick (1994) and cover 16 countries from 1946 to 1988. PDDA: Data
come from the Parliamentary Democracy Data Archive (Müller & Strøm 2000a, Strøm, Müller &
Bergman 2003) and the Manifesto Research Group (Budge et al. 2001) and cover 16 countries from
1946 to 1998.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed).
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because the processes leading to dissolution and replacement are different
(Diermeier & Stevenson 1999). It is possible to distinguish between these modes
of termination using a competing risks version of the Cox model.26 The first two
columns (Pooled) in table 7.5 indicate how the covariates affect government dura-
tion without distinguishing between whether one observes dissolution or replace-
ment for the two sources of data. The next two columns (Dissolution) indicate
how the covariates affect the duration of governments that end in dissolution.
Finally, the last two columns (Replacement) indicate the effect of the covariates on
government survival for those governments that terminate with replacement.
Remember that the principal hypothesis of interest relates to the effect of pre-
electoral coalitions on government duration. My expectation is that governments
based on electoral pacts should last longer than other governments and, hence,
that the coefficient on Pre-Electoral Coalition will be negative. The results from the
pooled and replacement models indicate that pre-electoral coalitions never have
any significant effect on government survival. In fact, it is only in the replacement
model, with data from Warwick, that the coefficient on Pre-Electoral Coalition is
ever negative (though insignificant). The results from the dissolution model indi-
cate that far from improving government survival, pre-electoral coalitions actually
significantly increase the risk of dissolution.
To be precise, a government based on an electoral agreement is 2.7 [1.2, 6.4]
times more likely to fail in dissolution than an identical government that is not
based on a pre-electoral coalition, according to the Warwick data, and 2.9 [1, 7.9]
times more likely to end in dissolution, according to the PDDA data. Confidence
intervals (95% and 90%, respectively) are shown in brackets. Note, though, that
the cases for which pre-electoral agreements significantly shorten the lives of gov-
ernments end in dissolution; in other words, the electorate does get to have its say
in the formation of the new government. In sum, and contrary to my expectations,
electoral coalitions never increase government survival.27 They either have no effect
on governments that end in replacement, or they actually shorten the lives of gov-
ernments that end in dissolution.
What about the effect of other government attributes on government duration?
First, there is strong evidence to support the standard claim that majority govern-
ments survive longer than minority governments—the coefficient on Majority
Government is always negative and is highly significant in five of the six models.
Another common claim in the coalition literature that receives support in this
analysis is that caretaker governments collapse more quickly than other govern-
ments—the coefficient on Caretaker Government is always positive and signifi-
cant.28
However, the results regarding the role of government attributes in table 7.5 do
not confirm other findings in the government duration literature. For example,
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there is little evidence that single-party governments improve the stability of gov-
ernments, as previous studies have found (Warwick 1994). In fact, there is some
evidence that single-party governments actually increase the risk of dissolution
when I employ the Warwick data. Similarly, there is no evidence that the ideolog-
ical diversity of a government makes the government more unstable, as some
scholars have reported (Warwick 1994; Diermeier & Stevenson 1999; Druckman
& Thies 2002). Substituting other measures of ideological diversity, such as
Ideological Spread and whether the government coalition is ideologically connect-
ed for Ideological Range, does not alter this conclusion. There is simply no com-
pelling evidence that ideological compatibility ever affects the survival of govern-
ments that form after elections. Finally, evidence is mixed, at best, for the claim
that the number of foiled attempts at government formation reduces government
survival. The Warwick data consistently provide support for this claim, whereas
the PDDA data consistently do not.29 The inconsistent results in table 7.5 are just
one illustration of my earlier point that the findings in the government duration
literature are not particularly robust to different data sources or slight variations in
how variables are measured.
Having examined the attributes of the government, what about the attributes
of the legislature? The results in table 7.5 provide little consistent evidence that
legislative fragmentation, as measured by the effective number of legislative par-
ties, ever reduces the duration of governments that form after elections. As pre-
dicted, the coefficient on Legislative Fragmentation is positive and significant in the
dissolution model, but only for the Warwick data and not the PDDA data. The
coefficient is also positive and significant in the replacement model, but now only
for the PDDA data and not the Warwick data. Again, one can see that the results
are not robust across the different sources of data.
As for country attributes, the results are mixed. Table 7.5 indicates that investi-
ture requirements significantly reduce government duration, but only with the
Warwick data. As I suggested earlier, this inconsistency is potentially a result of
how the two data sources measure government duration. By including announced
(but not formal) governments that collapse very quickly because they fail to pass
an investiture vote, the Warwick data is likely to overestimate any negative effect
of investiture requirements on government duration. In contrast, the PDDA data
only measure the duration of formal governments that have taken office. The
result that investiture votes do not significantly affect government survival using
the PDDA data contradicts virtually all of the claims in the coalition literature
regarding the effect of investiture votes on government survival.
I should remind the reader that the analyses conducted here focus only on those
governments that form after an election. In contrast, the previous literature on
government survival examines governments that form in inter-election periods as
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well. By including these additional governments, coalition scholars have implicit-
ly assumed that the factors affecting the survival of post-election governments are
the same as those affecting inter-election period governments. I examined whether
this assumption is valid by estimating the same models as shown in table 7.5 on a
sample including inter-election period governments. Although most of my infer-
ences are unaffected, there are a couple of substantive changes. First, there is now
strong evidence that legislative fragmentation reduces the duration of govern-
ments. Second, it appears that the ideological diversity of the government does sig-
nificantly reduce government survival based on the Warwick data (though ideolo-
gy still has no significant effect with the PDDA data). Along with the findings
from previous sections, these different results provide further evidence that ana-
lysts should begin to distinguish between governments that form after elections
and those that form in inter-election periods.
To conclude, pre-electoral coalitions do not increase government survival. In
fact, pre-electoral coalitions reduce the duration of governments that collapse in
dissolution. The one positive point here, from a normative perspective, is that in
those cases where pre-electoral coalitions significantly reduce government stabili-
ty, the electorate is typically consulted about the identity of the next government.
Thus, in some sense, electoral agreements could be said to have a ‘bad’ effect on
government survival, but at least they end in a ‘good’ way.
7.5 Conclusion
In previous chapters, I have shown that pre-electoral coalitions are not rare and
that their formation can be explained in terms of the office- and policy-seeking
preferences of political actors. As my bargaining model in chapter four recognizes,
the decision to form a pre-electoral coalition is largely determined by whether such
a pact is going to increase the probability of entering government. In this chapter,
I provide strong evidence that pre-electoral coalitions do indeed make it more like-
ly that member parties will enter government. Although Martin & Stevenson
(2001) have reported such a result before, their analysis is based on a small sub-
sample of the electoral coalitions that actually form prior to elections. As I indi-
cate, there are reasons to think that their analysis overestimates and underestimates
the effect of pre-electoral coalitions on the identity of the government—I show
that this is indeed the case. Overall, though, the evidence clearly indicates that pre-
electoral coalitions help parties enter government. Moreover, the effect is quite
substantial—a potential government is 123 times more likely to enter government
if it is based on a pre-electoral agreement than if it is not. For critics of propor-
tional representation and multiparty parliamentary systems, this ought to be an
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encouraging result, because it implies that voters may often have a more direct say
in the identity of the future government than is typically supposed (Pinto-
Duschinsky 1999).
The analyses in this chapter also indicate that government coalitions based on
pre-electoral agreements are more ideologically compatible than governments that
are not constrained by electoral pacts. This result was consistently obtained using
several different measures of ideological compatibility. Coalition governments are
typically thought to face more difficulties than single-party governments because
of the potential for inter-party disagreements over policy. These difficulties are
likely to be exacerbated when the coalition partners have disparate policy goals.
Being able to agree on and enact policy is an important requisite for a successful
government, and ideological compatibility should make this capability more like-
ly to occur. Pre-electoral coalitions help achieve this goal. This result suggests that
party leaders are more worried about being punished for forming an ideologically
incompatible coalition if the coalition must face the electorate before taking office
than if the coalition is negotiated after the election.
After an election has been held, there is wide variation in the amount of time
that it takes to form a government. Some governments form immediately after the
votes have been counted and the distribution of seats in the legislature has been
determined. Others can take several weeks or months to form, with power left in
the hands of some sort of caretaker cabinet with no real mandate to make policy
in the interim. In these latter cases, this situation means that important, and pos-
sibly urgent, legislation is delayed. Moreover, the uncertainty that surrounds the
government formation process is likely to have negative economic consequences,
with market actors unsure how to make their investments. Anything that can
shorten the length of time that it takes to form a government should be welcomed
by all political actors. In this chapter, I showed that governments based on pre-
electoral coalitions suffer fewer delays in taking office and that this is particularly
the case when there are many parties in the cabinet. For example, pre-electoral
agreements can reduce the time that it takes to form a three-party government by
roughly three weeks. This reduction is quite significant, given that the average time
that it takes to form a government in my sample of 16 Western European coun-
tries from 1946 to 1998 is 32 days.
Although one might expect pre-electoral coalitions to enhance government
stability and increase government duration, I find no evidence for this case. In
fact, governments that end in dissolution are likely to be more unstable if they are
based on pre-electoral coalitions than if they are not. The one saving grace about
this situation is that whenever pre-electoral agreements increase the risk of gov-
ernment collapse, the end result is a new election and a chance for the electorate
to again influence the government formation process. My analysis indicates that
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pre-electoral coalitions have no effect on the risk of collapse for governments that
end in replacement.
Aside from the normatively pleasing aspects of pre-electoral coalitions (such as
giving voters a chance to express their preferences over government alternatives,
endowing the government with a stronger mandate, and generally creating a
stronger connection between the electorate and the government that eventually
forms following an election), the analysis in this chapter shows that pre-electoral
coalitions have concrete effects on various aspects of government coalitions as well.
They affect who gets into government, how long it takes to form a government,
and how ideologically compatible the government is. While pre-electoral agree-
ments do have a negative effect on government survival in some circumstances,
they at least result in elections rather than in replacement. Thus, electoral coali-
tions have a real impact on how coalition governments work in parliamentary
democracies—their impact does not end when the votes have been counted and
the seats have been allocated.
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion
Coalitions are a fundamental part of democratic politics because democracies gen-
erally rely on legislative majorities to determine policy. Since single parties do not
form such a majority in most countries, those parties who wish to exercise execu-
tive power are typically forced to form some kind of coalition. In effect, political
parties have two choices. They can either form a coalition prior to elections, or
they can compete independently at election time and try to form a government
coalition afterwards. Most scholars have ignored the possibility of pre-electoral
coalitions. Instead, they employ a simple dichotomy between single-party govern-
ments that appear in the ideal ‘Westminster’ or ‘majoritarian’ democracies and
coalition governments that appear in the ideal ‘proportional representation’ or
‘consensus’ democracies (Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000). The unstated assumption
that these analysts make is that electoral coordination among political actors
occurs prior to elections and within parties in majoritarian systems, but after elec-
tions and between parties in proportional representation systems (Bawn &
Rosenbluth 2003).1 Although it captures certain aspects of political reality, it
should be obvious to the reader by now that this simple dichotomy is limited in
its usefulness, because it overlooks the fact that political parties can, and often do,
form multi-party coalitions prior to elections in both majoritarian and propor-
tional representation democracies. For example, I presented evidence in chapter
two illustrating that multi-party electoral coalitions routinely form in a wide vari-
ety of democracies such as France, Germany, Australia, and Israel. In fact, I found
evidence of 240 pre-electoral coalitions competing in the 364 legislative elections
held between 1946 and 2002 in the 23 advanced industrialized countries studied
in this book; only in Canada and Malta did I fail to find any evidence of nation-
al-level electoral coalitions.
Much has been written comparing the relative advantages and disadvantages
of the majoritarian and proportional representation visions of democracy. In con-
trast to the single-party governments typically found in majoritarian democracies,
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it is common for coalition governments in proportional representation democra-
cies to be criticized for producing a disconnect between the electorate and the
government. The basic criticism is that voters in these democracies are largely
unaware as to how their votes are ultimately translated into an actual government.
The end result is a low level of government accountability and identifiability, as
well as an absence of government mandates. Government accountability is low
because voters cannot use their votes to reward or punish the government for its
policy choices, since they do not know how (or, in some cases, even if ) their votes
will influence the government formation process. Government identifiability is
low because voters have difficulty in identifying the probable government alter-
natives when casting their ballots. As a consequence, it is not always clear whether
government coalitions actually have the support of the electorate in any mean-
ingful sense. As a result of this last point, it is, therefore, difficult for governments
to legitimately claim a popular mandate for their policies in proportional repre-
sentation democracies.
Although these criticisms are often made of coalition governments and the pro-
portional representation vision of democracy more broadly, it should be noted that
their strength rests largely on the mistaken belief that coalition governments only
form after elections have taken place. As I have illustrated in this book, this is far
from the case. The presence of pre-electoral coalitions in many countries means
that voters in proportional representation democracies are often able to identify
the different government alternatives at election time and express their support for
one of them. By providing a direct link between the voters and the government
that proposes and implements policy, electoral pacts undermine the common crit-
icism that coalition governments lack a convincing mandate from the voters and
that the quality of representative democracy is thereby diminished (Pinto-
Duschinsky 1999). In fact, one could argue that pre-electoral coalitions provide a
unique opportunity to combine the best elements of the majoritarian vision of
democracy (increased accountability, government identifiability, strong mandates)
with the best elements of the proportional representation vision of democracy
(wide choice, more accurate reflection of voter preferences in the legislature).
Given these potential normative benefits, electoral coalitions are perhaps some-
thing that should be encouraged. This book indicates some of the ways that poli-
cy makers might achieve this goal. For example, policy makers could encourage
pre-electoral coalition formation by manipulating the electoral rules. Of course, as
the analyses conducted in chapters three and six indicate, the actual effect of this
manipulation will ultimately depend on the size of the party system and the ideo-
logical nature of political competition in each country.
Not only do the pre-electoral strategies of political elites have significant nor-
mative consequences, but they also routinely affect the identity of the government
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that forms in many countries across the world. Fully one-fifth of all the govern-
ments that formed after the 364 legislative elections studied in this book were
based on pre-electoral pacts. It is worth pointing out that this percentage would
be even higher if I restricted my sample to purely coalition governments and if I
also counted those governments that contained parties in addition to those partic-
ipating in an electoral coalition. As the qualitative analysis of electoral coalition
history in France and South Korea illustrated, the presence or absence of pre-elec-
toral coalitions can have a quite dramatic effect on election outcomes. For exam-
ple, it was the failure on the part of left-wing elites to coordinate their electoral
strategies that enabled the leader of the extreme-right National Front to progress
against all odds to the second round of the French presidential elections in 2002,
and it was a similar coordination failure on the part of pro-democracy candidates
that gifted electoral victory to the official candidate of the military regime in the
first democratic presidential elections in South Korea in 1987. Other examples
illustrating the profound effects that pre-electoral agreements can have on election
outcomes can be found in numerous other countries. For instance, I briefly
described in chapter three how pre-electoral agreements were instrumental in
defeating once-dominant parties in Sweden, Ireland, and India.
Given the relative frequency with which electoral coalitions form, the significant
normative benefits that they offer, and the tremendous effect that they can have on
election outcomes, it is somewhat surprising that so little attention has been paid
to them in the existing coalition literature. Although some scholars with knowledge
of countries such as Germany or Ireland do mention electoral agreements with
some regularity when explaining why certain government coalitions form, this book
represents the first systematic cross-national study of pre-electoral coalition forma-
tion. I hope that at some point in the future scholars will go further and develop a
fully integrated model of coalition formation that incorporates both pre-electoral
and government coalitions within a unified framework. Just as existing models of
government coalitions ignore the possibility of pre-electoral agreements, the bar-
gaining model that I presented in chapter four does not explicitly take account of
any post-election bargaining phase that might occur. Given the state of the coali-
tion literature and the fact that we do not yet have a very satisfying model of gov-
ernment coalition formation, a fully integrated model is probably some way off in
the future. As a result, I have undertaken a slightly narrower project in this book by
analyzing just the determinants of pre-electoral coalition formation. While such a
partial equilibrium approach offers the possibility of important insights into this
stage of the coalition formation process, it also holds out the possibility that it could
be combined with a model of government coalition formation at a later date. The
approach that I take explicitly recognizes that the accumulation of knowledge in the
scientific process typically occurs in small steps (Kuhn 1962).
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The central question that I address in this book is why some parties choose to
coordinate their electoral strategies as part of a pre-electoral coalition, whereas oth-
ers choose to compete independently at election time. For the purposes of this
book, an electoral coalition was defined as a publicly stated coordination of elec-
toral strategies by party leaders at the national level. Rather than address the vari-
ety of different forms that electoral agreements can take (nomination agreements,
joint lists, dual ballot and vote transfer instructions, public commitments to 
govern together), I focused simply on whether parties publicly coordinated their
electoral strategies in some way at the national level or not. While the dearth of
studies on pre-electoral coalitions indicates that this simple dichotomy is a useful
starting point, future researchers might well want to disaggregate the different
types of electoral agreements. The new data set on pre-electoral coalitions accom-
panying this book should provide a good foundation on which scholars interested
in such an endeavor can build.
Before presenting my theoretical model of pre-electoral coalition formation, I
tested two implicit hypotheses regarding electoral coalitions that can be found in
the existing government coalition literature. The first hypothesis was that electoral
coalitions are more likely to form in countries with disproportional electoral sys-
tems because such systems benefit larger parties. The problem with this hypothe-
sis as it stands is that it ignores the fact that the incentives to form electoral coali-
tions in disproportional systems really exist only when there are a sufficiently large
number of parties. For example, one would not expect a pre-electoral coalition to
form if there were only two parties. As a result, I tested the Disproportionality
Hypothesis that electoral coalitions were more likely to form and be successful in
disproportional systems so long as the party system was sufficiently large.
The second hypothesis was that party leaders form pre-electoral coalitions in
order to signal the identity of future governments to the electorate. There are sev-
eral reasons why party elites might want to send such a signal. First, they might
want to signal that member parties can form an effective government and thereby
convince voters that they would not be wasting their votes by supporting the coali-
tion parties. Second, they might want to signal the identity of a potential future
government as clearly as possible out of a desire to give voters a more direct role in
choosing the government. Third, they might simply want to signal the identity of
the government clearly so as to increase the efficiency of the post-election govern-
ment coalition bargaining process. I tested the Signaling Hypothesis that electoral
coalitions are more likely to form and be successful when government identifia-
bility is low (or when the effective number of parties is high).
While the statistical analyses conducted in chapter three provided considerable
support for the Disproportionality Hypothesis, there was no such support for the
Signaling Hypothesis—at least, there was no evidence that increasing the effective
140 CHAPTER EIGHT
Golder_CH_8_2nd.qxp  6/8/2006  3:58 PM  Page 140
number of parties makes it more likely that electoral coalitions will form and be suc-
cessful. As I noted when I discussed these results earlier, one should be wary of reject-
ing the Signaling Hypothesis outright on the basis of this single analysis for two 
reasons. First, the effective number of parties is not a particularly good proxy for the
identifiability of government alternatives. Second, we do observe pre-electoral coali-
tions forming in countries, such as Israel and the Netherlands, with highly propor-
tional electoral systems. These two points suggest that the Signaling Hypothesis
should be exposed to further scrutiny before it is completely rejected.
The implicit claim in much of the coalition literature is that pre-electoral coali-
tion formation is a simple function of electoral rules. While the analyses conduct-
ed in chapter three do indeed confirm that electoral institutions play an important
role, this cannot be the full story, because it ignores the fact that pre-electoral
agreements can involve significant distributional and ideological costs. Before
party leaders can benefit from any increased probability of winning office that
might result from forming a coalition, they have to reach an agreement on a coali-
tion policy and a distribution of expected office benefits. It may well be the case
that party leaders fail to reach an agreement on these divisive issues even if the
potential electoral coalition offers significant electoral benefits. In chapter four, I
presented a bargaining model in which party leaders who care about office and
policy must weigh the electoral benefits of forming an electoral coalition against
the associated distributional and ideological costs.
The implications of the model are quite straightforward. For example, increas-
ing the expected office benefits from running as a coalition makes it more likely
that party leaders will reach a pre-electoral agreement. If the likely opposition
party is ideologically extreme, then party leaders will be more likely to form a pre-
electoral coalition so long as the coalition is electorally beneficial. In other words,
party leaders want to keep extreme opposition parties or coalitions from coming
to power. If this goal is best achieved by forming a coalition, this is what they do.
If not, they prefer to run separately. Parties that are ideologically close are more
likely to form an electoral coalition than parties with incompatible policy plat-
forms. Finally, party leaders are less likely to form a coalition as the probability of
winning office after running separately increases.
The plausibility of the model’s assumptions and implications are explored in
chapter five using in-depth analyses of electoral coalition history in Fifth Republic
France and post-1987 South Korea. These histories are particularly interesting
because they highlight that the underlying logic of pre-electoral coalition forma-
tion that I present is quite general and not country- or region-specific. Despite sig-
nificant differences in terms of geography, culture, democratic history, institutions,
and ideological divisions, the history of electoral coalitions in both countries pro-
vides significant support for my model. In two very different settings, we see that
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having a disproportional electoral system, in which forming an electoral coalition
could reasonably be expected to provide electoral advantages, is not sufficient for
pre-electoral agreements to be reached.2 This situation is perhaps most clearly seen
in the first presidential elections after the transition to democracy in South Korea.
Both leaders of the democratic opposition preferred to compete separately (and
lose) rather than form a pre-electoral agreement, even though opinion polls con-
vincingly indicated that a single democratic candidate would defeat the military
incumbent.
The history of pre-electoral coalitions in France indicates that potential coali-
tion partners must be sufficiently ideologically compatible for coalitions to form.
For example, the Socialists and the Communists were willing to consider electoral
coalitions only after their ideological positions drew sufficiently close to each other
in the 1970s. There is also compelling evidence from the French case that coali-
tion formation is facilitated if the policies proposed by the likely opposition are
extreme. For instance, right-wing parties and voters were able to coordinate much
more effectively when the Communist Party was considered the dominant party
on the left. In addition to policy and electoral incentives, both countries also indi-
cated that the divisibility of office benefits matters for the likelihood of pre-elec-
toral coalition formation. The bargaining model presented in chapter four sug-
gested that it is easier to form electoral coalitions when the benefits of office can
be divided in a manner that makes both parties better off. Evidence in support of
this idea comes from the fact that electoral agreements have been much more com-
mon in French legislative elections, where there are nearly 600 offices to share out
among coalition partners, than in French presidential elections, where there is only
one office at stake. While the Korean analysis illustrates that presidential electoral
coalitions can form in certain circumstances, I argued that they are made possible,
or more likely, by the use of term limits. The existence of term limits in South
Korea is important, because they provide for the temporal divisibility of the pres-
idential office, and because they make it easier for party leaders to compromise by
weakening the power of the presidential office. Finally, the evidence from both
countries suggests that personal animosity and myopia on the part of party lead-
ers, which receive so much attention in the description of campaigns and party
politics in particular countries, play no systematic role in pre-electoral coalition
formation. This finding is especially striking in South Korea.
The qualitative analysis of electoral coalitions in France and South Korea sug-
gested that the assumptions and implications of my bargaining model are plausi-
ble and informative in these two countries. However, I claimed throughout this
book that the logic of pre-electoral coalition formation that I set out in chapter
four is more general and applies in multiple settings. To examine whether this is
the case, in chapter six I subjected my model’s hypotheses to a series of statistical
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tests using data from 20 advanced industrialized countries. The results strongly
supported all of my model’s predictions. For example, two parties are more likely
to form an electoral coalition when they share similar ideological preferences. They
are also more likely to form a coalition if the party system is ideologically polar-
ized and the coalition offers an electoral bonus. Coalitions are also more likely to
form when the potential coalition size is large, but not too large. In other words,
party leaders prefer to join a coalition if it increases their chances of winning office.
On the whole, it is reasonable to think that a coalition’s chance of winning office
will increase with its size. However, if the coalition becomes too large, such that
one of the parties starts to think that it can win office on its own, then the likeli-
hood of coalition formation begins to decline. The more asymmetric the strength
of the two parties in the potential coalition, the more quickly this cut-point will
be reached. This last point indicates that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to
form between parties of similar size. The cross-national statistical analyses con-
ducted in this chapter clearly support the model of pre-electoral coalition forma-
tion that is the centerpiece of this book.
To a large extent, party leaders who decide to form a pre-electoral coalition
are ultimately interested in government coalition formation. As I indicated in
chapter two, this is particularly the case regarding the national-level electoral
pacts that are the focus of the empirical analyses in this book. Therefore, I inves-
tigated how pre-electoral agreements affect various aspects of the government
formation process in chapter seven. Throughout the book, I had suggested that
the primary benefit from forming a pre-electoral coalition is that it improves the
probability that member parties will enter government. The statistical analyses
conducted in chapter seven confirm this claim—a potential government is 123
times more likely to enter government if it is based on a pre-electoral agreement
than if it is not.
The statistical analyses also indicate that governments based on pre-electoral
agreements are more ideologically compatible than governments that are not
based on such pacts. We already know that both pre-electoral and government
coalitions are more likely to form between ideologically compatible parties than
incompatible ones. What the results in chapter seven indicate in addition to this
fact is that the ideological compatibility constraint facing party leaders thinking
about forming a coalition may well be stronger prior to an election than after-
wards. One reason is that any proposed pre-electoral coalition, unlike a proposed
government coalition, must be immediately put before the voters. It is worth 
noting that the increased ideological compatibility of governments based on pre-
electoral agreements is quite appealing, because it means a greater ideological
congruence between the electorate of the government and the policy position of
that government.
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Finally, the empirical analyses conducted in chapter seven indicate that gov-
ernments based on pre-electoral coalitions take office more quickly than equiva-
lent governments that are not based on electoral pacts. This is particularly the
case when the government consists of many parties. This result suggests that pre-
electoral agreements help to resolve some of the bargaining difficulties that arise
with large government coalitions prior to the election rather than leaving them to
be resolved after the election. By shortening the time that it takes a government
to take office, pre-electoral coalitions have the beneficial consequence of reduc-
ing the amount of time a country must live under a caretaker government that
has no real mandate to make policy. By reducing the period of uncertainty that
characterizes the government formation process, electoral coalitions are also like-
ly to have a positive effect on economic actors who would otherwise be uncertain
as to how to make their investment decisions. This idea is particularly important
given the growing empirical evidence that political uncertainty can have a signif-
icant negative impact on a country’s economy.
This book represents just a first step toward understanding pre-electoral coali-
tions, and my hope is that it will generate a wider scholarly debate about their
causes and consequences. I believe that the study of electoral coalitions provides
a fertile terrain for the opportunistic researcher. Let me briefly describe one
avenue of future research that would be worth examining. In chapter two, I
argued that one could think of electoral coordination as a continuum, with com-
pletely separate and independent parties competing in elections at one end of the
spectrum, and party mergers at the other end. Pre-electoral coalitions represent
some intermediary position on this continuum of electoral coordination—
indeed, the various types of electoral pacts described in chapter two represent dif-
ferent intermediary positions on this continuum. Although I only considered
snapshots of party systems prior to elections in this book and asked whether or
not a pre-electoral coalition is likely to form, it is worth thinking about what
types of electoral coalitions are ‘stable’ and what types are just a step on the way
to a full party merger.
Duverger (1963 [1954], 224) pointed out a long time ago that electoral
alliances are frequently “the prelude to the extreme form, total fusion, which is the
normal term of the development and is often attended by schism. . . .” For exam-
ple, the three Christian Democratic parties in the Netherlands originally ran as
separate parties prior to competing in elections as a pre-electoral coalition before
eventually merging into a single party. By describing “total fusion” as the “normal
term of development,” Duverger implies that electoral coalitions are somehow
ephemeral, simple intermediary steps on the way to party fusion, or failed experi-
ments that ultimately collapse back to complete party independence. I think that
this implication is somewhat mistaken and that there are circumstances in which
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party leaders will prefer to permanently retain their separate identities yet coordi-
nate their electoral campaigns with other parties. What these circumstances are has
never really been examined and is beyond the scope of this book.
Nevertheless, I can offer one or two speculations. For example, if two parties
have separate electoral bases of support, then they might be less likely to merge. If
the electorates are geographically separate, as is the case with the Christian
Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union in Germany, or the National
Party and the Liberal Party in Australia, then the parties in question can easily
form an electoral coalition instead of giving up their separate identities by merg-
ing into a single party. It is striking that these two cases—the only two in my sam-
ple that can be considered ‘permanent’ pre-electoral coalitions—have unusually
separate geographic bases of support.
Certain electoral institutions should also encourage pre-electoral coalitions as a
permanent feature of electoral politics. Consider the situation where a country
employs different electoral formulas in national and sub-national elections. 
In such a country, it is often the case that sub-national elections employing pro-
portional representation give parties and voters incentives to maintain a higher
number of parties than would otherwise be the case. For example, France uses a
majoritarian formula in single-member districts for its legislative elections, but a
proportional representation formula in multi-member districts for its regional
(and some local) elections. Small parties in France that might otherwise have dis-
appeared can benefit from the proportional representation elections to win region-
al and local offices, thereby making them more viable coalition partners on the
national political scene. Electoral rules that allow voters to indicate coalition pref-
erences are also likely to make electoral alliances a permanent feature of the polit-
ical landscape, because they make reaching a pre-electoral agreement so costless
that party leaders are simply unwilling to give up their independence by merging
into a larger party. For example, the alternative vote in Australia, the single trans-
ferable vote in Ireland, and the two-vote system in Germany all allow voters to
show their support for more than one party in a given election. As a result, party
elites do not need to broker politically costly nomination agreements that force
some of their own candidates to withdraw from competition. These are obviously
just a few speculations, and further research is required to better evaluate the ‘sta-
bility’ or ‘permanence’ of pre-electoral coalitions.
Like all good comparative political scientists, I end with an appeal for more
(and better) data concerning pre-electoral coalitions. The country-specific mate-
rial used to build the data set employed in this book varied widely in the amount
of useful information that it provided concerning electoral coalitions. It is my
opinion that there is a vast amount still to be discovered. With more detailed case
studies of electoral coalition formation in various countries, it would be possible
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to disaggregate the different types of pre-electoral coalitions in terms of the nature
of the electoral coordination chosen, or in terms of their purpose—that is, was
the coalition formed to get parties over an electoral threshold in order to win leg-
islative seats or in order to enter government? Such distinctions will prove invalu-
able as scholars develop more precise theories of pre-electoral coalition formation
than that presented here.
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APPENDIX
In this appendix, I provide detailed information by country on the 240 national-
level electoral coalitions that formed prior to the 364 legislative elections held
between 1946 and 2002 in the 23 advanced industrialized countries studied in this
book. I do not provide tables containing information on Canada (17 elections from
1949–2000) or Malta (8 elections from 1966–98) because I found no national-level
electoral coalitions in these countries. Those interested in the coding rules for iden-
tifying national-level electoral pacts should examine chapter two. Given that there
is sometimes conflicting information regarding the presence or absence of electoral
coalitions, I cite all sources consulted in detail so that the interested reader can eval-
uate my coding decisions. The tables that follow contain the following data:
• Election Year: This is the year in which the legislative election was held.
Note that if the election was held near the end of the year, it is possible
that the government that eventually forms does not enter office until the
next year.
• % Vote for Coalition: This is the percentage of votes cast for the parties
in the electoral coalition. These percentages are taken mainly from
Mackie & Rose (1991), the European Journal of Political Research (various
years), Caramani (2000), or the website www.electionworld.org.
• PEC: This is a list of the parties in the pre-electoral coalition. The abbre-
viations of the party names are explained below each table.
• In Govt?: This indicates whether or not the pre-electoral coalition
entered government following the election. Unless otherwise indicated,
the parties in the pre-electoral coalition form the government without
additional parties.
• MRG: This indicates whether the electoral coalition members are includ-
ed as separate parties in the Comparative Manifesto Research Group
(MRG) data set (Budge et al. 2001). This data set provides information
on the ideological position of the parties from 1946 to 1998. Certain par-
ties or coalitions listed in the appendix are not included in the empirical
analyses conducted in chapters six and seven, because the MRG data set
does not include all of the parties or because it includes an electoral coali-
tion as a single party.
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Table A.1
Electoral Coalitions in Australia, 1946–2002
Election Year % Vote for Coalition PEC In Govt? MRG
1946 43.9 Lib+Nat No Yes
1949 50.3 Lib+Nat Yes Yes
1951 50.3 Lib+Nat Yes Yes
1954 47 Lib+Nat Yes Yes
1955 47.6 Lib+Nat Yes Yes
1958 46.5
9.4
Lib+Nat
DLP+QLP
Yes
No
Yes
No
1961 42.1
8.7
Lib+Nat
DLP+QLP
Yes
No
Yes
No
1963 46.0 Lib+Nat Yes Yes
1966 49.9 Lib+Nat Yes Yes
1969 43.4 Lib+Nat Yes Yes
1972 41.4 Lib+Nat No Yes
1974 44.9 Lib+Nat No Yes
1975 53.1 Lib+Nat Yes Yes
1977 48.1 Lib+Nat Yes Yes
1980 46.3 Lib+Nat Yes Yes
1983 43.6 Lib+Nat No Yes
1984 45.0 Lib+Nat No Yes
1987 45.9 Lib+Nat No Yes
1990 43.2 Lib+Nat No Yes
1993 44.27 Lib+Nat No Yes
1996 47.2 Lib+Nat Yes Yes
1998 39.18 Lib+Nat Yes Yes
2001 42.7 Lib+Nat Yes No
PARTIES: Lib: Liberal Party of Australia, Nat: National Party (formerly Country Party); DLP:
Democratic Labor Party; QLP: Queensland Labor Party. The DLP and QLP merged into a single
party in 1962.
COMMENTS: All elections: For Lib+Nat coalition, see Klingemann, Hofferbert & Budge (1994,
81), Butler (1999), Powell (2000, 71–72), and McAllister (2003, 381). 1958, 1961: For the
DLP+QLP electoral coalition, see Mackie & Rose, Table 1.1 (1991).
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Table A.2
Electoral Coalitions in Austria, 1946–2002
Election Year % Vote for Coalition PEC In Govt? MRG
1949 82.74 ÖVP+SPÖ Yes Yes
1953 83.37 ÖVP+SPÖ Yes Yes
1956 89.01 ÖVP+SPÖ Yes Yes
1959 88.98 ÖVP+SPÖ Yes Yes
1962 89.43 ÖVP+SPÖ Yes Yes
1966 90.91 ÖVP+SPÖ ÖVP only Yes
1970 No
1971 No
1975 No
1979 No
1983 No
1986 (84.41)
4.82
ÖVP+SPÖ*
Green Alternative
Yes
No
Yes
No
1990 74.84 ÖVP+SPÖ Yes Yes
1994 62.59 ÖVP+SPÖ Yes Yes
1995 (66.35)
10.32
ÖVP+SPÖ*
Greens+LF
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
1999 No
2002 No
*SPÖ announced intention to govern with ÖVP but ÖVP did not reciprocate.
COALITIONS: Green Alternative: Alternative List of Austria and United Greens of Austria.
PARTIES: SPÖ: Socialist Party. ÖVP: People’s Party. LF: Liberal Forum.
COMMENTS: 1949–62: See Müller (2000, 91–92). 1966: See Müller (2000, 91–92) and
Dreijmanis (1982, 256). 1986: SPÖ announced an intention to govern with ÖVP. Although the ÖVP
did not reciprocate, it did not repudiate the offer (Müller 2000, 92). The Alternative List of Austria
and the United Greens (VGÖ) ran joint lists—see Müller (1996, 62) and the Library of Congress
Country Studies (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/attoc.htm). 1990: SPÖ announced it would not gov-
ern with FPÖ but would govern with ÖVP (Müller 2000, 92). Powell refers to a pre-election coali-
tion victory (2000, 141) but later says that the grand coalition was “only vaguely identified as a pre-
electoral coalition” (2000, 213). 1994: Continuation of grand coalition (Müller 2000, 92). 1995:
SPÖ announced an intention to govern with ÖVP. Although the ÖVP did not reciprocate, it did not
repudiate the offer (Lauber 1996, 256–57).
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Table A.3
Electoral Coalitions in Belgium, 1946–2002
Election Year % Vote for Coalition PEC In Govt? MRG
1946 No
1949 No
1950 No
1954 No
1958 No
1961 No
1965 No
1968 5.90 FDF+RW No Yes
1971 11.23 FDF+RW No Yes
1974 10.94 FDF+PLDP+RW No Yes
1977 4.7 FDF+RW No Yes
1978 7.04
1.40
FDF+RW
VVP+VNP
No
No
Yes
No
1981 4.21
4.92
FDF+RW
Eco+Agalev
No
No
Yes
Yes
1985 50.20 CVP+PSC+VLD+PRL Yes Yes
1987 17.40 PSC+PRL Yes* Yes
1991 1.5 FDF+PPW No No
1995 10.30 PRL+FDF No Yes
1999 10.14
5.6
PRL+FDF
VU+ID21
Yes*
No
No
No
*Pre-electoral coalition did not enter government alone.
PARTIES: FDF: Democratic Front of French Speakers. PLDP: French-speaking Liberal Party. CVP:
Christian People’s Party (Flemish). PSC: Christian People’s Party (Walloon). VLD: Liberals (Flemish).
PRL: Liberals (Walloon). RW: Walloon Rally. VVP: Flemish People’s Party. VNP: Flemish National
Party (merged 1979). Eco: Ecologist Confederation for the Organization of New Struggles. Agalev:
Live Differently, Greens. PPW: Parti pour la Wallonie. VU: People’s Union. ID21: Social-Liberal
Party.
COMMENTS: 1968, 1971: See Caramani (2000). 1974: See Caramani (2000) and Dewachter
(1987, 295). Note that Mackie & Rose (1991) only mention FDF+PLDP as being in the electoral
coalition. 1977: See Caramani (2000). 1978: For the FDF+RW coalition, see Caramani (2000). For
the VVP+VNP coalition, see Mackie & Rose (1991). 1981: See Caramani (2000, 158, 185) and
Mackie & Rose (1991).  Note that with the exception of Louvain, the two Green parties competed
in different districts. 1985: See Powell (2000, 73). 1987: See Downs (1998, 190). 1991: See the 1992
European Journal of Political Research (22) election report. 1995: See De Winter, Timmermans, and
Dumont (2000, 303), the 1996 European Journal of Political Research (30) election report, and
http://elections.fgov.be/Resultats/electionshtml/710.html. 1999: See http://elections.fgov.be/
Resultats/electionshtml/5130.html, http://electionworld.org/belgium.htm, and http://polling2003.
belgium.be/electionshome/uk/result/chamber/table\_top.html.
Golder_Appendix_3rd.qxp  6/8/2006  3:58 PM  Page 150
151APPENDIX
Table A.4
Electoral Coalitions in Denmark, 1946–2002
Election Year % Vote for Coalition PEC In Govt? MRG
Yes
1947 No
1950 No
1953 (April) No
1953 (Sept.) No
1957 No
1960 No
1964 No
1966 No
1968 53.89 RL+Con+Lib Yes Yes
1971 No
1973 7.80 CD+SLE No No
1975 2.20 CD+SLE No No
1977 6.40 CD+SLE No No
1979 No
1981 No
1984 No
1987 No
1988 No
1990 1.67 CP+LSP No No
1994 3.15 CP+LSP No No
1998 2.70 CP+LSP No No
2001 2.40 CP+LSP No No
PARTIES: Lib: Liberals. Con: Conservatives. SD: Social Democrats. RL: Radical Liberals. CP:
Communist Party. LSP: Left Socialist Party. CD: Center Democrats (1973 splinter of Social
Democrats). SLE: Schleswig Party (German-speaking minority).
COMMENTS: 1968: See Pesonen & Thomas (1983, 71–72), Fitzmaurice (1986, 266), Schou &
Hearl (1992, 155), Arter (1999, 210), and Damgaard (2000, 245). 1973, 1975, 1977: See Mackie
& Rose (1991), Table 5.1. See also Elklit (2002, 63). 1979–84: Powell (2000, 76) implies that a pre-
electoral non-bourgeois coalition formed prior to these elections. However, he does not specify the
parties that are involved, and other literature on Denmark makes no reference to these electoral coali-
tions. 1990–2001: See Esaiasson & Heider (2000, 445–46, Elklit (2002, 64), updates to Mackie &
Rose (1991) in the European Journal of Political Research, the Danish election update in Electoral
Studies (1994), and http://electionworld.org.
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Table A.5
Electoral Coalitions in Finland, 1946–2002
Election Year % Vote for Coalition PEC In Govt? MRG
1948 No
1951 No
1954 No
1958 No
1962 No
1966 No
1970 18.22 CE+CHR No Yes
1972 No
1975 No
1979 No
1983 17.63 Lib+CE Yes* Yes
1987 No
1991 No
1995 No
1999 67.2 Purple Coalition Yes No
*Pre-electoral coalition did not enter government alone.
COALITION: Purple Coalition: Conservative Party, Left-Wing League, Swedish People’s Party,
Social Democratic Party, and Greens.
PARTIES: Lib: Liberals. CE: Center Party (formerly Agrarians). CHR: Christian League of Finland.
COMMENTS: 1970: The CHR, with only 1.1% of the vote, broke into parliament and, profiting
from an electoral alliance with the CE, had 1 MP (Arter 1999, 110). 1983: According to Appendix
2 in Esaiasson & Heidar (2000, 447–48), the Liberals ran with the Center Party from 1982–86. See
also Sundberg (2002, 98) and Caramani (2000, 286). 1999: Personal communication with Mark
Hallerberg: the ‘Purple coalition,’ which had formed a government coalition following the 1995 elec-
tion, campaigned asking to be re-elected to form the government again.
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Table A.6
Electoral Coalitions in France, 1946–2002
Election Year % Vote for Coalition u PEC In Govt? MRG
1946 No
1951 No
1956 No
1958 No
1962 34.39
39.25
UNR+UDT+RI (2)
PCF+SFIO+PRG (2)
Yes
No
UNR+UDT = 1 Party
Yes
1967 45.7
56.18
16.54
40.45
UNR+UDT+RI (1)
UNR+UDT+RI+CD (2)
FGDS:SFIO+PRG+CIR (1)
FGDS+PCF+PSU (2)
Yes
Yes
No
No
UNR+UDT = 1 Party
UNR+UDT = 1 Party
SFIO+PRG only
SFIO+PRG+PCF only
1968 36.87
50.96
41.41
UNR+RI (1)
UNR+RI+PDM (2)
FGDS+PCF (2)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No PDM
Yes
1973 34.07
47.32
19.10
42.46
UDR+RI+UC (1)
UDR+RI+UC+REF (2)
UGDS:PS+PRG (1)
UGDS+PCF+PSU (2)
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
PS only
PS+PCF only
1978 20.21
42.75
24.95
45.56
UDF:CDS+PR+RI (1)
UDF+RPR (2)
PS+PRG (1)
PS+PRG+PCF (2)
Yes
Yes
No
No
UDF = 1 Party
Yes
PS only
PS+PCF only
1981 41.16
37.53
53.66
RPR+UDF (1)
PS+PRG (1)
PS+PRG+PCF (2)
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
PS only
PS+PCF only
1986 (PR) 42.1
23.8
RPR+UDF†
PS+PRG
Yes
No
Yes
PS only
1988 37.67
35.90
47.22
RPR+UDF (1)
PS+PRG (1)
PS+PRG+PCF (2)
No
Yes*
No
Yes
PS only
Yes
1993 39.47
18.49
27.67
7.64
RPR+UDF (1)
PS+PRG (1)
PS+PRG+PCF (2)
Greens+GE (1)
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
PS only
PS+PCF only
Greens+GE = 1 Party
1997 31.5
29.1
39.0
RPR+UDF (1)
PS+PRG+Greens (1)
PS+PRG+Greens+PCF (2)
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
2002 33.7
30.1
34.9
UMP:RPR+UDF+DL (1)
PS+PRG+Greens (1)
PS+PRG+Greens+ PCF (2)
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
*Pre-electoral coalition did not enter government alone. 
(1) and (2) indicate the round of the two-ballot system in which the pre-electoral coalition formed. 
uThe vote percentages are taken from Portelli (1994) for 1958–93. Figures for 1997 are from the elec-
tion results report in the 1998 European Journal of Political Research (34), and the figures for 2002 are
from www.electionworld.org. 
†The UDF and RPR ran joint lists in 61 districts and separate ones in 35 districts. The joint list won
21.0%, while the separate lists won an additional 9.6% and 11.5% of the vote respectively.
COALITIONS: FGDS: Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left, SFIO+PRG+CIR (1967,
1968). UGDS: Democratic and Socialist Union, PS+PRG (1973). UDF: Union for French
Democracy, CDS+PR+RI (1978). UMP: Union for a Presidential (Popular) Majority,
RPR+UDF+DL (2002).
PARTIES: UNR: Gaullist Party (1958–62). UDT: Left Gaullists (merged with the UNR after 1962
elections and became the UNR-UDT 1962–67 and then the UDVe 1967–68). UDR: Gaullist Party 
(cont.)
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(1968–76, continuation of UDVe). RPR: Gaullist Party (1976–2002, continuation of UDR). UMP:
Gaullist Party (2002–, continuation of RPR). UDF: Union for French Democracy. SFIO: Socialist
Party (1905–69). PS: Socialist Party (1969–, continuation of SFIO). PCF: Communist Party. PRG:
Left Radical Party (PRG 1998–, PRS 1996–98, MRG 1973–96, MGRS 1972–73, Radicals
1901–72). REF: Reformateurs (split from Radicals in 1972). PSU: Unified Socialist Party. Greens:
Green Party. GE: Generation Ecology. RI: Independent Republicans. PR: Republicans. UC: Center
Union. CD: Democratic Center. PDM: Progress and Modern Democracy.
COMMENTS: 1962: See Bell & Criddle (1984, 26) and Cole & Campbell (1989, 97). 1967: See
Bell & Criddle (1984, 47, 76), Cole & Campbell (1989, 100), and Alexandre (1977, 146). 1968: See
Bell & Criddle (1984, 49) and Cole & Campbell (1989, 104). 1973: See Bell & Criddle (1984, 75),
Martin (1993, 53), Lavau & Mossuz-Lavau (1980, 110), and Portelli (1994, 225). 1978: See Charlot
(1980, 82, 108), Martin (1993, 53), Jaffré (1980, 46, 72), Portelli (1994, 236–37), and Bell &
Criddle (1984, 101). 1981: See Ysmal (1989, 129), Martin (1993, 53), Portelli (1994, 304), and
Schlesinger & Schlesinger (2000, 136). 1986: See Bréchon (1995), Martin (1993, 53), Portelli
(1994,, 366–37, 371), and Ysmal (1989, 146). 1988: See Martin (1993, 53), Portelli (1994, 402),
and Schlesinger & Schlesinger (2000, 136–38). 1993: See Charlot (1994, 37), Ysmal (1993),
Backman & Birenbaum (1993), Martin (1993, 53), Portelli (1994, 445–47), Thiébault (2000, 502),
and http://www.les-verts.org/histoire.html. 1997: See Schlesinger & Schlesinger (2000, 136–38,
149), Thiébault (2000, 501, 511–12), and http://www.les-verts.org/histoire.html. 2002: Le Monde,
various.
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Table A.7
Electoral Coalitions in Germany, 1949–2002
Election Year % Vote for Coalition PEC In Govt? MRG†
1949 No
1953 48.38 CDU+CSU+DP Yes* CD
1957 53.55 CDU+CSU+DP Yes CD
1961 45.31 CDU+CSU Yes* CD
1965 47.59 CDU+CSU Yes* CD
1969 46.09 CDU+CSU No CD
1972 44.86
54.21
CDU+CSU
SPD+FDP
No
Yes
CD
Yes
1976 48.64
50.48
CDU+CSU
SPD+FDP
No
Yes
CD
Yes
1980 44.54
53.48
CDU+CSU
SPD+FDP
No
Yes
CD
Yes
1983 55.73 CDU+CSU+FDP Yes CD
1987 53.35 CDU+CSU+FDP Yes CD
1990 54.85
1.20
CDU+CSU+FDP
B’90+Greens
Yes
No
CD
No
1994 41.44 CDU+CSU Yes* CD
1998 39.58 CDU+CSU No CD
2002 38.5
47.1
CDU+CSU
SPD+Greens
No
Yes
No
No
*Pre-electoral coalition did not enter government alone. 
†CDU/CSU treated as a single party—the Christian Democrats (CD).
PARTIES: CSU: Christian Socialist Union. CDU: Christian Democratic Union. FDP: Free
Democrats. SPD: Social Democrats. DP: German Party. B’90: Alliance ‘90. Greens: Green Party.
COMMENTS: 1953: See Saalfeld (2000, 39). 1957: See Saalfeld (2000, 39), Mackie & Rose (1991),
Table 8.1. 1965: See Pulzer (1983, 102). 1969: See Mackie & Rose (1991), Table 8.1. 1972: See
Pulzer (1983, 102), Powell (2000, 141), Schoen (1999, 488), and Conradt (1978, 34). 1976: See
Pulzer (1983, 102), Powell (2000, 72), and Conradt (1978, 45). 1980: See Pulzer (1983, 102), Powell
(2000, 72), and Gunlicks (1990, 3). 1983: See Powell (2000, 72), Conradt (1990, 45) and Martin &
Stevenson (2001). 1987: See Powell (2000, 72) and Martin & Stevenson (2001). 1990: See Powell
(2000, 72, 210) and Martin & Stevenson (2001). 2002: New York Times (various).
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Table A.8
Electoral Coalitions in Greece, 1946–66, 1974–2002
Election Year % Vote for Coalition PEC In Govt? MRG
1946 55.1
19.3
2.9
UCNM
NPU
UNM
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
1950 2.6
16.4
9.7
8.2
5.3
FWR+NAPP
EPEK
DC
PIC
NRF
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
1951 No
1952 34.2 UP No No
1956 48.2 DU No No
1958 2.9
10.6
UPP
PADU
No
No
No
No
1961 33.7
14.6
CU+PP
UDL+NAPP
No
No
No
No
1963 No
1964 35.3 NRU+PP No No
1974 9.5
20.4
UL
CU+NF
No
No
No
No
1977 2.7 PLWF No No
1981 48.1
1.4
UDL+PASOK
RCPG+CPG-ML
Yes
No
No
No
1985 45.8
40.8
UDL+PASOK
PDS+ND
Yes
No
No
No
1989 (June) 13.1 PLWF No No
1989 (Nov.) 11.0 PLWF No No
1990 10.3 PLWF No No
1993 No
1996 No
2000 No
COALITIONS: UCNM: United Camp of the Nationally Minded: People’s Party, Reformist Party, National
Liberal Party, Royalist Party, Panhellenic National Party, Patriotic Union Party, Political Group Forward,
Party of Reconstruction, Social Radical Union. NPU: National Political Union: National Unity Party,
Democratic Socialists, Venizelist Liberals. UNM: Union of the Nationally Minded: Party of the Nationally
Minded, People’s Agrarian Party. DC Democratic Camp: Union of Democratic Leftists, Socialist Party—
Union of Popular Democracy, Party of Leftist Liberals. PIC: Politically Independent Camp: Greek
Renaissance Party, Party of the Nationally Minded. NRF: National Reconstruction Front: National Unity
Party, People’s Progressive Party, Panhellenic Party. EPEK: National Progressive Center Union: Progressive
Liberal Center Party, Democratic Progressive Party. UP: Union of the Parties: National Progressive Center
Union, Liberal Party, Socialist Party – Union of Popular Democracy. DU: Democratic Union: United
Democratic Left, Liberal Party I, National Progressives Center Union, Farmers’ and Workers’ Rally,
Democratic Party, Liberal Democrats, People’s Party. UPP: Union of the People’s Parties: People’s Party,
People’s Social Party. PADU: Progressive Agrarian Democratic Union: National Progressives Center Union,
Farmers’ and Workers’ Rally, Democratic Party, Progressives Party. UL: United Left: Communist Party,
Communist Party-Interior, United Democratic Left Party. PLWF: Alliance of Progress and Left-Wing
Forces: Christian Democrats, Communist Party-Interior, Socialist Initiative, Socialist March, U.D. Left.
PARTIES: FWR: Farmers’ and Workers’ Rally. NAPP: National Agrarian Progressive Party. UDL: United
Democratic Left. PASOK: Socialists. PSP: Popular Social Party. NRU: National Radical Union. PP:
Progressive Party. NF: New Forces. CU: Center Union. RCPG: Revolutionary Communist Party of
Greece. CPG-ML: Communist Party of Greece—Marxist Leninist. PDS: Party for Democratic Socialists.
ND: New Democracy. 
COMMENTS: 1946–85 See mainly Clogg (1987) but also Mackie & Rose (1991), Kohler (1982,
105–33) for 1961, 1974–77, and Papayannakis (1981, 141–53) for 1956 and 1977. 1989–90: Various
issues of the European Journal of Political Research—reports on national elections in western nations.
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Table A.9
Electoral Coalitions in Iceland, 1946–2002
Election Year % Vote for Coalition PEC In Govt? MRG
1946 No
1949 No
1953 No
1956 19.2 People’s Alliance I Yes* Yes
1959 (June) 15.2 People’s Alliance I No Yes
1959 (Oct.) 16.0 People’s Alliance I No Yes
1963 16.0 People’s Alliance II No No NPP
1967 13.9 People’s Alliance I No Yes
1971 No
1974 4.60 ULL+PP No Yes
1978 No
1979 No
1983 No
1987 No
1991 1.8 NP+HP No No
1995 No
1999 26.8 PA+WP+SDP+PM No No
*Pre-electoral coalition did not enter government alone.
COALITIONS: People’s Alliance I: United Socialist Party, Social Democratic Party (1956, 1959,
1967). People’s Alliance II: United Socialist Party, Social Democratic Party, National Preservation
Party (1963).
PARTIES: IP: Independence Party. PP: Progressive Party. ULL: Union of Liberals and Leftists. NPP:
National Preservation Party. SP: United Socialist Party. PA: People’s Alliance. WP: Woman’s Party.
SDP: Social Democratic Party. PM: People’s Movement. NP: National Party. HP: Humanist Party.
COMMENTS: 1956–67: This electoral coalition included the left wing of the SPD only. The coali-
tion eventually merged into a single party (PA) in 1968. See Grimsson (1982, 146), Kristjánsson
(1998, 175), Arter (1999, 84–85), Esaiasson & Heidar (2000, 448, 450), Hardarson (2002, 109,
144), Kristjánsson (2002, 126), and Indriðason (2004). 1974: Includes only a splinter of the PP and
not the entire party (Grimsson 1982, 148). 1991: See the European Journal of Political Research 1992
(22)—reports on national elections in western nations. 1999: See Hardarson (2002, 107).
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Table A.10
Electoral Coalitions in Ireland, 1946–2002
Election Year % Vote for Coalition PEC In Govt? MRG
1948 No
1951 53.11 FG+L+CnT+CnP No Yes
1954 44.28 FG+L+CnT Yes Yes
1957 No
1961 No
1965 No
1969 No
1973 48.75 FG+L Yes Yes
1977 42.12 FG+L No Yes
1981 46.40 FG+L Yes Yes
1982 (Feb.) 46.42 FG+L No Yes
1982 (Nov.) 48.6 FG+L Yes Yes
1987 No
1989 No
1992 No
1997 40.8
44.0
FG+L+DL
FF+PD
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
2002 No
PARTIES: CnP: Clann na Poblachta (Party of the Republic). CnT: Clann na Talmhan (Party of the
Land). DL: Democratic Left. FF: Fianna Fáil (Soldiers of Ireland). FG: Fine Gael (Irish Race). L:
Labour. PD: Progressive Democrats.
COMMENTS: 1951: See Farrell (1987, 138). 1954: See Farrell (1987, 138). 1973: See Sinnott
(1987, 93), Mair (1987, 114), Farrell (1987, 138), and Gallagher (1982, 118,190–96). 1977: See
Gallagher (1982, 216–32). 1981: See Laver (1992). 1982 (February and November): See Gallagher
(1982, 249) and Sinnott (1987, 93). 1997: See Murphy (2003, 4), Collins (2003, 25), and Gallagher
(2003, 93).
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Table A.11
Electoral Coalitions in Israel, 1948–2002
Election Year % Vote for Coalition PEC In Govt? MRG†
1949 12.2 URF Yes* No
1951 No
1955 4.7 Torah Front No No
1959 4.7 Torah Front No No
1961 No
1965 21.3 Gahal No No
1969 21.7
46.2
Gahal
Maarakh
Yes*
Yes*
No
No
1973 30.2
39.6
1.4
3.8
Likud Bloc
Maarakh
Moked
Torah Front
No
Yes*
No
No
No
No
No
No
1977 33.4
24.6
11.6
Likud Bloc
Maarakh
DMC
Yes*
No
No
No
No
No
1981 37.1
36.6
Likud Bloc
Maarakh
Yes*
No
No
No
1984 31.9
34.9
4.0
Likud Bloc
Maarakh
HaTehiya+Tsomet
Yes*
Yes*
Yes*
No
No
No
1988 31.1 Likud Bloc Yes* No
1992 24.9
9.6
Likud Bloc
Meretz
No
Yes*
No
No
1996u 25.8 LGT Yes* No
1999u 14.1
20.2
3.0
3.7
Likud Bloc
One Israel
National Union
Yahadut HaTorah
No
Yes*
No
No
No
No
No
No
*Pre-electoral coalition did not enter government alone.
†The MRG data set includes these coalitions as single parties. 
uThe Prime Minister was directly elected by the voters in 1996 and 1999.
COALITIONS: URF (United Religious Front): Mizrahi, HaPoel HaMizrahi, Agudat Israel and
Poalei Agudat Israel. Torah Religious Front: Agudat Israel and Poalei Agudat Israel. Gahal: Liberal
Party and Herut. Likud Bloc: Liberal Party, Herut, Free Center, Laam, Movement for a Greater Israel,
State List. Maarakh (Alignment): Labor Party and Mapam. Moked: Maki and Rakah – The
Communist Party of Israel was founded in 1949, and in 1965 broke into two factions, Maki and
Rakah. They formed an electoral list together in 1973. DMC (Democratic Movement for Change):
Shinui and Free Center. Meretz: Shinui, Mapam and Ratz. One Israel: Labor, Gesher and Meimad.
LGT: Likud Bloc, Gesher and Tsomet. Yahadut HaTorah: Agudat Israel and Degel HaTorah.
National Union: Moledet, Herut and Tekuma.
COMMENTS: See official Knesset website, www.knesset.gov.il. See also the Library of Congress
(http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/israel/il_appnb.html), Laver & Schofield (1998, 230), Penniman (ed.)
(1979), Aronoff (1978).
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Table A.12
Electoral Coalitions in Italy, 1946–2002
Election Year % Vote for Coalition PEC In Govt? MRG
1948 31.0 PCI+PSI No Yes
1953 35.3 PCI+PSI No Yes
1958 No
1963 No
1968 No
1972 No
1976 No
1979 No
1983 No
1987 No
1992 No
1994 34.3
15.7
46.4
Progressive Allia nce
Pact for Italy
Pole of Good Government
Yes*
Yes*
No
(1)
Yes
(2)
1996 43.4
42.1
Olive Tree I + RC
Freedom Pole
Yes†
No
(3)
(4)
2001 35.0
45.4
Olive Tree II
House of Freedom
No
Yes
No
No
* Pre-electoral coalition did not enter government alone.
† Although the RC was a member of the electoral alliance, it did not enter government. The RC did
support the Olive Tree I government in the legislature, though. 
(1) MRG data set does not include the Socialist Party, Social Christians, or Socialist Renewal; (2)
MRG data set does not include the Christian Democratic Center, Democratic Union of the Left,
Liberal Democratic Pole; (3) MRG data set does not include the Prodi Group or the Sardinian Action
Party; 4) MRG data set treats the Christian Democrats as a single party.
COALITIONS: Progressive Alliance: Party of the Democratic Left, Communist Refoundation,
Greens, Network, Democratic Alliance, Socialist Party, Social Christians, Socialist Renewal. Pact for
Italy: Popular Party, Segui Pact. Pole of Good Government: Forza Italia, National Alliance, Northern
League, Panella List-Reformers, Christian Democratic Center, Democratic Union of the Left, Liberal
Democratic Pole. Freedom Pole: Forza Italia, National Alliance, Christian Democratic Center, United
Christian Democrats. Olive Tree I: Party of the Democratic Left, Prodi Group, Dini List-Renewed
Italy, Green Federation. House of Freedom: Forza Italia, National Alliance, Northern League, Union
of Christian and Center Democrats (formerly the Christian Democratic Center and the United
Christian Democrats), New Italian Socialist Party. Olive Tree II: Party of Democratic Left, Italian
People’s Party, Democrats, Dini-List-Renewed Italy, Democratic Union for Europe, Green Federation,
Italian Democratic Socialist Party, Party of Italian Communists.
PARTIES: RC: Communist Refoundation. PCI: Communist Party. PSI: Socialist Party.
COMMENTS: 1948: See Mackie & Rose (1991), Marradi (1982, 39), and Mastropaolo & Slater
(1992, 313). 1953: See Mastropaolo & Slater (1992, 313). 1994: See Newell (2000, 32), Mershon
(2002), Rhodes (1995, 128–29), Daniels (1999, 82–84), and Verzichelli & Cotta (2000). 1996: See
Mershon (2002), Newell (2000, 38–39), Daniels (1999, 85–89), and Verzichelli & Cotta (2000).
2001: See Mershon (2002) and www.electionworld.org.
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Table A.13
Electoral Coalitions in Japan, 1946–2002
Election Year % Vote for Coalition PEC In Govt? MRG
1947 No
1949 No
1952 No
1953 No
1955 No
1958 No
1960 No
1963 No
1967 No
1969 No
1972 No
1976 No
1979 No
1980 No
1983 No
1986 No
1990 No
1993 37.18
10.69
JRP+JSP+CGP+DSP+SDF
NP+JNP
Yes*
Yes*
No SDF
Yes
1996 No
2000 No
*The government was formed from the two pre-electoral coalitions in 1993.
PARTIES: CGP: Clean Government Party. DSP: Democratic Socialist Party. JNP: Japan New Party.
JRP: Japan Renewal Party (Shinsei-to). JSP: Japan Socialist Party. NP: New Party (Sakigake). SDF:
Socialist Democratic Federation.
COMMENTS: 1993: See Kohno (1997, 139–41, 149).
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Table A.14
Electoral Coalitions in Luxembourg, 1946–2002
Election Year † % Vote for Coalition PEC In Govt? MRG
1954 No
1959 No
1964 No
1968 68.45 LSAP+CSV Nous Yes
1974 No
1979 6.64 EF+SI No No
1984 No
1989 No
1994 9.91 GAP+GLEI No 1 Party
1999 No
†The elections of 1949 and 1951 were partial legislative elections and were, thus, not included.
uAfter the election, the LSAP was prevented from entering the government coalition by its trade
union—the CSV did want to form the government coalition based on the electoral pact (Dumont &
De Winter 2000, 405).
PARTIES: CSV: Christian Democrats. LSAP: Socialists. GAP: Alternative Green Party. GLEI: Green
Left Ecological Initiative. EF: Forcibly Enrolled. SI: Independent Socialists.
COMMENTS: 1968: See Dumont & De Winter (2000, 405). 1979: See Mackie & Rose (1991),
Table 15.1. 1994: See Dumont & De Winter (2000, 403).
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Table A.15
Electoral Coalitions in the Netherlands, 1946–2002
Election Year % Vote for Coalition PEC In Govt? MRG
1946 No
1948 No
1952 No
1956 No
1959 No
1963 No
1967 No
1971 33.70 PvdA+D66+PPR No Yes
1972 36.29 PvdA+D66+PPR Yes* Yes
1977 31.89
35.90
ARP+CHU+KVP
PvdA+PPR
Yes*
No
1 Party
Yes
1981 No
1982 No
1986 52.00 CDA+VVD Yes Yes
1989 67.19
4.10
PvdA+CDA
CPN+PPR+EVP
Yes
No
Yes
No
1994 No
1998 62.7 D66+PvdA+VVD Yes Yes
2002 No
*Pre-electoral coalition did not enter government alone.
PARTIES: PvdA: Social Democrats. D66: Liberal Democrats. PPR: Radical Party. CHU: Christian
Historical Union. ARP: Anti-Revolutionary Party. KVP: Catholic People’s Party – ARP, CHU and
KVP merged to form the Christian Democrat Appeal (CDA) in 1979. VVD: Liberals. CPN:
Communist Party. EVP: Evangelical People’s Party.
COMMENTS: 1971: See Timmermans & Andeweg (2000, 367), Tops & Dittrich (1992, 279), and
Daalder (1987, 254). 1972: See Timmermans & Andeweg (2000, 367), Tops & Dittrich (1992, 279),
Daalder (1987, 254), and De Swaan (1982, 223, 230). 1977: See Koole (1994, 280), Daalder (1987,
217), de Jong & Pijnenburg (1986, 148), De Swaan (1982, 223, 230), and Keesing’s. 1986: See
Powell (2000, 141) and Napel (1999, 177). 1989: See Powell (2000, 55). 1998: See Irwin (1999).
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Table A.16
Electoral Coalitions in New Zealand, 1946–2002
Election Year % Vote for Coalition PEC In Govt? MRG
1946 No
1949 No
1951 No
1954 No
1957 No
1960 No
1963 No
1966 No
1969 No
1972 No
1975 No
1978 No
1981 No
1984 No
1987 No
1990 5.2 MM+NLP No No
1993 No
1996 No
1999 46.4 AL+LAB Yes No
2002 No
PARTIES: MM: Mana Motuhake. NLP: New Labor Party. AL: Alliance Party. LAB: New Zealand
Labour Party.
COMMENTS: 1990: See Alliance website, http://www.alliance.org.nz. The NLP stood in the gen-
eral seats, and Mana Motuhake stood in the Maori seats.  In 1991, the two parties merged into the
Alliance. 1999: See Vowles (2002) and Alliance website http://www.alliance.org.nz.
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Table A.17
Electoral Coalitions in Norway, 1946–2002
Election Year % Vote for Coalition PEC In Govt? MRG
1949 No
1953 No
1957 No
1961 No
1965 49.47 SP+H+V+KRF Yes Yes
1969 48.88 SP+H+V+KRF Yes Yes
1973 11.20 CP+SPP+WIC No 1 Party
1977 45.78 H+KRF+SP No Yes
1981 47.77 H+KRF+SP No Yes
1985 45.28 H+KRF+SP Yes Yes
1989 37.19 H+KRF+SP Yes Yes
1993 No
1997 26.04 KRF+SP+V Yes Yes
2001 22.00 KRF+SP+V No No
PARTIES: SP: Center Party. H: Conservative Party. V: Liberal Party. KRF: Christian People’s Party.
CP: Communist Party. SPP: Socialist People’s Party. WIC: Worker’s Information Committee.
COMMENTS: 1965: See Groennings (1970, 73–74), Fitzmaurice (1986, 266), Rommetvedt (1992,
59), Hancock (1998, 245), Arter (1999, 210), and Narud & Strøm (2000, 175). 1969: See
Fitzmaurice (1986, 266), Strøm & Leipart (1992, 69), and Narud & Strøm (2000, 175). 1973: See
Valen & Martinussen (1977, 40–43), Esaiasson & Heidar (2000, 452), and Keesing’s. In March 1975
the electoral coalition was transformed into the Socialist Left Party. 1977: See Rommetvedt (1992,
61, 75) and Arter (1999, 210). 1981: See Narud & Strøm (2000, 177), Shaffer (1998, 122) and
Rommetvedt (1992, 60, 75). 1985: See Strøm & Leipart (1992, 69) and Narud & Strøm (2000,
175). 1989: See Rommetvedt (1992, 61) and Narud & Strøm (2000, 175). 1997: See Narud &
Strøm (2000, 175). 2001: See Valen (2003).
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Table A.18
Electoral Coalitions in Portugal, 1976–2002
Election Year % Vote for Coalition PEC In Govt? MRG
1976 No
1979 46.30
19.51
SD+CDS+PMP
PCP+MDP
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
1980 27.80
17.32
48.30
PS+UEDS+ASDI
PCP+MDP
SD+CDS+PMP+Ref
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Not Ref
1983 18.69 PCP+MDP+Greens No Yes
1985 15.97 PCP+MDP+Greens No Yes
1987 12.46 CDU No Yes
1991 8.80 CDU No 1 Party
1995 8.60 CDU No 1Party
1999 9.02
2.46
CDU
UBL
No
No
No
No
2002 7.00
2.80
CDU
UBL
No
No
No
No
COALITIONS: CDU (Unitarian Democratic Coalition): Communist Party and Greens. UBL
(United Block of the Left): Worker’s Revolutionary Party, Democratic People’s Union, and Extreme
Left (Politica XXI).
PARTIES: PCP: Communist Party. MDP: Portuguese Democratic Movement. CDS: Center Social
Democrats. SD: Social Democrats. DI: Democratic Intervention. Ref: Reformists. PS: Socialist Party.
UEDS: Left Social Democratic Union. ASDI: Independent Social Democrats. PRD: Party of
Democratic Renovation. PMP: Popular Monarchist Party.
COMMENTS: 1979: See Cunha (1997, 36), Frain (1997, 100–102), Kohler (1982, 196, 209),
Bruneau & Macleod (1986, 28–29), Mackie & Rose (1991), Table 20.3a, Magone (2000), and Laver
& Schofield (1998, 237). 1980: See Cunha (1997, 37), Frain (1997, 100–102), Bruneau & Macleod
(1986, 28–29), Mackie & Rose (1991), Table 20.3a, Magone (2000), and Laver & Schofield (1998,
237). 1983–87: See Cunha (1997, 39–41), Mackie & Rose (1991), Table 20.3a, Magone (2000), and
Laver & Schofield (1998, 237). 1991–95: See Cunha (1997, 45–47), Magone (2000, 533). 1999: See
Lloyd-Jones (2002) and Keesing’s. 2002: See electionworld.org.
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Table A.19
Electoral Coalitions in Spain, 1977–2002
Election Year % Vote for Coalition PEC In Govt? MRG
1977 34.52
9.35
4.47
UCD
PCE+CS
PSP+FSP
Yes
No
No
1 Party
Yes
No
1979 5.97
10.82
AP+PDP+PL
PCE+CS
No
No
1 Party
Yes
1982 23.64 AP+PDP No Yes
1986 26.12
4.63
AP+PDP+PL
PCE+left
No
No
Yes
No
1989 9.13 IU No No
1993 9.63 IU No No
1996 No
2000 39.6 PSOE+IU No No
COALITIONS: IU (United Left Coalition): Spanish Communist Party, Communist Party of the
Peoples of Spain, Catalan Unified Socialist Party, Progressive Federation, Party of Socialist Action,
Unitarian Candidature of Workers, Berdak-Les Verds and Republican Left. This was an electoral coali-
tion until 1994, when it became a federation where its members could belong either to the IU itself
or to its member parties (Newton 1997, 193, 215). UCD: Union of the Democratic Center: an elec-
toral coalition of fourteen center and right-wing parties that merged into a single party in 1978. AP:
Popular Alliance: an electoral alliance with around seven conservative constituent parties.  By 1978,
the coalition had split, losing some conservative members and gaining some moderate ones.
PARTIES: PDP: Christian Democrats. PL: Liberals. PCE: Communists. CS: Catalan Unified
Socialist Party. PSOE: Socialists. PSP: Popular Socialist Party. FSP: remnant of Federation of Socialist
Parties.
COMMENTS: 1977: See Kohler (1982, 17–35), López-Pintor (1985a, 189), Esteban & López
Guerra (1985), Mackie & Rose (1991), Heywood (1995, 175), Caramani (2000), and Hopkin (1999,
213). 1979: See Kohler (1982, 27–28), López-Pintor (1985a, 189), and Esteban & López Guerra
(1985). 1982: See López-Pintor (1985b), Mackie & Rose (1991), and Laver & Schofield (1998,
239–40). 1986: See Laver & Schofield (1998, 239–40) and Gillespie (1995, 59). 1989: See Keesings
and Newton (1997, 193, 210–11). 1993: See Keesings, Newton (1997, 193, 210–11), and Budge et
al. (2001). 1996: See Newton (1997, 210–11). 2000: See Colomer (2001) and www.election-
world.org.
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Table A.20
Electoral Coalitions in Sweden, 1946–2002
Election Year % Vote for Coalition PEC In Govt? MRG
1948 47.48 CE+LIB+CON No Yes
1952 56.79 SD+CE Yes Yes
1956 No
1958 No
1960 No
1964 No
1968 No
1970 No
1973 48.81
9.4
CE+LIB+CON
SLP+left
No
No
Yes
Yes (SKP)
1976 50.73 CE+LIB+CON Yes Yes
1979 49.0 CE+LIB+CON No Yes
1982 No
1985 12.42 CE+CD No Yes
1988 No
1991 31.05 LIB+CON Yes* Yes
1994 No
1998 No
2002 No
*Pre-electoral coalition did not enter government alone.
PARTIES: SD: Social Democrats. SKP: Left Party. CE: Center Party. LIB: Liberal Party. CON:
Conservative Party. CD: Christian Democratic Party. ND: New Democracy Party.
COMMENTS: 1948: See Särlvik (2002, 243–45, 247). 1952: See Bergman (2000, 208). 1973: See
Bergman (1995, 74, 84), Särlvik (1977, 75–76), Hadenius (1990, 132–33), Strøm & Bergman
(1992, 115) and Powell (2000, 76). 1973: Keesing’s reported an alliance on the left but mentioned
only one party by name (SKP). 1976: See Särlvik (1983, 126), Fitzmaurice (1986, 266), Hadenius
(1990, 144), Strøm & Bergman (1992, 115), and Powell (2000, 72, 76, 261). 1979: See Särlvik
(1983, 131), Fitzmaurice (1986, 266), Strøm & Bergman (1992), and Powell (2000, 76, 261). 1985:
See Hadenius (1990, 177), Sannerstedt & Sjölin (1992, 104), Strøm & Bergman (1992, 117), Arter
(1999, 111), and Särlvik (2002, 229, 257–58). 1991: See Bergman (2000, 209).
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Table A.21
Electoral Coalitions in the United Kingdom, 1946–2002
Election Year % Vote for Coalition PEC In Govt? MRG
1950 No
1951 No
1955 No
1959 No
1964 No
1966 No
1970 No
1974 (Feb.) No
1974 (Oct.) No
1979 No
1983 25.37 Lib+SocDem No Yes
1987 22.57 Lib+SocDem No Yes
1992 No
1997 No
2001 No
PARTIES: Lib: Liberals. SocDem: Social Democratic Party.
COMMENTS: 1983: See Boothroyd (2001, 5–8), Kitschelt (1994, 180), Norton (1984, 126–30),
and Peele (1995, 202–3). 1987: See Peele (1995, 202–3) and Boothroyd (2001, 5–8).
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NOTES
Notes to Chapter 1
1. I use the terms ‘electoral’ or ‘pre-electoral’ interchangeably to characterize coali-
tions that form prior to elections.
2. Electoral coalitions can also play a role in determining the identity of the govern-
ment in countries with more proportional electoral rules. For example, the presence of an
electoral coalition can affect the choice of government formateur or allow a small party that
is a potential government member to surpass an electoral threshold. By affecting the iden-
tity of the government, electoral coalitions ultimately influence the types of policy that get
implemented. This is the case whether the electoral system is disproportional, as in the styl-
ized example above, or not.
3. Some of these studies do take account of the pre-election environment by incor-
porating voter choice and candidate entry (Shepsle 1991). For instance, Austen-Smith and
Banks (1988) analyze the strategic behavior of voters in their model of government coali-
tion formation. Other more recent work combines voter behavior with post-election elite
bargaining (Glasgow & Alvarez 2005; Quinn & Martin 2002). However, none of these
analyses ever explicitly allows for pre-electoral coalition formation.
4. I know of only one major cross-national statistical analysis that takes account of
pre-electoral coalitions (Martin & Stevenson 2001). However, just as in the rest of the lit-
erature, the goal of this study is to better understand government coalitions, not electoral
coalitions. Extremely recently, several papers have appeared examining electoral coalitions
between particular parties in France (Blais and Indriðason 2004; Spoon 2004; Fauvelle-
Aymar & Lewis-Beck 2005).
5. Kaminski (2001) uses a cooperative game-theoretic model to examine pre-electoral
coalitions and party mergers in Poland in the 1990s. However, his analysis has not been
extended to other cases and does not take account of bargaining or policy issues.
6. I do not claim that pre-electoral coalitions will automatically be electorally advan-
tageous. After all, it may be the case that a coalition is composed of parties that are so ide-
ologically incompatible that their respective electorates refuse to vote for the coalition.
7. Note that this does not have to be the case for a coalition to be advantageous. A
coalition that attracts more votes than either party could win on its own, but fewer than
the total number of votes they would win running independently, may still be useful if it
increases the probability that this coalition enters government or becomes the formateur.
Notes to Chapter 2
1. Powell (2000) has collected data on government majorities that were identifiable
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prior to elections. Although he includes some pre-electoral coalitions in his analysis, they
are certainly not the main focus of his book. Martin and Stevenson (2001) include a pre-
electoral coalition variable in their analysis of government coalitions. However, as I note in
chapter seven, they significantly underestimate the presence of electoral coalitions in their
sample.
2. Convergencia i Unió is an electoral coalition between the Democratic
Convergence of Catalonia and the Democratic Union of Catalonia. Unidade Galega,
known as the Socialist Galega Block in 1982 and the Socialist Galega-Left Galega in 1986,
is composed of several small Galician parties. The Galician National Popular Block is
another Galician electoral coalition in which the Marxist Unión do Pobo Galego is the
dominant party. The Basque Left is an electoral coalition of left-wing Basque parties, while
Herri Batasuna is an electoral coalition of more extreme left-wing parties in the Basque
region.
3. These two electoral coalitions formed in the 1993 legislative elections (Kohno
1997, 139–41, 149). One electoral coalition comprised the Clean Government Party, the
Democratic Socialist Party, the Socialist Democratic Federation, the Japan Renewal Party
(Shinsei-to) and the Japan Socialist Party. The other comprised the New Party (Sakigake)
and the Japan New Party. Both electoral coalitions entered government in 1993.
4. There was a coalition between the Center Party and the Christian League of
Finland in 1970 (Arter 1999, 110), a coalition between the Liberals and the Center Party
in 1983 (Esaiasson & Heidar 2000, 447–48), and the Purple Coalition in 1999 (personal
correspondence with Mark Hallerberg). For more on electoral coalitions in Finland, see
Sundberg (2002) and Kuitunen (2002).
5. I do not include Switzerland in this book because my statistical analyses focus on
parliamentary, rather than presidential, systems. Were I to do so, though, it would present
other ambiguous cases. Parties in Switzerland often form electoral coalitions in particular
cantons; however, they are not nation-wide coalitions. The ‘magic formula’ used after 1959
to determine coalition government composition means that everyone knows in advance
which parties will end up in government (Kerr 1987) and that “elections do not have a
direct impact on the government composition” (Caramani 1996). I do not consider this
agreement over government composition to constitute a pre-electoral coalition, since the
parties in question do not coordinate their electoral strategies. Moreover, members of the
executive council are elected individually by the parliament and are not “constrained by
interparty policy deals” (Church 2004, 20, 117–18). Thus, although Switzerland has pre-
electoral coalitions at the local level and the ‘magic formula’ at the national level, I would
code Switzerland as having no national-level pre-electoral coalitions.
6. Prior to the 1960s, the Liberal Party also formed several local electoral coalitions
with the Conservative Party. These coalitions took the form of nomination agreements, in
which the Liberals agreed “not to contest a particular seat if the Conservatives refrained
from offering a candidate in another seat” (Rasmussen 1991, 167).
7. Identifying electoral coalitions in Israel is further complicated by the fact that some
parties that form an electoral alliance for certain elections later merge into a single party,
where the original constituent parties exist as separate factions. This was the case with
Mapai and its electoral alliance partners when they merged to form the Labor Party in
1968. Fortunately the act of officially forming a party does tend to be mentioned in the lit-
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erature on elections and parties in Israel.
8. For a more detailed discussion of electoral coordination in mixed and multi-tier
electoral systems with dual ballots, see Ferrara & Herron (2005).
9. Because the National and Liberal parties have such a long-standing electoral agree-
ment, most of their pre-electoral bargaining is not actually over the flow of preferences, but
rather over the number of districts in which both should compete and the extent to which
their policy platforms differ (Sharman, Sayers, & Miragliotta 2002).
Notes to Chapter 3
1. Note that this is equivalent to saying that an increase in the number of parties will
only raise the likelihood of pre-electoral coalitions when the electoral system is sufficiently
disproportional.
2. However, some commentators analyzing Dutch politics have suggested that elec-
toral coalitions have not been very effective in giving Dutch voters more say over the com-
position of their governments. For example, De Jong and Pijnenburg (1986, 148) state that
“the making of a [government] coalition remains the crucial moment despite the efforts . . .
towards more ‘political clarity’ and pre-electoral agreements . . . Dutch voters will never
decide on the composition of their government.”
3. A slightly different scenario took place in Italy in 1996, when a number of center-
Left parties running under the heading of Olive Tree agreed to go into government togeth-
er if they were successful at the polls. While the Communist Refoundation (RC) was not
part of this coalition and had no intention of going into government with the Olive Tree,
it did reach nomination agreements with the member parties of the Olive Tree to avoid
splitting the left-wing vote in a number of constituencies (Daniels 1999, 85–86). Following
the election, the Olive Tree coalition entered government, and the RC simply supported it
from the legislature (Newell 2000, 38). In this case, I do consider that the government was
based on an electoral coalition.
4. For another analysis of how electoral system disproportionality and party system
size affect the probability of electoral coalition formation, see S. Golder (2005).
5. The effective threshold is the mean of the thresholds of representation and exclu-
sion. It is calculated as
where M is the district magnitude. If there are legal thresholds and/or upper-tier seats, the
calculation is slightly more complicated (Lijphart 1994, 25–30). For more information on
electoral thresholds, see Taagepera (1998a, 1998b).
Notes to Chapter 4
1. However, it is important to recognize that actual election results may rule out cer-
tain combinations, so that a party may reconsider its alliance strategy afterwards. It may
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also be the case that voters do not clearly show their support for a particular electoral coali-
tion. In these circumstances, party leaders can more easily justify not honoring the terms
of the electoral coalition. After all, agreements over the division of government spoils do
not necessarily specify appropriate behavior if the coalition loses. It is, perhaps, interesting
to note that some pre-electoral agreements are sufficiently detailed that they take these pos-
sibilities into account and prescribe particular actions. This is an indication that party lead-
ers are clearly aware of the commitment problems associated with electoral coalitions.
2. If the main issue for voters in a particular election was incumbent corruption, then
parties at opposing extremes could potentially form an anti-incumbent, anti-corruption
electoral coalition that could generate a significant amount of voter support. In fact, this is
the story often told of the defeat of the Congress Party in India in 1989 (Andersen 1990).
3. Note that the fact that a coalition may be sub-additive does not necessarily mean
that it offers no significant electoral gains. It is possible for a coalition to be sub-additive
and yet still be sufficiently large to represent the largest ‘party,’ thereby winning itself the
role of government formateur.
4. This does not rule out the possibility that politicians will overestimate the support
they would receive from running separately or from forming an electoral coalition.
Estimates of party or coalition support are likely to be uncertain in volatile or new party
systems. Although the extent to which these estimates are inaccurate can obviously affect
the range in which coalition bargains are feasible, I have not explicitly modeled this source
of uncertainty.
5. The core of any bargaining game is that two players are bargaining over a ‘pie.’ The
size of this pie is typically normalized to 1. An agreement is a pair (x1, x2), in which x1 is
Player A’s share of the pie and x2 Player B’s share. The set of possible agreements is: X =
{(x1, x2) : x1 + x2 = 1 and xi 0 for i = 1, 2}.
6. As long as party leaders have single-peaked preferences over the policy space, then
the use of a quadratic loss function does not affect any of the model’s implications.
7. It is not difficult to see that this feature of presidential elections would make it
rather difficult to find a coalition bargain acceptable to both sides. The problems caused by
non-divisible presidential offices will be illustrated in the next chapter.
8. Although there are three possible sub-game perfect Nash equilibria, there is always
a unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium for any given set of values for the model’s
parameters.
9. However, this assumption is not entirely innocuous, since it does affect the num-
ber of possible sub-game perfect Nash equilibria. It turns out that if I allow the players to
remain indifferent between making and not making an offer, there would be an addition-
al equilibrium in which Party A makes an offer, B rejects this offer, and B makes no count-
er-offer. The outcome would be that no electoral coalition forms.
10. If this assumption is not made and the players are allowed to remain indifferent,
then there is a fourth sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. The outcome is that Player A
makes an initial offer, which is rejected. The game enters a second period, but Player B does
not make a counter offer. The end result is that no electoral coalition forms.
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Notes to Chapter 5
1. Le Pen received 16.86% of the vote in the 2002 presidential election compared to
15% in 1995. A rival far-right candidate, Bruno Mégret, won another 2.34% of the vote
in 2002. These figures come from the Election Politique website at http://www.election
-politique.com.
2. The electoral system used for the 1986 elections was different. In an attempt to
prevent an expected right-wing legislative majority, President Mitterrand introduced a pro-
portional representation system similar to that used in the Fourth Republic. He hoped that
this system would encourage voters to support the extremist National Front and siphon off
votes from the moderate right-wing parties. Although a large number of voters did support
the National Front, the leader of the moderate right, Jacques Chirac, still managed to
become prime minister, albeit with a legislative majority of just two. Chirac immediately
restored the traditional two-round electoral system.
3. The early 5% threshold was based on the actual number of votes cast. When the
threshold was raised to 10% in 1966, the percentage of votes a party now needed to
advance to the second round was 10% of the registered voters. This method remained in
place when the threshold was raised to 12.5% (Duhamel 1999, 138–39). Given turnout
levels, a party often needs around 17% of the actual vote to qualify for the second round.
4. A small number of moderate right-wing deputies regularly call for an electoral
coalition with the National Front in certain districts. However, they tend to be isolated very
quickly by the party elites (Hecht & Mandonnet 1998). For example, when several main-
stream right politicians were elected with the help of the National Front in the cantonal
and regional elections of 1998, President Chirac immediately went on national television
to denounce all alliances between the moderate and the extreme right. The politicians were
then kicked out of their parties (Martin 1999).
5. Cohabitation refers to a time when the presidential and prime ministerial positions
are held by people from opposing parties.
6. The origins of this federation can be found in a series of discussions that took place
around the presidential candidate of a mysterious ‘Monsieur X.’ It was only once the idea
of a candidate of the center-Left had been ‘tested’ in the weekly magazine, L’Express, that
Gaston Deferre came out and announced that he was actually Monsieur X (Chagnollaud
& Quermonne 1996).
7. The PCF were opposed to the alliance, because they did not want to be sidelined
as they had been in the Fourth Republic. Since the Gaullists opposed the alliance and want-
ed the centrist voters for themselves, they constantly raised the religious issue to drive a
wedge between the Socialists and the MRP.
8. Parties of the right during the Third and Fourth Republics had always suffered
from elite fragmentation and the poor organization of their mass electoral following.
However, the Gaullists were able to gain control of the local ‘notables’ and achieve a high
degree of parliamentary discipline, centralization, and nationalization (Schain 1991).
9. The other three cases include one with multiple left-wing candidates, and two with
multiple right-wing candidates. In the fourth district in the Maine-et-Loire department,
the left-wing candidate managed to win with only 36.57% of the vote, because two main-
stream-Right candidates split the right-wing vote between them.
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10. In the proportional representation elections of 1986, the UDF and the Gaullists
ran joint lists in 61 of the 96 electoral districts. They ran separate lists in the remaining 35.
11. Along with a small band of followers, the UDF leader François Bayrou was one of
the few who refused to join the new ‘Union for a Presidential Majority.’ He was worried
that the Gaullists would dominate the new coalition and control the bulk of the campaign
funding from the government.
12. Socialist voters were much less likely to vote for a Communist candidate in the sec-
ond round than Communist voters were to support a Socialist candidate. The vast major-
ity of centrist voters simply refused to vote for an electoral union of the Left led by the PCF
(Hanley 2002; Bell & Criddle 1984; Johnson 1981; Alexandre 1977).
13. Rivalry among the various leaders of the moderate Left was intense; anecdotes of
the personal nature of this rivalry are rife in the descriptive literature (Du Roy & Schneider
1982; Alexandre 1977). It is important to note that this rivalry did not prevent the merg-
er. As a result, one should be wary of the ‘personal animosity’ story as an explanation for
coordination failure.
14. It is important to remember that the 1986 election was held under a proportional
representation system. It is worth stating, though, that there is some doubt as to how many
of the French voters actually realized this prior to the election. The simulation would cer-
tainly be more useful had the poll been taken during an election held under the usual two-
round system.
15. Analysts of French politics often refer to the parties on the right using a typology
developed by René Rémond (1982), according to which the Right has been divided since
Napoleon into Orleanist, Bonapartist, and Monarchist wings. In recent years, references to
this typology have diminished. For a further discussion, see Golder (2000).
16. There were seven candidates representing the Right. See http://www.election
-politique.com for a complete listing of candidates and results.
17. So far, the National Front has not managed to win seats in the legislature, with the
exception of 35 seats in the 1986 proportional representation elections.
18. As one might expect, these electoral agreements are often a source of conflict
between the party elites and the local candidates.
19. Both Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung were confident of at least receiving the
votes from their own native region (Im 2000; Nam 1989, 196; Dong 1988, 181–82).
20. Although the Korean system is often treated as presidential (Przeworski et al.
2000), it does have a prime minister subject to the approval of parliament. The president
is not responsible to parliament and does not have the ability to dissolve it. The govern-
ment of the prime minister can be brought down, though, by a vote of no confidence. In
many ways, this system is similar to that used in France. The main difference is that the
South Korean president does not have the power to dissolve the parliament, as the French
president does.
21. In the absence of ideological conflict, regional distinctions have become central to
much of Korean politics. Regional antagonisms were encouraged during Park Chung Hee’s
reign (Nam 1989, 279, 316–17). This applies particularly to the split between the Cholla
region and the rest of the country. Morriss (1996) argues that regional voting did not devel-
op before the 1970s but has grown rapidly since then. He emphasizes that this pattern is a
political construct, since there are no intrinsic regional differences, and that in “the absence
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of other socio-economic cleavages, regional attachments provide a way for leaders to dif-
ferentiate themselves, and a basis on which to appeal to their supporters.”
22. Kim Dae Jung also promised to change the institutional setup and create more of
a parliamentary regime in which the president would have no more than a ceremonial role
(Diamond & Shin 2000; Kim 2000b). Since parliament was controlled by Kim Young
Sam’s party at the time, it would obviously be difficult to get such a measure passed. As a
result, this second promise was never entirely credible.
23. Kim Young Sam’s long-term rival, Kim Dae Jung, came second with 33.8% of the
vote, while Chung Ju Yung came third with 16.3%.
24. Shortly before the election, though, Chung abruptly ended his alliance with Roh.
Despite this change, Roh still won the election.
Notes to Chapter 6
1. Kaminski (2001) has used a similar survey approach to the one suggested here to
analyze coalition stability in Poland.
2. Dyadic data is also the format of choice in the international relations literature
addressing coalition or alliance behavior.
3. ‘Government potential’ refers to a party that is a former, actual, or (realistically)
possible member of government. ‘Blackmail potential’ refers to a party that is able to affect
the tactics of party competition among government-oriented parties (Budge et al. 2001,
216). The Budge et al. criteria are themselves drawn from Sartori (1976).
4. Random effects are similar to fixed effects in that they are both used to model
unobserved heterogeneity. However, they measure unobserved heterogeneity in different
ways. The fixed effects model introduces dummy variables, essentially modeling unob-
served heterogeneity as an intercept shift. In contrast, a random effects estimation models
unobserved heterogeneity with an additional disturbance term that is drawn from a normal
distribution with mean zero. There are at least two reasons why random effects are prefer-
able here. Theoretically, a random-effects specification is more appropriate when inferences
are being made about a population on the basis of a sample as is the case here (Greene
2003; Hsiao 2003). More practically, running a fixed-effects model by election would
mean that all elections in which no pre-electoral coalition formed would be dropped.
Doing so would leave me with only 37% of the observations and potentially introduces
selection bias.
5. The log-likelihood from the model with random effects is !625.79, while the log-
likelihood from the model without them is !681.29. This gives a x 2 statistic of 111.0, i.e.,
2(!625.79 + 681.29) = 111.0. The p-value of obtaining a x 2 statistic of this magnitude or
larger if the random effects are not required is less than .0001, with one degree of freedom.
This result strongly suggests that random effects should be retained.
6. Confidence intervals are based on simulations using 10,000 draws from the esti-
mated coefficient vector and variance-covariance matrix.
7. One might also wonder about the predictive power of my analysis. As with all rare
event data, the predicted probability of a pre-electoral coalition forming is quite low (King
& Zeng 2001). However, the results from my analysis show that the mean predicted prob-
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ability of an electoral coalition forming for those dyads that actually did form an electoral
coalition (.10) is twice as large as the mean predicted probability for those dyads that did
not form a coalition (.05). The fact that simulations show that we can be highly confident
(greater than 99%) that these mean predicted probabilities are different provides support
for the predictive power of my analysis.
8. I show the effect of a change in Polarization by one standard deviation from its mean
both when Effective Threshold is at its minimum value and when it is at its maximum value.
This result shows the effect of a reasonable change in Polarization over the whole range of val-
ues of Effective Threshold in the sample. I do this for the other interacted variables as well.
Notes to Chapter 7
1. See Martin & Stevenson (2001, 38) for a discussion of the reasons why more tra-
ditional regression methods are unsuitable for analyzing which parties enter government.
2. Martin & Stevenson do, in fact, code some potential government coalitions as
being based on pre-electoral agreements during inter-election periods. They do not discuss
the justification for coding these observations in this way.
3. The test essentially involves comparing the estimated parameters produced by a
fully specified model (all potential choices are included) with the estimated parameters
from a model where the set of choices is restricted (some choices have been dropped). If
IIA holds and the dropped choices are irrelevant, then the estimates of the model parame-
ters will be the same. While Martin & Stevenson conducted their test by randomly drop-
ping 20% of the potential government coalitions, I employed a more stringent test and ran-
domly dropped 50% of the potential governments. I then repeated this procedure 50 times
to make sure that the randomization procedure did not produce an unusual answer. If the
p-value from the test is less than .05, then the null hypothesis of IIA is rejected. The aver-
age p-values from the 50 tests for the four models that I estimated in table 7.1 range from
.69 to .89. I also conducted more stringent tests, where I dropped more than 50% of the
potential government coalitions; I was still unable to reject the IIA assumption.
4. By the same logic, one might also worry about the omission of Investiture from the
model, since this variable is interacted with Minority status. However, Investiture does not
vary across the choices for a given formation opportunity, and including it along with its
interaction with Minority status would lead to perfect multi-collinearity. Thus, omitting
the constitutive term Investiture is appropriate and necessary in this particular case
(Brambor, Clark, & Golder 2006).
5. Martin & Stevenson draw this same inference, but in slightly different terms. They
state that “[v]ery strong parties do tend to get into government and, even more, to rule
alone” (2001, 46).
6. The inclusion of the constitutive term Single Party also affects some of the other
coefficients. For example, it increases the size of the coefficient on Minimal Winning
Coalitions by 43% and reduces the size of the coefficient on Ideological Divisions by 26%.
This is just further evidence of the bias arising from the omission of Single Party in Model
1.
7. These two claims cannot be verified by simply looking at the results in Model 3
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and comparing them to those in Model 2. However, the results from a model in which I
interact all of the variables in table 7.1 with a Post-Election dummy variable do support
these claims—the coefficients on the interaction terms Minimal Winning Coalition × Post-
Election and Pre-Electoral Pact × Post-Election are both positive and significant in this model.
These results are not shown.
8. The odds that a potential coalition becomes the government if it is based on a pre-
electoral coalition compared to the exact same potential coalition that is not based on an
electoral pact is calculated as        where bPEC is the coefficient on the Pre-Electoral
Coalition variable in table 7.1 (Long 1997, 168–70).
9. In addition, non-political factors such as holidays affect the length of time between
the election and the date the new government takes office. For instance, forming the
German government at the end of the year in 1990 took extra time because of the
Christmas holidays (Saalfeld 2000, 48).
10. The data in table 7.2 refer only to governments that formed after an election.
Governments also form in inter-election periods after a cabinet falls. The mean length of
time that it takes to form a government in an inter-election period is only 13.5 days. A dif-
ference in means test indicates that we can be well over 99% confident that governments
that form after an election take a much longer time to take office than those that form in
an inter-election period.
11. The hazard rate has two components. The first is a set of covariates that are
hypothesized to systematically affect the timing of an event. The second is the baseline haz-
ard function that indicates the rate of event occurrence when all the covariates are zero, i.e.,
the baseline hazard reflects how the rate of event occurrence changes with time only
(Martin & Vanberg 2003).
12. The results from a generalized gamma model, as well as an examination of the Cox-
Snell residuals, indicate that the Weibull model is appropriate for examining the duration of
government formation (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004, 41–43, 124–25, 137–39). The fact
that the results from a Cox proportional hazards model are qualitatively similar to those that
I obtain from the Weibull model indicates that I can be particularly confident that my results
are not dependent on my choice of the Weibull distribution to parameterize the baseline haz-
ard function. This is because the Cox model does not have to specify a particular distribution
of the hazard rate. The results from estimating the Cox model also indicate that the propor-
tional hazards assumption underlying both the Weibull and Cox models is not violated—the
p-value from the global test of the Schoenfeld residuals is .21 (Grambsch & Therneau 1994;
Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004; Cleves, Gould, & Gutierrez 2004, 178–80).
13. See http://www.pol.umu.se/ccpd/.
14. Figure 7.1 illustrates the change in expected duration as the Pre-Electoral Coalition
variable goes from 0 to 1 across the range of observed values for Government Parties. The
change in expected duration in the Weibull model for a given number of Government
Parties is calculated as:
E(TPEC=0|Parties) ! E(TPEC=1|Parties) =
(7.2)
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where l = exb is a scale parameter, r is a shape parameter, and G is the gamma function.
Confidence intervals around this change in expected duration are based on simulations
using 10,000 draws from the estimated coefficient vector and variance-covariance matrix.
Change in expected duration and confidence intervals are then calculated for all of the
observed values of Government Parties, and these values are then plotted in figure 7.1.
15. In addition to using the Ideological Range variable, I also examined whether the
Ideological Spread and Ideological Connectedness of the incoming government affected the
duration of the government formation process. I found no evidence that they did. These
additional variables are described in some detail in the next section.
16. I should note, though, that the 1977 Spanish government was actually based on a
14-party pre-electoral coalition. The problem is that the ideological data from the
Manifesto Research Group have this government coded as a single party even though the
parties did not merge until 1978.
17. As Laver (2003, 30) notes in a recent review article on government duration and
termination, scholars have “tended to assemble a portfolio of independent variables gleaned
from previous published work and the author’s own ideas, each given a brief ad hoc ‘theo-
retical’ justification in its own terms. But the set of independent variables taken as a whole
does not amount to the empirical elaboration of a coherent model of government termi-
nation.”
18. In some cases, both sets of scholars will find a model and sample that support their
‘contradictory’ theoretical claims. For example, Strøm (1985) argues and finds that the
number of days of ‘crisis’ before a government forms increases cabinet duration, while King
et al. (1990) argue and find that the same variable actually decreases cabinet duration.
19. For example, much of the debate over questions of government duration has cen-
tered on the advantages of survival analysis as compared to ordinary least squares regression
(King et al. 1990), whether the hazard rate is rising or falling and how it should be inter-
preted (Alt & King 1994; Warwick 1992, 1994; Beck 1998), and whether analysts should
be employing a competing risks model or not (Diermeier & Stevenson 1999).
20. While Warwick (1994, 42) seems aware of some these problems, this does not
change the fact that this type of procedure is problematic in the presence of multi-collinear-
ity and leads to confidence intervals that are too small and p-values that cannot be inter-
preted in the usual way (Altman & Andersen 1989). Another problem is that this elimina-
tion procedure cannot distinguish between predictors of direct substantive interest and
those whose effects one wants to control for (Singer & Willett 2003). Moreover, the end
result is a model that tends to be sample specific. This last point may help to explain why
the results from government duration models are not always robust across different sam-
ples.
21. Warwick does provide measures for different definitions of the government; he just
prefers the more inclusive definition stated above.
22. The principal reason for employing the Weibull model earlier was that it made it
easier to evaluate the conditional effect of pre-electoral coalitions on government bargain-
ing delays in figure 7.1.
23. Censoring issues occur when the analyst does not observe the end of a duration peri-
od (right-censoring), while truncation issues occur when the analyst does not observe the
duration of an observation that occurs prior to the start point of the data (left-truncation).
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24. Although Warwick’s data actually start in 1945, I only have data on pre-electoral
coalitions from 1946.
25. Another source of data commonly used in the government duration literature is
King et al. (1990). These data measure government duration in months, whereas the two
data sources that I employed measure it in days. Since the data provided by King et al. are
less accurate, I did not use them in my analysis.
26. Competing risks (or multiple destination) models take account of the fact that
observations can terminate in different ways (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004). I employ
a latent survivor time approach to the competing risks problem where there are two spe-
cific destination states (dissolution or replacement), each of which has a latent failure time
associated with it for each observation (Diermeier & Stevenson 1999).
27. I have already shown in previous sections that pre-electoral coalitions increase the
ideological compatibility of governments and shorten the length of time that it takes to
form a government. As a result, one might reasonably wonder if the effect of pre-electoral
coalitions on government survival is being muted by the fact that I include Ideological
Range and Formation Attempts as independent variables in table 7.5. However, analyses
where I drop Ideological Range and Formation Attempts do not change my inferences.
28. The ‘––––’ symbol for the risk of dissolution indicates that the coefficient on
Caretaker Government tends toward infinity, because there are no cases (Warwick data) or
only one case (PDDA data) of a caretaker government that forms after an election ending
in dissolution (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004, 171). The one case of a caretaker govern-
ment ending in dissolution in the PDDA data occurs in Iceland in 1959. Since the cate-
gorization of this particular government is open to interpretation, I should note that my
results do not change if this government is not classified as a caretaker government
(Indriðason 2004).
29. A cursory glance at the data reveals that Warwick and PDDA often measure the
number of foiled formation attempts for the same governments differently. In fact, the cor-
relation between the Warwick and PDDA variables is only 0.54.
Notes to Chapter 8
1. There are a few exceptions, of course. For example, Powell (2000) makes a point
of considering both single parties and pre-electoral coalitions in ‘majoritarian’ democracies.
He does so because he is interested in the identifiability of government alternatives.
However, a more typical example is Laver and Schofield (1998, 1). Although they include
a nice discussion of pre-electoral coalitions in their book on multi-party government, they
still state that the “[t]he special forms of bargaining and negotiation that characterize the
politics of coalition can be found after nearly every election that does not produce an unas-
sailable ‘winner’ in the shape of a single party that controls a majority of the seats in the
legislature.” Emphasis added.
2. This suggests that a cooperative game-theoretic approach where coalitions auto-
matically form whenever they are expected to be super-additive in seats or votes (Kaminski
2001) is less appropriate for modeling electoral coalition formation than the non-coopera-
tive approach that I employ in this book.
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